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Introduction: Beyond Aid – 
The Future of Development 
Cooperation
Jing Gu1 and Naohiro Kitano2
Abstract This introduction explains the rationale behind this issue of the 
IDS Bulletin, and identifies the key issues and research questions addressed 
by the contributors. In so doing, it identifies the emerging outlook of 
future international development cooperation, such as the new model, 
approaches, and characteristics of international development cooperation 
embodied by the traditional and emerging donors. This introduction notes 
the economic, political, and development trajectories of international 
development cooperation, and explores how the changing dynamics affect 
the future of these partnerships. It also presents the central argument that 
runs throughout the studies; namely, that whilst the ‘emerging economies’ 
have excited worldwide attention, and scholarly and policy interest, 
there has been an over-concentration on a limited number of ‘emerging 
donors’, particularly the BRICS economies, a consequential neglect and 
underestimation of the importance of the wider range of ‘new donors’, and 
a pressing need for a more holistic approach to analysis and understanding.
Keywords: development cooperation, global partnership, knowledge 
creation, emerging donors, BRICS, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Mexico.
This issue examines the breadth and diversity of  what have come to be 
termed ‘emerging donors’, and seeks to provide a counter to a debilitating 
asymmetry in the existing conventional analysis, understanding, and 
policy approach to these donors. The respective studies in this IDS Bulletin 
explore this in the context of  an evolving international understanding 
of  development assistance that seeks to move ‘beyond aid’ to encompass 
wider economic development as a key component of  equitable, inclusive, 
and innovative sustainable growth. The premise for moving ‘beyond 
aid’ is that ‘conventional development aid is inadequate to address 
the bottlenecks to growth in many developing and emerging market 
economies’ (Lin and Wang 2017: 1) with the prescription that
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we need to go well beyond aid and purposefully combine aid, 
trade, and investment, using all financial instruments available and 
introducing new and innovative ones to meet the challenges of  
eliminating poverty and transforming industrial structures toward 
green and emission-reducing development (ibid.: 1).
Heiner et al. usefully explain that
as an umbrella term, beyond aid describes different aspects of  the 
transformation of  development cooperation. The transformation is 
particularly pronounced in four dimensions where aid is decreasing 
in relative importance: the proliferation of  actors, the diversification 
of  finance, the shaping of  rules and policies, and the sharing of  
knowledge for development (Heiner, Klingebiel and Paulo 2014: 2).
This issue of  the IDS Bulletin is a result of  a unique collaboration between 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute 
and the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS). This collaboration is itself  
grounded in a shared belief  in the value of  examining the rapidly changing 
international development assistance system by applying a wider and holistic 
lens encompassing the increasingly broad number of  ‘new’ donors. The 
central argument and thread running through this issue is that whilst the 
‘emerging economies’ have generated worldwide attention, scholarly and 
policy interest, there has been an over-concentration on a limited number 
of  the ‘emerging donors’, a consequential neglect and underestimation 
of  the importance of  the wider range of  ‘new donors’, and a pressing 
need for a more holistic analysis and understanding. This collection of  
studies dedicated to highlighting the actual and potential contribution of  a 
wider range of  donors is intended to help compensate for this imbalance 
in the existing literature, contribute to scholarly understanding, and offer 
informative insights for practical policy deliberation.
The key themes of  this issue include:
 l the need to acknowledge, explain, and understand more deeply 
the nature and significance of  a broader spectrum of  donors; i.e. a 
truly holistic perspective and approach, evidenced in this issue in the 
geographical range of  countries covered such as India and Indonesia;
 l the utility of  applying innovative analytical methods, models, and 
frameworks to help explain the complexities of  these cooperation 
relationships;
 l the importance of  domestic experience, and efficient and effective 
policy administration as conditioning, and in some instances 
determining, factors in the formulation and implementation of  the 
development cooperation approaches of  donors;
 l the growing significance of  cooperation between ‘new donors’ 
themselves, beyond high-profile groups such as the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa); and
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 l the need for a continuing process of  data reassessment and updates 
to underpin continuing research.
Almost two decades have passed since the ‘new’ providers of  
development cooperation called ‘emerging donors’ (who later came to 
be called ‘new development partners’ or ‘providers of  South–South 
cooperation’) began to attract the attention of  ‘traditional donors’. 
Initially, ‘emerging donors’ were regarded as ‘rogue aid providers’ 
(Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Naim 2009). Since that initial phase, however, 
there has been a steady accumulation of  scholarly works that have 
enriched our understanding of  the ‘emerging donors’ (Woods 2008; 
Rhee 2011; Watson 2014). Consequently, the focus has expanded to 
cover development assistance activities by BRICS countries as a whole, 
and comprehensive comparisons of  the various features of  ‘emerging’ 
and ‘traditional’ donors have been elaborated on as their economic and 
political roles have solidified (Gu 2017).
More recently still, analysis has refocused to counterbalance the 
conventional wisdom of  treating the BRICS as a homogeneous group. 
This approach has moved to deconstruct this rather homogenised 
approach to understanding this group of  economies in order to 
explore and explain the various heterogeneous dimensions – elements 
of  variability that are also a component characteristic of  the group’s 
evolution – and the implications of  this for the BRICS’ own development, 
as well as for their impact on the wider international system and 
development assistance community (Gu, Shankland and Chenoy 2016). 
Moving beyond the BRICS, the latest acronymic group branded by the 
former Goldman Sach’s economist Jim O’Neill, the person to whom 
authorship of  the BRICS acronym is attributed, are the so-called MINT 
economies of  Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey (BBC 2014).
Despite the extensive and growing literature, analysis, and debate, the 
current status of  knowledge still seems to leave many blind spots, stopping 
short of  asking many relevant questions necessary to delve deeper into 
the realities of  ‘emerging donors’, and to facilitate cooperative and 
mutually beneficial relationships between the two camps. For instance, 
‘emerging donors’ have received perfunctory attention, leaving their 
diverse uniqueness virtually unexplored. Especially, there is a paucity 
of  scholarship focused on the realities of  the development cooperation 
undertaken by many emerging powers other than the BRICS countries. 
Even more challenging, there is insufficient empirically-based evidence 
about the realities of  BRICS development cooperation. For example, we 
are yet to understand the impact of  this cooperation, although the rising 
prominence of  emerging donors is keenly felt on the side of  ‘traditional 
donors’ by its volume of  development assistance, and thus it has been 
one of  the main focal points of  the debate. The difficulty in assessing 
the volume of  development assistance from emerging donors may arise 
from the fact that their notion of  ‘development cooperation’ is different 
from that of  Western donors (Bräutigam 2011; Gu 2015); for example, 
with respect to the role of  the state (Gu et al. 2016a, b). This definitional 
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cleavage is of  increasing importance when more emphasis is placed on 
the role of  development cooperation as a ‘catalyst’ to invoke private 
sector resources for development.
Added to this, our knowledge regarding the contribution of  ‘emerging 
donors’ to the improvement of  good governance in developing countries 
seems sobering. For example, the endeavour by India or emerging 
democracies such as South Africa, Indonesia, and East European 
countries for the consolidation of  democratic governance in other 
developing countries has received relatively less attention. One can 
speculate that behind this paucity of  scholarship lies the unwritten 
assumption that the lessons for development emanate and flow only 
from Western advanced countries, assuming away the possibility 
that developing countries can be reliable sources of  knowledge and 
experience relevant for the economic, political, and social development 
of  fellow developing countries. In other words, the normative concerns 
that have always informed the study of  ‘emerging donors’ were the 
product of  the overestimation by ‘traditional donors’ of  the superiority 
of  their development assistance.
All in all, the task of  delving deeper into the ‘emerging donors’ is 
made difficult by the very dichotomy of  ‘emerging and traditional 
donors’. First, it obscures the enormous diversity in each camp. We can 
reasonably raise the question of  whether the BRICS countries are the 
representative examples of  ‘emerging donors’. Second, it emphasises 
the static picture of  the characteristics and the differences of  each 
camp, and obscures the dynamic nature of  donors and development 
cooperation. Lastly, the dichotomy of  ‘we’ and ‘they’ deflect us from 
introducing the often neglected but nonetheless important viewpoint: 
the viewpoint of  the recipient of  development cooperation.
Bearing that in mind, this collection of  studies seeks to remedy these 
deficiencies of  the current status of  knowledge about ‘emerging donors’, 
by asking the following questions: how diverse are ‘emerging donors’? 
What are the realities of  development cooperation by medium-sized 
emerging powers other than the BRICS? What is the actual picture 
of  the cooperation of  ‘emerging donors’ for the improvement of  good 
governance? How are ‘emerging donors’ changing over time, and how 
do they utilise their experience of  being the development assistance 
recipients to elaborate a distinctive understanding of, and practical 
policy approach to, international development assistance? How do the 
‘traditional donors’ and recipients behave and react to the ‘emerging 
donors’?
Recently, the scholarly and practical debate on ‘emerging donors’ 
has gained renewed currency, stimulated by the establishment of  the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS’ New 
Development Bank (NDB), which was initially seen as a head-on 
challenge to the existing international order of  development cooperation. 
The rationale behind this IDS Bulletin is that the examination of  the 
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above-mentioned questions will contribute to a holistic assessment of  
the impact of  the rise of  the new development partners, and will avoid 
the conventional terminology and thinking characterised by continuing 
usage of  the framing of  ‘we and they’ or ‘self  and others’.
Over the last decade, the global development landscape has changed 
rapidly. There has been a complex mix of  economic globalisation 
and anti-globalisation, new principles, processes and practices, fresh 
multilateral institutions and agencies, international dialogue, and 
cooperative agreements, with their centre of  gravity in the global South, 
as well as the global compacts on sustainable development and climate 
change. This has led governments, practitioners, and academics alike to 
ask whether it is indeed time to move development policy and practice 
‘beyond aid’. As noted above, this term is best understood in terms 
of  the evolution and application of  a broader notion of  development 
assistance to embrace wider economic development and sustainable 
growth, including multilateralised financing, premised on principles of  
equity, inclusivity, and partnership (Reisen 2015).
At the centre of  this evolution, China and other emerging powers 
have emerged as critical players (Mawdsley 2012). They have rapidly 
expanded the financing programmes of  their development cooperation 
and launched new multilateral initiatives and South–South cooperation 
(Stuenkel 2013). From discourse to cooperation modalities to new 
institutions, the emerging powers have served as an influential driver of  
shifting development paradigms (Qobo and Soko 2015). Furthermore, 
as a result of  its overseas activity, development finance has diversified 
beyond official development assistance (ODA), entering recipient 
countries through other channels such as investment and trade.
What are the prospects for a post-2015 global partnership? (Hackenesch 
and Janus 2014). With the growing role of  China, including its ‘Silk 
Roads’ initiative (Gu et al. 2014; Gu 2015), and other non-traditional 
donors such as India (Mawdsley and McCann 2011), many have 
asked what the future of  development cooperation might look like and 
whether a new SDG global partnership might be possible. With this 
increasing diversity of  actors and flows, the development community 
now faces difficult questions about how to move forward and ‘beyond 
aid’ together, in meaningful and effective partnership.
As a consequence, this issue of  the IDS Bulletin examines the diverse 
providers of  development cooperation from various viewpoints. The 
contributors provide a rich and varied menu of  studies around the 
issue’s central themes, bringing fresh insights and understanding 
into today’s rapidly changing domain of  development cooperation. 
The subjects covered in the various articles range from exploring the 
importance of  knowledge in the development cooperation experience 
of  emerging economies such as Indonesia; the challenges involved in 
the policy formulation and implementation of  triangular cooperation 
within a sometimes contradictory set of  processes embedded in 
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South–South cooperation (Quadir 2013); the dynamics of  ‘two-way 
interaction’ between donors and recipients in chains of  knowledge 
creation; and an important reassessment and updating of  the critical 
data upon which estimates of  China’s foreign aid disbursements are 
made and understood in international comparison.
A key aspect of  these studies is the authors’ development and 
application of  fresh analytical approaches with which to deconstruct 
the complexities of  their subjects. For example, Akio Hosono’s article 
deploys an ‘Indonesian model’ through which to assess the effectiveness 
and wider applicability to development cooperation; Naohiro Kitano’s 
article utilises the tool of  ‘regularity’ in the reassessment of  China’s 
gross disbursements of  concessional loans; and Yasutami Shimomura 
and Wang Ping develop a hypothetical model to explain in detail the 
processes by which ‘knowledge creation’ by emerging donors, during the 
time they receive development assistance, becomes a core component 
of  their approach to development cooperation. Each of  the studies 
provide new perspectives into the specific aspects being addressed by 
the authors. However, in looking across the studies, one is struck by 
a common theme, namely the importance the contributors attach to 
understanding development cooperation as a dynamic relationship; 
as an interactive process between the partners, requiring a carefully 
analytical deconstruction of  the complex processes at the heart of  these 
evolving relationships. This is perhaps more evident if  we introduce 
each of  the articles in a little more detail.
The article by Akio Hosono, entitled ‘Potential and Challenges for 
Emerging Development Partners: The Case of  Indonesia’, assesses the 
possible gains as well as the challenges of  development cooperation for 
new development partners, and examines the experience and approach 
of  Indonesia as its case study. The major distinctive features of  
Indonesia’s aid pattern could be summarised as flexible and pragmatic, 
with significant emphasis on technical cooperation, and without a 
strong regional or specific-country focus. The particular interest of  
the study is in the component of  the knowledge of  emerging partners 
in development cooperation. Hosono’s main argument is that there 
is an enormous potential impact to be realised from the accumulated 
knowledge of  the global South, but only if  it is mobilised to its fullest 
extent. To achieve this goal, the author argues that a critical issue is 
‘to identify and make available knowledge that is valuable to those 
countries that need it’. In addition to this potential, the article also notes 
the significant challenges involved.
The importance of  the knowledge component of  emerging partners 
in development cooperation is also the central focus of  the article by 
Yasutami Shimomura and Wang Ping, ‘Chains of  Knowledge Creation 
in the Evolution of  New Donors’. In this closely argued account, the 
authors examine and assess the relationship between aid receiving 
and giving. The study illustrates the importance of  recognising and 
explaining the way that aid recipients have created knowledge during 
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the time they receive aid, and the potential contributions of  emerging 
donors based on their ‘knowledge creation’ during this receiving of  
aid. Drawing on a number of  interesting and valuable case studies, the 
authors’ analysis finds that there is ‘two-way interaction’ that operates 
in the donor–recipient relationship which contributes to the process 
of  knowledge creation. Based on this important insight, the study 
concludes that sharing this experience and knowledge of  receiving 
aid with other developing economies can offer an important source of  
strength as traditional donors essentially lack this source of  influence.
The study provides an important contribution to our understanding 
of  the way that emerging economies as recipients of  aid ‘nurture’ the 
knowledge they gain through these chains of  knowledge creation, and 
then seek to apply it to other countries through their own financial and 
technical cooperation. Also investigating development cooperation 
primarily with a focus on it being a relationship, Jin Sato’s article, 
‘Triangular Cooperation in East Asia: Challenges and Opportunities 
for Japanese Official Development Assistance’, presents a critique of  
the way that triangular cooperation works in practice, assessing the 
balance sheet of  potential benefits and challenges it presents. The study 
addresses an important issue by seeking to explain the ability of  East 
Asian economies to transform ODA institutions. Whilst there is diversity 
across the policy and practice of  Japan, China, and South Korea 
and these have been subject to substantial discussion and critique, it 
is perhaps surprising that their combined cooperative relationships 
have been much less examined. The study focuses on the experiences 
of  JICA, centring on the political dimension and policy formulation, 
and explains what Sato argues is the ‘central importance’ of  power for 
our closer understanding of  how development assistance relationships 
begin, sustain, and evolve.
Drawing upon case study evidence, the author argues that triangular 
cooperation represents a new means by which some donors aim to 
keep their relationships with emerging powers. Where this operates, the 
analysis indicates that South–South cooperation, including triangular 
cooperation, is inherently contradictory due to the realities of  power 
embedded in it, and that primarily this is ‘an effort by the North to 
support South–South cooperation’. The study argues that co-financing 
rather than triangular cooperation offers a potentially more fruitful 
avenue to respond to this challenge. Sato’s study argues that 
co-financing cooperation can have a positive impact on development 
cooperation efficiency and effectiveness. However, the study indicates 
that JICA’s experience demonstrates how constraints can operate, for 
example, in the requirement for prior administrative clearance and a 
rapid turnover of  staff that work to disrupt policy continuity.
Naohiro Kitano’s article, ‘Estimating China’s Foreign Aid Using 
New Data’, provides an important update and corrective to earlier 
assessments. The stated aim of  the study is to provide ‘updated 
estimates of  China’s foreign aid volumes between 2001 and 2014’. 
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This serves as a proxy for China’s ODA defined by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and can be used to compare 
the results with the ODA of  other DAC members. It applies a modified 
methodology to estimate the gross disbursements of  concessional loans 
in the period under review. The principal finding is that there may be 
a ‘weak regularity’ within a cumulative amount of  the framework loan 
agreement, the project loan agreement, and the gross disbursement of  
concessional loans.
Working from this fresh data, the study provides fresh insight and 
understanding into China’s foreign aid volumes in 2012 and 2013. 
Kitano’s study convincingly demonstrates that China’s foreign aid 
volumes were rather less than had previously been assessed. This 
carries implications for the comparative ranking of  disbursements 
of  concessional loans. The analysis indicates that, whilst China was 
ranked number six for these years, the more accurate ranking is at tenth 
in 2012 and ninth in 2013. This study provides an analytical update 
and represents an important adjustment carrying substantial weight 
in deepening our knowledge and understanding for the comparative 
assessment of  ODA disbursements, multilateral aid, and administrative 
budgeting for grants and loans.
Reflecting the aim of  this issue of  the IDS Bulletin to broaden the 
focus of  development cooperation and the ‘new donors’, the article by 
Neil Renwick entitled ‘Emerging Economies, Disaster Risk Reduction, 
and South–South Cooperation: The Case of  Mexico’ examines the 
contribution of  Mexico to reducing the risk of  natural disasters. Mexico 
is a so-called ‘MINT’ emerging economy with a high-risk exposure 
to disaster. The study explains Mexico’s substantial commitment to 
domestic disaster risk reduction and effective engagement in regional 
and global disaster risk management and development cooperation. 
The finding of  the article is that Mexico’s story not only has many 
important positive aspects to contribute to South–South cooperation 
knowledge-sharing and international development cooperation, 
but it also demonstrates the continuing challenges of  financing, 
administration, and politics for emerging and developing economies.
The role of  the emerging economies in development cooperation 
attracts widespread interest, and the questions of  how these economies 
can contribute and how far this is distinctive have generated substantial 
debate. The key interest of  Hiroaki Shiga’s article, ‘India’s Role as a 
Facilitator of  Constitutional Democracy’, is in analysing governance 
in developing countries. The core research question that Shiga poses 
is ‘How can the unique experiences, institutions, norms, and ideas 
of  developing countries contribute to the development and good 
governance of  other developing countries?’. In an illuminating study that 
challenges conventional wisdom and offers a new perspective, the article 
provides a forensic analysis of  the principal characteristics of  Indian 
democratic governance and, particularly, constitutional government.
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Building upon the important insights into India’s political infrastructure 
and political culture, the study then moves on to explore and assess 
India’s role in democratic facilitation and promotion in the context 
of  development assistance. The central argument being put forward 
through the study is that India’s constitutional system and qualities 
of  governance place it in a ‘unique’ position to contribute to good 
governance in other developing countries. This role and its significance, 
it is argued, has been largely ‘underestimated’ in the conventional 
literature and wisdom. Challenging this established viewpoint, 
the article details the extensive countervailing evidence of  India’s 
development cooperation; for example, in its provision of  constitutional 
articulation and drafting.
Following on from this study of  India, two articles broaden the 
analytical scope. The first of  these, by Geovana Zoccal Gomes and 
Paulo Esteves, addresses the impact of  the BRICS group of  economies 
as a component of  South–South cooperation. Entitled ‘The BRICS 
Effect: Impacts of  South–South Cooperation in the Social Field of  
International Development Cooperation’, the article considers the effect 
of  South–South cooperation in the established principles and practices 
of  development cooperation, globally and locally. Using an innovative 
application of  a mode of  analysis, combining the Bourdieusian concept 
of  social fields with current international relations perspectives, 
the article works from the premise that international development 
cooperation is better understood and explained as a social field. In this 
respect, the authors argue that emerging economies such as the BRICS 
offer South–South cooperation as an alternative model for development.
The second article broadening the scope of  analysis is ‘Perspectives 
on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation’ by 
Xiaoyun Li, Jing Gu, Samuel Leistner, and Lídia Cabral. The article 
seeks to identify the reasons behind global development cooperation 
and the challenges which arise. The authors argue that the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) 
created a unique opportunity to combine the advantages and different 
approaches of  North–South and South–South cooperation. The study 
presents a distinctive critique of  GPEDC, putting forward a strong 
case that the GPEDC has been weakened by a lack of  support from 
both the North and South, resulting from a lack of  trust and because 
of  misconceptions among the partner countries. The article specifically 
explains the withholding of  support for the GPEDC by the rising 
powers, by applying a perspective highlighting the difference between 
South–South cooperation and the approach of  Southern development 
assistance within it, and North–South cooperation with ODA by the 
OECD-DAC. The authors argue that the bedrock of  a convincing 
analysis of  effective development cooperation and the contribution 
of  the emerging economies is, necessarily, the availability of  reliable, 
testable data contributing to a deeper and more convincing foundation 
for both scholarly and policy understanding.
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Based on the fresh insights and new understanding offered by these 
studies, this issue of  the IDS Bulletin helps to advance the scholarly study 
of  the new providers of  development cooperation, firstly, by critically 
reviewing the conventional wisdom and, secondly, by introducing new 
perspectives. More fundamentally, this issue questions the explicit and 
implicit underlying assumptions in examining the issue of  development 
cooperation: namely, the dichotomy of  ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ 
donors, and the dominance of  superior knowledge, technologies, 
institutions, and experience of  Western countries. The underlying hope 
is that this IDS Bulletin will also contribute to the enhancement of  a 
better mutual understanding of  ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ donors, 
and thus to the constructive engagement of  both camps; for example, 
in terms of  a continuing process of  dialogue on knowledge-sharing, 
financing, and inclusive growth.
Notes
1 Director of  the Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development 
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Potential and Challenges for 
Emerging Development Partners: 
The Case of Indonesia*
Akio Hosono1
Abstract Emerging development partners can play an extremely important 
role in international cooperation because they have accumulated valuable 
experience and knowledge identifying and implementing their own 
development solutions. The potential impact of accumulated knowledge 
of the South could be enormous – if it is fully mobilised. The objective 
of this article is to gather insights into the potential and challenges in 
development cooperation for new development partners by drawing 
from a case study on Indonesia. Indonesia is a member of the G20 and 
a pioneering emerging development partner that is mainstreaming 
knowledge-centred South–South cooperation. The ‘Indonesian model’ is 
found to be flexible and pragmatic, with a significant emphasis on technical 
cooperation and without a strong regional or specific-country focus. The 
country’s experiences and its innovative use of South–South and triangular 
cooperation (SSTC) might be considered valuable for other emerging 
development partners looking for a modality of effective SSTC.
Keywords: emerging development partners, South–South cooperation, 
triangular cooperation, development cooperation, knowledge-sharing, 
Indonesia.
1 Introduction
Recent literature on development has recognised the importance of  
accumulation of  knowledge and capabilities (Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz 
2009) as well as the creation of  a learning society (Stiglitz and Greenwald 
2014) in order to achieve transformation, and inclusive and sustainable 
growth. From this point of  view, the role of  new development partners 
(often called ‘emerging donors’)2 in international development cooperation 
may be extremely important due to the accumulation of  valuable 
experience and knowledge in identifying and implementing development 
solutions, as well as overcoming difficulties and constraints that developing 
countries face (Hosono 2013). As such, the potential impact of  accumulated 
knowledge of  the South could be enormous – if  it is fully mobilised.
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The objective of  this article is to gather insights into both the potential 
benefits and challenges of  international development cooperation 
for new development partners by drawing from a case study of  
Indonesia. As a member of  the G20 and a pioneering emerging 
country, Indonesia has been taking initiatives to strengthen cooperation 
among the countries of  the South. This article will first provide an 
analytical perspective and discuss key issues related to cooperation with 
other countries of  the South (Section 2). It will then consider three 
dimensions that are crucial for emerging development partners in 
making such cooperation effective: (1) identifying and making valuable 
knowledge and experience available for transfer to the rest of  the South; 
(2) establishing institutional frameworks or systems for international 
cooperation to smoothly share such knowledge and experience; and 
(3) taking advantage of  triangular cooperation involving traditional 
donors to scale up South–South cooperation. Each of  these three 
dimensions will be discussed in Sections 3, 4, and 5. Finally, some 
concluding remarks will be presented in Section 6.
This article focuses on the knowledge/technology component of  
emerging partners in development cooperation, or South–South 
cooperation (SSC). It recognises that SSC also has other components, 
including significant financial assistance, but these components are 
not the focus of  this study. The article also focuses on the specific 
experiences of  Indonesia. This country is one of  the most important 
new development partners3 and has become a pioneer in South–South 
cooperation. Indonesia’s involvement in SSC can be traced back to 1955 
when the country hosted the Asia–African Conference in Bandung. 
The country has effectively scaled up SSC, on many occasions, through 
triangular cooperation (TrC). Therefore, the country’s knowledge and 
experience in relation to the three dimensions mentioned above could 
provide us with valuable clues for formulating strategies of  addressing 
challenges to fully realise the potential impact of  the knowledge of  
the South. In addition, Indonesia’s aid patterns have some distinctive 
features: the country promotes technical cooperation ahead of  
economic/financial cooperation and does not have a strong country 
focus among recipient countries, apart from some exceptional cases such 
as Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, among the several regional groupings to 
which Indonesia belongs, the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) remains the highest priority in Indonesia’s South–South 
cooperation (NCT and JICA 2012: 79).
2 Analytical perspective and key issues
As mentioned in Section 1, this article examines three dimensions 
that are crucial for emerging development partners to effectively 
cooperate with the other countries of  the South: identification of  
valuable knowledge to be shared, institutional frameworks or systems for 
international cooperation to share such knowledge, and scaling up of  
SSC through global, multilateral, and triangular initiatives. These three 
dimensions are closely related, and this article discusses them in a holistic 
manner. Each of  them is discussed below from an analytical perspective.
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2.1 Knowledge and development experience
The outcome document of  the Busan High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness held in November 2011, Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation (henceforth, the Busan outcome document) 
(OECD 2011), emphasises the importance of  South–South cooperation 
and triangular cooperation (SSC/TrC, also abbreviated in Indonesia 
as SSTC). It does so in terms of  knowledge-sharing for sustainable 
development.
The recent literature emphasises that investment in knowledge tends 
to be suboptimal for society, especially in the South (Iizuka, Hosono 
and Katz 2016). Against this backdrop, the considerable and diverse 
knowledge accumulated in the South that has not been provided by the 
traditional donors may be essential for development – experiences that 
were created or developed almost exclusively in the South. Examples of  
such knowledge include the broad range of  appropriate technologies and 
intermediate technologies such as technologies for agriculture in tropical 
climates that cannot be developed in the North. Similarly, knowledge 
related to production based on ‘natural capital’ such as aquaculture, 
agroforestry, livestock, and so on is key for sustainable development 
(Iizuka et al. 2016). Sustainable housing using traditional architecture and 
design and sustainable materials is a good example of  this in the case of  
Indonesia. It also includes knowledge related to ‘bottom of  the pyramid’ 
(BoP) and inclusive businesses (Kato and Hosono 2013).
In summary, the potential impact of  knowledge accumulated in 
the South could be enormous – if  it is fully mobilised. It is critical 
to achieving the goals and targets of  the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Therefore, a key issue is to identify and make available 
knowledge that is valuable to those countries that need it.4
2.2 The national system of development cooperation
New and emerging development partners need effective national 
systems for international cooperation. These could be multi-layered 
from decision-making level to the administrative and coordination level, 
and to field implementation-level experts and organisations, who will be 
the direct providers of  knowledge.5 As Mawdsley stated,
the administration of  foreign aid and development cooperation 
requires trained personnel, legal frameworks, budget lines and 
management, monitoring and evaluation systems and so on… The 
management of  external assistance also requires attention to the 
balance of  responsibilities and power between different domestic 
institutions, and the coordination of  their relevant activities (2012: 93).
However, there is no standard model of  national system of  development 
cooperation.
Even among traditional donors, national systems are diverse. Mawdsley 
(2012: 94–98) compared national systems of  emerging development 
partners, finding great differences between them.
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The key issue here is to establish and strengthen national systems 
of  development cooperation along with the dynamism of  SSC by 
addressing challenges and costs, in order to make development 
cooperation as effective as possible.
2.3 Global, multinational, and triangular initiatives to scale up SSC
The efforts towards development cooperation by emerging development 
partners could be supported by global, multinational, and triangular 
initiatives. In this regard, the Busan outcome document recognised ‘that 
many countries engaged in South–South cooperation both provide and 
receive diverse resources and expertise at the same time, and that this 
should enrich cooperation without affecting a country’s ability to receive 
assistance from others’ (OECD 2011: 10). It then highlighted the four 
factors essential in strengthening the sharing of  knowledge and mutual 
learning: (1) scaling up the use of  triangular approaches to development 
cooperation; (2) making fuller use of  South–South and triangular 
cooperation, recognising the synergies they offer; (3) encouraging the 
development of  networks for knowledge exchange, peer learning, 
and coordination among South–South cooperation actors; and 
(4) supporting efforts to strengthen local and national capacities to 
engage effectively in South–South and triangular cooperation (ibid.: 10).
The key issue here is how to scale up SSC effectively through TrC, and 
global initiatives for knowledge-sharing in the South.
2.4 Research questions
Each of  the key issues mentioned above is related to the basic research 
questions of  this article, drawing on the case of  Indonesia. They are as 
follows: (1) How was valuable knowledge identified and made available 
to beneficiary countries through Indonesia’s development cooperation? 
(2) How was a national system of  development cooperation established 
and strengthened in the country, in a way that kept in step with the 
dynamism of  its SSC to address challenges and costs, in order to make 
the cooperation as effective as possible? (3) How has the development 
cooperation of  Indonesia effectively been scaled up?
3 Knowledge and development experience: how to identify and make 
it available
3.1 The changing context, national vision of cooperation, and 
identification of knowledge to be shared
The first initiative towards policy mainstreaming of  South–South 
cooperation/triangular cooperation in Indonesia began in 2009 
when the Jakarta Commitment presented SSTC as one of  the key 
pillars of  Indonesia’s development effectiveness agenda in its strategic 
vision (NCT 2012: 12; JICA 2013: 6). SSTC was further elevated 
onto the Indonesian domestic development agenda following the 
Jakarta Commitment (JICA 2013: 6).6 In 2010, SSTC became part 
of  the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN). As 
discussed in Section 4, a new inter-ministerial coordination body of  
SSTC, the National Coordinating Team on SSTC (hereafter, NCT) 
was established. Thus, inclusion of  SSTC in the RPJMN definitively 
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clarified its domestic function: SSTC plays an important role in 
promoting domestic development, which was a necessary process 
in gaining domestic support. With the establishment of  NCT, the 
institutional setting was re-defined, though it was not a fully fledged 
solution (JICA 2013: 6–7).
In this new context, the National Seminar on South–South Cooperation 
was held in 2010. According to the resulting NCT document (NCT 
2012: 13), Indonesia’s vision for SSC was for a better partnership 
for prosperity based on the principles of  equality, mutual respect, 
non-conditionality, experience and knowledge-sharing, comparative 
advantage, demand-driven, mutual benefit and opportunity, and 
sustainability. A policy document and its implementation plan of  SSTC 
– called Grand Design (GD) and Blue Print (BP) – were drafted in 2011. 
The BP mentioned the focus of  Indonesia’s cooperation policy in the 
first period of  GD (2011–14), and flagship programmes were defined 
based on need, global challenges, and the ability to contribute to 
national development target achievement (NCT 2012: 17).7
It is important to note that most of  the flagship programmes are based 
on knowledge that was created or developed in the context of  the 
diverse local conditions of  Indonesia: a broad range of  appropriate 
technologies and intermediate technologies are essential components, 
such as technologies for agriculture in tropical climates, disaster risk 
management, and maternal and child health. These cases, together 
with many others, demonstrate Indonesia’s vision of  sharing knowledge 
created or developed endogenously in the process of  overcoming 
difficulties that constrain the development process in the country.
The Vice-Minister of  National Development Planning, Dinarsyah 
Tuwo, as the person in charge of  international cooperation, 
reconfirmed this vision in his speech in March 2012, in which he 
pointed out that,
It is a great momentum for us to maximise the impact of  the 
cooperation which certainly in the previous experiences has 
contributed to so many development issues. Now, it has showed 
that South–South and Triangular Cooperation provide a significant 
support to the sharing knowledge and experiences that have 
been acknowledged extensively in the international forums and 
development cooperation context (Dinarsyah Tuwo 2012: 2).
In the same speech, the Vice-Minister emphasised the changing 
international context: ‘As we are all aware, the global and regional 
position of  our Government is becoming more strategic and significant 
since Indonesia became a member of  the G-20, and has graduated to 
be a middle-income country’ (Dinarsyah Tuwo 2012: 2).
It was within this context that Indonesia led a global initiative to prepare 
an innovative platform of  knowledge-sharing and announced its new 
vision of  international cooperation. The announcement was made 
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on the occasion of  an international conference, the Bali High-Level 
Forum, Country-Led Knowledge Hubs, in July 2012. The then Vice 
President of  Indonesia Mr Boediono announced that Indonesia was 
ready to be a knowledge hub in three areas: development, governance 
and peace-building, and macroeconomic management for sharing 
knowledge with other countries. This initiative is a relevant case in 
which a country identifies the priority area of  knowledge-sharing in 
response to the changing context of  international cooperation.
3.2 Organisations in which knowledge is embodied: centres of excellence8
Knowledge that has been identified as being of  importance for SSTC 
can then be shared with other countries of  the South. The main actors 
of  this process are organisations in which knowledge is embodied. In 
practice, these organisations constitute an essential part of  the national 
system of  cooperation, which will be discussed in Section 4. In spite 
of  their importance, their functions are not properly discussed in the 
existing literature.9 The Nairobi outcome document of  the High-Level 
United Nations Conference on South–South Cooperation in 2010 
encouraged United Nations organisations to assist developing countries 
in enhancing or establishing centres of  excellence in their respective 
area of  competence.10
In the case of  Indonesia, many such organisations are referred to 
as ‘implementing agencies’, mostly under the line ministries. The 
Vice-Minister of  National Development Planning stated that,
the Government of  Indonesia has committed to support process 
by sharing the success from the development programmes that for 
so many years have been supported by development aid. These 
programmes have been modified and developed further using the 
local knowledge and expertise. And we expect that this kind of  
mechanism can also be implemented in the knowledge sharing 
process (Dinarsyah Tuwo 2012: 3).
Organisations that implemented such programmes were able to create, 
develop, or adapt knowledge while taking into consideration local 
conditions, and have, therefore, experiences and capabilities of  mutual 
learning and co-creation of  innovative solutions when they share the 
knowledge through SSTC.
The 2012 NCT document (2012) listed more than 50 organisations as 
implementing agencies, many of  which are internationally well known 
and could be considered as centres of  excellence or prospective centres 
of  excellence. Some of  these outstanding centres are listed in Table 1.11 
Actual examples of  SSTC by these and other centres are listed and 
explained in Indonesia’s Capacities on Technical Cooperation (NCT 2012) and 
Indonesia’s Development: Knowledge through Japan’s Cooperation for South–South 
and Triangular Cooperation (JICA 2014).
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4 Institutional frameworks for international cooperation and 
formation of the ‘Indonesia model’
4.1 The formation of institutional frameworks: experiences and challenges
Indonesia’s institutional framework for international cooperation is a 
national system resulting from several initiatives that have been taken 
in different circumstances. The fundamental baseline of  Indonesia’s 
commitment to South–South cooperation can be traced back to the 
‘Asian–African Conference’ in 1955 held in Indonesia, widely known 
as the ‘Bandung Conference’. The conference established the concept 
of  the South and of  cooperation among developing countries, or 
South–South cooperation, for the first time. So, it can be said that SSC 
has its origin in Indonesia’s initiative (JICA 2011: 5), together with 
initiatives from other countries of  the South. Its commitment to SSC 
was renewed with the establishment of  the Non-Aligned Movement 
Centre for South–South Technical Cooperation (NAM-CSSTC) in 
Table 1 Implementing agencies (centres of excellence or prospective centres of excellence)
Centres of excellence Centre’s expertise (knowledge and technology)
Agency for Agricultural Extension and 
Human Resource Development (AAEHRD)
Leading organisation for training in agriculture and horticulture sectors 
with its Education, Training and Extension Centres.
Center for Research on Engineering 
Application in Tropical Agriculture (CREATA, 
Bogor Agricultural University)
Leading organisation for development and application of engineering 
sciences to create appropriate technology for development of sustainable 
tropical agriculture.
Main Centre of Brackishwater Aquaculture 
Development (MCBAD)
Aquaculture technology for brackish environments focusing on shrimp, fish, 
swimmer crabs and mud crabs, bivalves, and seaweed.
Gondol Research Institute for Mariculture 
(RIM)
Mariculture technology such as hatchery and culture, brood-stock 
transportation, finfish breeding, and so forth. 
People Centered Business and Economic 
Institute (IBEKA)
Leading organisation (Indonesian NGO) in the field of micro-hydro power 
as well as social development, training programmes, biogas, and clean 
water supply.
Research Institute for Human Settlement 
(RIHS) 
Appropriate technology for sustainable low-cost housing, technology 
of developing local building materials, technology of clean water and 
sustainable sanitation in tropical areas, and planning of earthquake-resistant 
buildings.
Sabo Technical Center Technology and knowledge on mitigation of sediment-related disaster 
damage, pyroclastic flow management and integrated sediment-related 
disaster management, and so forth.
Center of Brantas River Basin Leading organisation for river basin development and management. 
Technology for water management, including flood control, and water 
distribution to meet the needs of irrigation, electricity, watershed 
management, land rehabilitation and so forth.
Bio Farma The only vaccine manufacturer in Southeast Asia that produces all complete 
vaccines needed for the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) in one 
location.
Electronics Engineering Polytechnic 
Institute of Surabaya (EEPIS-ITS)
Vocational education and applied technology in the field of electronics 
engineering; also renowned for its excellence in the field of robotics as 
well as information technology. 
Source Author’s own.
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Jakarta in 1995 at the initiative of  the governments of  Indonesia and 
Brunei Darussalam, with the aim of  pooling and collecting all resources 
and abilities available in developing countries for mutual support to 
accelerate national development in each country (JICA 2014: 2).
Following the development of  the basic concepts of  SSC at the Bandung 
Conference, Indonesia’s engagements in SSC and SSTC began in 
1981. The Coordinating Committee of  International Cooperation 
(CCITC) was established as the coordinating body of  SSTC, headed 
by the Cabinet Secretariat (currently the State Secretariat) as the core 
institution. However, after the Asian financial crisis in 1998,
the national coordination mechanism almost collapsed due to the 
decline of  activities because most of  the national budget at that time 
was diverted to domestic development and even after the country’s 
recovery from the crisis, the lack of  national coordination continued 
(JICA 2013: 6).
In re-establishing the institutional framework for a national system, 
important momentum was provided by the Jakarta Commitment in 
2009. This reiterated the significance of  ‘SSTC as one of  the key pillars 
of  Indonesia’s development effectiveness agenda in the strategic vision’ 
Beneficiary countries
Implementing 
agencies*
Line ministries
NGO, private sectors
Donors
MOF
Bappenas SETNEGMOFA
Core ministries 
of National 
Coordination Team 
(NCT)
Figure 1 Institutional framework of Indonesia’s SSTC
Notes *Including centres of excellence; dotted arrowed lines: budget flow; dashed arrowed lines: logistic support; solid 
arrowed lines: knowledge-sharing.  
Source Author’s own, based on NCT and JICA (2012).
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(JICA 2013: 6). A year after the Jakarta Commitment, two important 
steps were taken: (1) SSTC became part of  the National Medium-Term 
Development Plan (PRJMN), which clearly pointed out the ‘necessity 
of  articulating a long-term vision of  how Indonesia optimises the 
utilisation of  SSTC’ (JICA 2013: 6); and (2) a new inter-ministerial 
coordination body of  SSTC, the National Coordination Team on 
South–South and Triangular Cooperation (NCT), was established by 
ministerial decree from the National Development Planning Agency 
(Bappenas) in 2010. The NCT consists of  four core ministries: 
Bappenas, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of  
State Secretariat (SETNEG) and the Ministry of  Finance (MOF). These 
two decisions could be considered milestones in the establishment 
of  the current national system of  international cooperation in the 
country. Two years later, the Directorate of  International Development 
Cooperation was established in Bappenas to lead the initiative and 
chair the Technical Committee of  NCT. This institutional framework is 
illustrated in Figure 1.
The NCT is organised based on the following structure:12 The 
Steering Team works at the decision-making level, with Bappenas 
and the MOFA as chairs. At the technical level (or administrative and 
coordination level), the Technical Committee is organised with the 
Director of  International Development Cooperation of  Bappenas 
as its chair and directors of  the four institutions of  SETNEG, MOF, 
MOFA, and Bappenas as Vice-Chairs. Under the Technical Committee, 
three working groups were set up: Working Group 1 on Institutional 
Framework; Working Group 2 on Programme and Funding; and 
Working Group 3 on Monitoring, Evaluation, and Knowledge 
Management.
The implementation mechanisms of  SSTC have been placed under 
the NCT. Eleven line ministries participate in technical cooperation. 
They are SETNEG, the MOFA, the Ministry of  Agriculture (MOA), 
the Ministry of  Trade, the Ministry of  Forestry, the National Family 
Planning Agency (BKKBN), the Ministry of  Public Works, the Ministry 
of  Communications and Information Technology, the Ministry 
of  National Education, and the Ministry of  Health. Under these 
ministries, there are many organisations referred to as ‘implementation 
agencies’ in NCT documents (NCT 2012).
As line ministries and the implementing agencies under their 
jurisdiction are the direct actors engaging in SSC, the coordination 
between NCT and line ministries at both the decision-making level 
and technical coordination level, and the coordination between the line 
ministries and implementation agencies at the implementation level 
in the field is considered essential in strengthening the national system 
of  SSC. Furthermore, strengthening of  the mechanisms to facilitate 
SSC at the implementation level appears to be crucial in effectively 
promoting Indonesia’s international cooperation. This could be one of  
the major challenges in enhancing the Indonesian capacity for SSC.
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4.2 The relationship between technical cooperation and economic/
financial cooperation
It is important to notice that so far, the Indonesian government has 
promoted technical cooperation (Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries, TCDC, the term used in Indonesian documents) 
ahead of  economic/financial cooperation (Economic Cooperation 
among Developing Countries, ECDC, the term used in Indonesian 
documents). There is an intention to consider ECDC at a later date 
(NCT and JICA 2012: 23). Reasons for this stance of  the government 
are, among other things, that ECDC requires the participation of  
various stakeholders, including the private sector; some parties have 
been reluctant to provide loans to other countries because of  the 
financial crisis Indonesia suffered (NCT and JICA 2012: 23).
The NCT and JICA (2012) study states in this regard that,
it is important to consider the Indonesian way of  ECDC, taking into 
account of  what is needed by the private sector that could not be 
supplied by the existing private  sector. It is worth considering the 
strategic utilization of  EXIM bank for the purpose of  domestic 
development in relation to SSC in the long run (NCT and JICA 
2012: 23).13
However, the study mentions that, in order for the Exim Bank to 
provide ECDC, the ‘government’s clear policy and adequate funding 
are crucially needed’ (NCT and JICA 2012: 84). In this regard, the 
NCT presently ‘focuses on TCDC, but would like to include ECDC in 
SSC in future’ (NCT and JICA 2012: 82).
4.3 Outstanding features of the ‘Indonesian model’
Although there is a large amount of  literature on China and India, 
beyond these two major Southern providers, literature dealing with 
Asian emerging donors is scarce.14 As such, it is not easy to identify 
rigidly distinctive features of  Indonesia’s development cooperation. 
However, two recent studies appear to be relevant for this purpose. 
Kondoh et al. (2010) focus largely on ‘aid patterns’, a term that refers 
to the institutionalised orientation of  the aid policies and institutions 
that are specific to an individual donor (Kondoh et al. 2010: 5). 
Although the present article does not aim to make a strict comparative 
analysis between Indonesia and other emerging donors, the conceptual 
framework of  aid patterns utilised in the study provides a useful 
analytical perspective in highlighting some of  the outstanding features 
of  Indonesia’s SSC compared to that of  other major Asian emerging 
donors. This article also referred to a comparative study on Thailand, 
Brazil, and Indonesia by NCT and JICA on the management of  SSC 
(NCT and JICA 2012).
From the ‘aid patterns’ analytical perspective, at least the following 
characteristics of  Indonesia’s pattern (or model) can be identified.15 
First, the basic approach of  the Indonesian model could be considered 
flexible and pragmatic. As was discussed previously, SSC concepts can 
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be traced back to the Bandung Conference and a commitment to SSC 
has been reconfirmed on different occasions. However, its institutional 
framework, including the orientation of  cooperation policies, has been 
flexibly enhanced in response to changing contexts. Second, Indonesia’s 
model promotes technical cooperation ahead of  economic/financial 
cooperation. Third, a regional preference or a specific-country focus 
has not generally been observed in the Indonesian model, apart from 
some exceptional cases such as Timor-Leste. Fourth, it scales up SSC, in 
many occasions, through triangular cooperation.
As a result, the Indonesian model can be said to have a strong emphasis 
on technical cooperation, and its international cooperation could be 
considered to be a ‘knowledge-centred’ approach.
5 Scaling up of knowledge-centred SSC
5.1 Efforts to address the challenges of scaling up
As was previously mentioned, since the Jakarta Commitment in 2009, 
efforts have been aimed at strengthening the institutional framework to 
scale up SSC. In the same year, a workshop on South–South technical 
cooperation organised by the MOFA, SETNEG, NAM-CSSTC, and 
JICA identified the following three challenges to SSC in Indonesia: 
(1) mainstreaming SSC in the National Policy; (2) enhancing human 
resources for international cooperation; and (3) improving the quality of  
SSC (Shimoda and Nakazawa 2012: 155).
5.2 Scaling up SSC through TrC
The Busan outcome document (OECD 2011) highlighted the 
importance of  TrC in scaling up SSC, emphasising that the sharing 
of  knowledge and mutual learning be strengthened by scaling up, 
where appropriate, the use of  triangular approaches to development 
cooperation.
In the context of  Indonesia, some challenges – particularly related to 
budgets and funding – could be addressed by the triangular approach. 
Scaling up SSC typically depends, first, on financing often significant 
fixed costs incurred in developing and testing innovative technological 
interventions and, second, on keeping variable costs low so that an 
expanded scale of  activities fits within the country’s resource constraints 
(Hosono 2013: 240).
However, scaling up SSC through TrC extends far beyond addressing 
the financial constraints. One approach is to scale up through Southern 
centres of  excellence that specialise in particular fields. The Northern 
partner in a triangular cooperation programme provides assistance in 
strengthening such centres in the Southern partner, which in turn can 
share knowledge and cooperate with other developing countries (the 
beneficiaries of  triangular cooperation). The benefits come from the 
creation of  knowledge by centres of  excellence, from the adaptation 
of  global knowledge to developing countries’ conditions, and from cost 
savings when assistance is extended by the centres to other developing 
countries (Hosono 2013: 241–42). Furthermore, these centres of  
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excellence may obtain additional benefits from this approach. The 
mutual learning process enables them to achieve a deep understanding 
of  the potential and challenges of  beneficiary countries and to establish 
a reliable network of  specialists (Hosono 2013: 248). These centres may 
be able to accomplish a pivotal role in scaling up SSC through TrC.16
In this regard, it is important to note that Indonesia rather prefers to 
use the word ‘share’ in order to maintain an equal partnership, and the 
country is reluctant use the word ‘teach’ to other countries (NCT and 
JICA 2012: 23). Indonesia’s view is that ‘Remembering the experiences 
of  a recipient country, Indonesia could learn from recipient countries 
through SSC and be a spokesperson for developing countries at G20 as a 
representative of  Asian developing countries’ (NCT and JICA 2012: 23).
As stated in Section 3 of  this article, ‘many centres of  excellence were 
established in Indonesia, and the knowledge acquired in these centres 
was considered as an asset that was well adapted to the local context of  
Indonesia’ (JICA 2011: 7). Some of  these assets are deeply rooted in the 
Indonesian context, but are able to be transformed into technologies 
applicable to other developing countries since they were being adapted 
from a society closer to other developing countries (JICA 2011: 7–8).17
It is worth noting that in the case of  Indonesian and Japanese triangular 
cooperation, a ‘Model of  Triangular Cooperation’ with a set of  principles 
as a guideline of  TrC has been established through day-to-day operations 
of  engagement between the two countries and communication with 
other developing countries (JICA 2013: 10–11).18 This model could be 
considered innovative and promising in addressing the challenges of  
TrC, including managing transaction costs, while assuring effectiveness, a 
demand-driven approach, and quality of  knowledge transfer.
The partnership programme (PP) of  the Southern partner and the 
Northern partner could be one of  the more structured approaches to 
dealing with the challenges of  SSTC, such as high transaction costs, 
supply-driven bias, duplication and so on. The PP modality promoted 
by Japan provides a common framework within which a Southern 
provider country (or pivotal country) and Northern development 
partner country can jointly implement cooperation for beneficiary 
countries, while also allowing the two countries to share their knowledge 
and experience in aid management. The PP has resulted in a more 
coordinated and systematic modality of  knowledge-sharing, due to 
joint planning and periodic consultation between the two countries and 
to a combination of  cooperation schemes, such as triangular training 
programmes, third-country experts, joint projects, and others (Hosono 
2013: 249). The Japan–Indonesia Partnership Programme (JIPP) was set 
up in 2003, under which annual meetings have been held.
Germany, another major partner country for Indonesia’s SSTC through 
the German development agency GIZ, supported the formation of  the 
Aid Information Management System (AIMS) in Indonesia. In addition 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 3 July 2018: ‘Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation’ 13–30 | 25
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
to Germany and Japan, some other countries have recently started 
SSTC with Indonesia.
International organisations have started initiatives to support Indonesia’s 
SSTC. UNDP has supported Bappenas through the Enhancing 
Capacity for Better Aid Management project (ECBAM-UNDP). The 
World Bank has facilitated South–South knowledge exchange through 
the Global Distance Learning Network (GDLN) in many countries, 
including Indonesia, and more recently through the South–South 
Experience Exchange Facility (Shimoda and Nakazawa 2012: 154).
5.3 Scaling up SSC through regional, multilateral, and global networks
A new and innovative platform for knowledge-sharing called the 
Community of  Practice (CoP) was established in 2013. The preparation 
of  this global initiative was led by the Government of  Indonesia. 
It is a web-based knowledge-sharing platform for practitioners of  
SSTC in which Indonesia, the World Bank, JICA, UNDP and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) participate. The platform enables 
the practitioners to exchange ideas, post knowledge, and learn from 
one another (JICA 2013: 16). This platform is an outcome of  the Bali 
High-Level Forum, Country-Led Knowledge Hubs.19
6 Concluding remarks
The answers to the three research questions derived from the analytical 
perspective of  this article could be summarised as follows.
Regarding the identification and availability of  knowledge to be shared, 
efforts have been made in Indonesia to identify such knowledge through 
the lens of  the country’s national vision of  international cooperation in 
response to changing contexts. First, flagship programmes are defined 
based on need, global challenges, and the ability to contribute to 
national development target achievement. Most flagship programmes 
are based on knowledge that has been created or developed in the 
context of  the diverse local conditions of  Indonesia. More recently, the 
country announced new priority areas for SSTC such as governance 
and peace-building, macroeconomic management, and development, 
thereby identifying its comparative advantage. The National 
Coordinating Team listed more than 50 implementing agencies as 
organisations in which knowledge is embodied and can be shared. 
Each of  the organisations could be considered a centre of  excellence 
or prospective centre of  excellence in its respective areas. As such, the 
country recognises its strength and potential for knowledge-sharing in 
changing international contexts. Efforts have been made to ensure that 
the knowledge identified is sharable and knowledge management for 
SSTC has been introduced.
As for the establishment of  an institutional framework for a national 
system of  international cooperation, important steps have been taken 
to create a National Coordinating Team through the ministerial decree 
of  Bappenas, consisting of  four core ministries. At the same time, 
SSTC is now being mainstreamed, thus becoming part of  the National 
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Medium-Term Development Plan. Although further enhancement 
and strengthening of  the institutional framework is still needed, these 
two decisions could be considered a milestone in steps towards a fully 
fledged national system. From a comparative perspective with other 
Asian emerging development partners, the major distinctive features 
of  Indonesia’s aid pattern or the ‘Indonesian model’, as discussed 
previously, could be provisionally summarised as flexible and pragmatic, 
with significant emphasis on technical cooperation, and without a strong 
regional or specific-country focus.
Regarding the scale-up of  SSC through TrC, several new initiatives 
have been carried out. For example, it is worth noting that in the 
case of  Indonesian and Japanese triangular cooperation, a ‘Model of  
Triangular Cooperation’ with a set of  principles as a guideline of  TrC 
has been established.
Based on these findings, we could highlight the role of  Indonesia 
as a pioneering emerging development partner in mainstreaming 
knowledge-centred SSC. This approach could tentatively be called 
the ‘Indonesian model’, which is flexible and pragmatic, while being 
responsive to changing context. It places an emphasis on technical 
cooperation, working without a strong regional or specific-country focus. 
The experiences of  Indonesia with these outstanding characteristics 
might be considered valuable for other emerging developing partners 
looking for a modality of  effective SSTC. However, the country’s 
experiences with its ‘Indonesian model’ approach deserve a more 
in-depth analysis, especially in comparison with other emerging 
development partners. Moreover, the perspective from recipient 
countries could be essential in any further study of  Indonesia’s approach.
Notes
* An earlier version of  this article was produced as a JICA-RI Working 
Paper.
1 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute, 
Tokyo.
2 Regarding use of  the term ‘emerging donors’, see Mawdsley 
(2012: 4–5, 186).
3 Indonesia has taken several initiatives to strengthen SSC. Among the 
most relevant initiatives is the Bali High-Level Forum, Country-Led 
Knowledge Hubs hosted by Indonesia, World Bank, JICA, and 
UNDP in 2012.
4 For basic literature and discussion of  knowledge, transformation and 
South–South cooperation, see Hosono (2013, 2015).
5 For basic literature and discussion of  emerging donor aid patterns, 
see Kondoh et al. (2010). 
6 The Jakarta Commitment was formulated by the Government 
of  Indonesia as an agreement document on aid coordination for 
development effectiveness in 2009. It touched upon SSTC as one of  
the key pillars of  Indonesia’s development effectiveness agenda in its 
strategic vision (JICA 2013: 6).
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7 The flagship programmes are as follows: (1) Agriculture, food 
security, and social protection; (2) Disaster risk management; 
(3) Democratisation and good governance; (4) Trade and industry; 
(5) Infrastructure; (6) Human development (health, education, 
population, gender); (7) Indonesia’s commitment for Palestinian 
development.
8 For centres of  excellence, see Hosono (2013).
9 See for example, Mawdsley (2012).
10 UN (2011: 18).
11 These institutions were selected as examples by the author. For more 
details, see NCT (2012) and JICA (2014).
12 Based on Ministerial Decree of  Bappenas No. KEP.51/
HK/03/2013 dated 25 March 2013 (JICA 2013: 7).
13 The Exim Bank was established by the Government of  Indonesia 
in 2009 in order to support the overseas transactions of  Indonesian 
firms. The Exim Bank has both a commercial wing and an official 
development assistance (ODA) wing with the intention of  expanding 
ODA business by supporting government programmes over the 
long term. However, as a commercially operating entity, the Exim 
Bank cannot take risks associated with providing concessional loans 
to developing countries with high ‘country risks’ (NCT and JICA 
2012: 84).
14 Kondoh et al. (2010: 3) pointed out that, when a Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC) research project was conducted in 
2010 to explain the aid policies and performances of  six major Asian 
emerging donors, there was no substantial literature examining Asian 
emerging donors in detail.
15 Kondoh et al. (2010: 5) stated that the term ‘aid pattern’ has 
similarities to ‘aid model’ and can be expected to show patterns, 
idiosyncrasies, and aid activity characteristics of  each emerging 
donor. In reference to this distinction, this article uses the term 
‘Indonesian model’.
16 For discussion on scaling up SSC, see Kato (2012, 2013).
17 As a good example of  SSTC, the ‘Triangular Cooperation [of  
Timor-Leste, Indonesia and Japan] on Road Sectors [in Timor-
Leste]’ was acknowledged by JICA (2013: 22). It was made up 
of  components designed to produce tangible results: trainings in 
Indonesia, follow-up missions to Timor-Leste, and a final seminar. 
An important feature of  this cooperation was the strong ownership 
of  the governments of  Timor-Leste and Indonesia. The triangular 
cooperation projects of  Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Japan in 
agriculture, health, and community development may be considered 
another relevant example of  SSTC (see JICA 2013: 24).
18 An explanation of  this model has been elaborated by the author 
based on JICA (2013: 10–11).
19 For details of  the Bali High-Level Forum, Country-Led Knowledge 
Hubs, see Choesni and Schulz (2013: 81–84).
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Chains of Knowledge Creation in 
the Evolution of New Donors*
Yasutami Shimomura1 and Wang Ping2
Abstract This article highlights the importance of contributions of 
emerging donors based on their knowledge creation during the time they 
receive aid, focusing on the two-way interaction between donors and 
recipients. A hypothetical model was developed to illustrate the two-way 
interaction in the process of knowledge creation, combining local and 
foreign knowledge, or explicit and tacit knowledge. Drawing on three 
detailed case studies, the article shows how four former aid recipients – 
China, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand – nurtured the acquired knowledge, 
developed their own approach to development cooperation, and applied it 
to other countries. The study emphasises that created knowledge is a source 
of strength for emerging donors and can contribute in a unique manner to 
the development agenda in the era of the Sustainable Development Goals, 
because traditional donors basically lack this knowledge.
Keywords: explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge, external knowledge, 
local knowledge, knowledge creation, aid receiving, two-way interaction, 
emerging donor.
1 Objective and analytical framework
So-called ‘emerging donors’ attract worldwide attention, as they rapidly 
expand their activities and make considerable changes in developing 
countries, as well as in the international aid community. Taking into 
account the recent trend, this article attempts to cast new light on the 
possible contributions of  emerging donors based on their knowledge 
creation during periods of  receiving aid. 
One notable difference between traditional and emerging donors is 
their experience of  receiving aid. Sharing the experiences of  receiving 
aid with other developing countries could be a source of  strength, 
because traditional donors essentially lack this source of  influence. In 
this context, Japan is exceptional, as it received aid for a much longer 
period than Western donors did. Japan received external assistance 
for nearly 20 years, in the form of  US assistance programmes of  relief  
and rehabilitation between 1946 and 1951 and World Bank loans 
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between 1953 and 1965. In the meantime, Japan started its own aid 
programmes. Japan’s participation in the Colombo Plan (1954) was 
a gateway into technical cooperation. In those days, Japan was an 
emerging donor as well as a major recipient. 
One basic question that arises is: ‘how does recipient experience 
count?’ (Sato 2013: 1). The objective of  our article is to address the 
relationship between aid receiving and giving, highlighting the fact 
that aid recipients create knowledge during the time they receive aid. 
This created knowledge could inform the emerging donors’ own aid 
programmes and could be a unique contribution to development and 
poverty reduction. This article proposes a hypothetical model in which 
the knowledge created by emerging donors during the period when 
they receive aid is at the centre, and it verifies the proposed hypothesis 
through three case studies. The article analyses the experiences of  two 
emerging donors, China and Thailand, and one emerging donor-to-be, 
Indonesia.3 It also deals with Japan, a former emerging donor in the 
1950s and 1960s. Policy implications are drawn in the concluding 
section, based on the analysis. 
Let us start by examining the notion of  ‘knowledge creation’. The 
traditional concept of  knowledge is ‘explicit knowledge’ that ‘can 
be clearly stated’ (Polanyi 2009: 22), and can be expressed in words 
and numbers. Explicit knowledge can be transmitted easily and 
systematically. As Michael Polanyi pointed out, however, there is 
another type of  knowledge, i.e. ‘tacit knowledge’. A typical example 
of  tacit knowledge is the medical doctor’s capacity to identify 
diseases through the careful observation of  a patient’s appearance. 
This article regards knowledge as the composition of  explicit and 
tacit knowledge.
Figure 1 The process of recipient’s knowledge creation
Source Authors’ own. 
Donor’s knowledge
Recipient’s local knowledge
Explicit knowledge Tacit knowledge
Traditional sociocultural 
inheritance
Interaction Recipient’s new 
knowledge
Explicit knowledge Tacit knowledge
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According to Ikujiro Nonaka, new knowledge is created through ‘the 
continuous conversion of  tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge’ 
(Nonaka and Konno 2003: 56–57; Nonaka 2006: 13–14). Taking into 
consideration Nonaka’s way of  thinking, this article examines the process 
of  knowledge creation by the aid recipient based on the following three 
hypotheses. First, knowledge is created as the result of  the interaction 
between local knowledge and foreign (or donor) knowledge, which is 
absorbed by the aid recipient during aid implementation (see Figure 1); 
a new type of  knowledge is expected to evolve through this interaction. 
It is neither a simple learning process nor a one-way knowledge transfer 
from a donor to the recipient, contrary to the standard idea of  technical 
cooperation. Second, a new knowledge evolves through the interaction 
between explicit and tacit knowledge (see Figure 1). A donor’s knowledge 
is assumed to be largely explicit, as it is communicated through various 
written documents such as plans, directories, and manuals, although we 
do not exclude cases where a donor’s tacit knowledge, which is based on 
the practical experiences of  aid experts, plays an important role. On the 
other hand, tacit knowledge is assumed to be the overwhelming factor 
in local knowledge, as a substantial part of  local knowledge tends not 
to be expressed in formal ways. Third, the created knowledge, which is 
the output of  interactions between local and foreign knowledge, as well 
as explicit and tacit knowledge, could play a vital role in the aid-giving 
activities of  emerging donors (see Figure 2). In this regard, it is 
important to notice that local knowledge is embedded and deep-rooted 
in the recipient’s traditional socioeconomic inheritance and differs from 
one society to another. This leads to the diversity of  new donors, as the 
features of  a new donor’s aid-giving reflect diverse local knowledges. 
Moreover, as is shown in Figure 2, a ‘chain of  knowledge creation’ could 
occur among aid recipients through the donor–recipient interface. More 
specifically, Country A creates its knowledge during the aid-receiving 
period and utilises, as an emerging donor, the accumulated knowledge in 
its own aid programmes in relation to Country B. This process could be 
reproduced by Country B as a new aid provider. 
Figure 2 Chain of knowledge creation
Source Authors’ own. 
Donor
Recipient Country A
Recipient Country B
Aid
Aid
External knowledge
External knowledge
New knowledge
New knowledge
Knowledge creation
Knowledge creation
Local knowledge
Local knowledge
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The notion of  chains of  knowledge creation is different from the 
simple idea of  knowledge diffusion. While technical cooperation 
usually assumes a one-way transfer of  the best practice found in donor 
countries or the international aid community (Arndt 2000: 158–60), 
this view seems to fail to take into account a recipient’s ownership. On 
the contrary, our article emphasises, as mentioned above, the two-way 
interaction between donors and recipients in the process of  knowledge 
creation; in this regard, emerging donors are better positioned, as they 
have created their own knowledge through such two-way interactions 
during their aid receiving. 
The next task of  this article is to check how the hypothetical model of  
knowledge creation/transfer can explain the reality of  emerging donors’ 
activities through a set of  in-depth case studies. The three adopted 
cases are from four Asian countries at different stages of  maturity as aid 
providers: one traditional donor and former emerging donor (Japan); 
two emerging donors (China and Thailand); and one emerging donor-
to-be (Indonesia). The aim of  testing using in-depth case studies is to 
show that the model works in all three different types of  aid providers.
2 Case studies
2.1 Case A: The evolution of trinity development cooperation in China
2.1.1 China’s Grand Aid and its two origins
China has emerged as a major donor since the turn of  the century. 
The salient feature of  China’s foreign aid is its persistent pursuit 
of  close linkages between aid, direct investment, and trade in its 
engagement with developing countries. The importance of  this mode 
of  development cooperation has been repeatedly stressed by Chinese 
officials and researchers, as shown below. Liu Xiangdong, Deputy 
Minister of  Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, once argued 
that the synthesis of  aid, direct investment, and trade can play an 
important role in the economic development of  both the recipient 
countries and China (Liu 2011). Based on a series of  arguments along 
this line, Zhou Baogen, an economist at the Research Institute for 
Fiscal Science, launched the idea of  Da Yuanzhu (Grand Aid) or the 
concerted promotion of  aid, trade and investment, in which aid works 
as a catalyst to facilitate investment and trade (Zhou 2010a; Wang 2013: 
126–77). Such a characteristic of  China’s foreign aid, or economic 
cooperation in Chinese terms, has attracted the attention of  the 
international aid community. 
In our opinion, the so-called Chinese model of  foreign aid or economic 
cooperation has emanated from two different ways of  thinking: local 
and foreign. The local one, which appeared in China in the early 1990s, 
is called Da Jingmao (Broad-Based Strategy of  Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation). The foreign way is the New Asian Industries 
Development (AID) Plan, which was launched by Japan’s Ministry of  
International Trade and Industry in 1987. In our view, the so-called 
Chinese model, like Zhou Baogen’s Da Yuanzhu, was formulated 
combining these local and foreign policy strands. The purpose of  the 
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following sections is to illustrate how the Chinese way of  thinking about 
aid policy has evolved.
2.1.2 China’s broad-based strategy of foreign trade and economic cooperation
In 1992, Wu Yi, Minister of  Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
proposed the notion of  Da Jingmao (Broad-Based Strategy of  Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation), stressing the integration of  
various instruments for economic cooperation including aid, direct 
investment, and trade. Wu officially launched Da Jingmao in 1994, at the 
International Symposium on China’s Foreign Trade Strategy in the 1990s. 
Da Jingmao was authorised as a state strategy of  China’s foreign trade. 
Our literature review shows that the strategy had been deeply rooted 
in the policy debates between Chinese technocrats in the 1980s. The 
existence of  such debates is evidenced by an article by Ji Chongwei, 
who was a high-ranking official in the Research Center of  Economic, 
Technological, and Social Development, a thinktank under the State 
Council. In his article from 1988, which dealt with the path to an 
outward-oriented economy, Ji urged further integration between 
economic cooperation from abroad and China’s own external 
engagement. In this context, Ji expressed his support for the idea 
of  synthesising China’s trade, investment, and economic/technical 
cooperation (Ji 1988). His article implies that the original idea of  Da 
Jingmao had already been discussed by his fellow technocrats in pursuit 
of  effective measures for achieving the goal of  ‘reform and opening-up’. 
To put it differently, such an idea had already been shared in the 
late-1980s by the reform-oriented technocrats whose central policy 
agenda was to promote Chinese exports.
As the Chinese government fully recognised the huge potential of  
developing countries as markets for Chinese exporters, they began to 
accelerate the linking of  various instruments of  economic cooperation 
(Liu 1998: 140–41). Spearheading China’s export promotion, 
Da Jingmao was expected to contribute to the acceleration of  reform 
and opening-up that was urged by Den Xiaoping in his influential 
speeches during his Southern Tour of  January 1992. Da Jingmao 
outlined China’s approach to economic cooperation, emphasising the 
close linkages between aid, investment, and trade. The idea, emanating 
from the discussions of  Chinese technocrats, was the Chinese local 
intellectual output. This was also explicit knowledge, as the idea was 
detailed in various official documents. At the same time, it is assumed 
that Da Jingmao, like other policy debates in the era of  reform and 
opening-up, reflected the cultural inheritance of  China. China’s 
approach to reform and opening-up is usually described as gradual and 
experimental (Bell, Khor and Kochhar 1993: 2–5). This is in contrast to 
the ‘big bang’ approach, or the Bretton Woods institutions’ theoretical 
prescription for the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Sachs 
1993: 48–57; Koen and Philips 1993: 2–4). Most importantly, there 
was no detailed blueprint (Prasad 2004: 2). Their common practice 
of  patiently examining the results of  pilot projects in some localities 
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before applying them nationwide obviously came from China’s highly 
pragmatic traditional wisdom. To put it another way, the Chinese way 
of  thinking about policy is rich in tacit knowledge, and Da Jingmao is 
no exception. In our view, the notion of  Da Jingmao is accompanied 
by both explicit and tacit knowledge. While the Chinese approach to 
foreign aid emerged from within, reflecting China’s own culture, it also 
drew considerably on the experience gained when China received aid 
from Japan, as shown below.
2.1.3 The influence of Japan’s ‘trinity development cooperation’
Since the mid-1990s, Chinese scholars and experts of  economic 
cooperation have intensively studied Japan’s aid giving, in an attempt 
to draw out hints for China’s resurging foreign aid. A lot of  Chinese 
literature in the late 1990s and around the turn of  century (Zhang 
1994; Ou Yang 1998; Jin 2002; Wang 2005) essentially shared the 
following three views on Japan’s aid. First, Japan’s aid had positive 
effects on the development of  China and other Asian countries. Second, 
the effectiveness of  Japan’s aid came from its win–win approach, which 
intended to contribute to the aid recipient’s economic development as 
well as the promotion of  Japan’s exports. Third, the linchpin of  Japan’s 
win–win approach was the notion of  ‘trinity development cooperation’ 
or close linkages between aid, direct investment, and the promotion of  
Figure 3 Path to self-reliance/graduation: ‘Aid to end aid’
Source Authors’ own.
Improved living 
conditions in 
rural areas
Rural development
Attaining 
socio‑political 
stability
Increase in foreign 
direct investment
Improved 
international 
competitiveness
Surplus of BOP, 
increase in foreign 
currency reserve
Improved capacity of 
domestic resource 
mobilisation
Self‑reliance or 
graduation
Improved conditions 
for foreign investors
Infrastructure 
building
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exports from the recipient countries. Such views have been adopted by 
current Chinese policymakers. 
The concept of  trinity development cooperation was announced 
in 1987 by Japan’s Ministry of  International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) under the title ‘New AID Plan,’ as ‘comprehensive economic 
cooperation packages with the trinity of  aid, direct investment, and 
import from developing countries’ (MITI 1987: 166–69, 1988: 176). 
The objective was to promote the export-oriented industries of  
Asian countries, in particular Association of  Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) members, who were desperately pursuing a transformation 
of  their export structure from primary goods to the products of  
labour/technology-intensive manufacturing (Shimomura 2013: 156; 
Shimomura and Wang 2013: 118). To attract direct investment of  
export-oriented industries, aid-funded infrastructure construction was 
considered to be crucial. This rationale is illustrated in Figure 3. Trinity 
development cooperation was an example of  explicit knowledge, as 
detailed explanations were available in MITI’s various documents.
Our literature review shows that many Chinese foreign aid experts were 
interested in the notion of  trinity development cooperation, from which 
they drew hints for China’s own foreign aid policy. Zhou Baogen, who 
proposed the idea of  Grand Aid, referred to Japan’s trinity development 
cooperation (Zhou 2010b). While Da Jingmao stressed the integration 
of  aid, direct investment and trade, it lacked the feature of  a win–win 
approach, unlike Japan’s New AID Plan. Jin Xide of  the Chinese 
Academy of  Social Sciences claimed that in the middle of  the 1990s 
China began to connect recipient needs with China’s own economic 
interests, taking into consideration trinity development cooperation 
(Jin 2004). It also attempted to connect Da Jingmao and Prime Minister 
Zhou Enlai’s emphasis on ‘mutual benefit’ in his ‘Eight Principles for 
Economic Aid’ in a speech in Accra, Ghana, in January 1964 (Wang 
2013: 131); the result was the evolution of  the Chinese win–win 
aid approach. In our view, Japan’s trinity development cooperation 
furnished Chinese foreign aid experts with the opportunities to 
re-examine and improve China’s own economic cooperation strategy. 
The interaction between the Chinese and Japanese economic 
cooperation strategies was a process of  knowledge creation.
2.2 Case B: Creation of knowledge from coastal industrial estate 
management
2.2.1 Thailand’s transformation from a major recipient to a new donor
Thailand, once a major aid recipient, has emerged as a new donor since 
the mid-1990s, having established in 1996 the Neighboring Economies 
Cooperation Fund, the present title of  which is the Neighboring 
Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency, under the 
Ministry of  Finance; Thailand International Cooperation was also 
established in 2004. Nowadays, Thai leaders, in both public and private 
sectors, are keen to make financial as well as technical assistance to 
neighbouring Myanmar, utilising their experiences of  receiving aid. In 
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their efforts, centre stage is given to the Eastern Seaboard Development 
Plan, a gigantic coastal industrial complex located southeast of  
Bangkok. This case study explores a chain of  knowledge creation 
in which Thailand intends to utilise the knowledge that was created 
and accumulated during the period it received aid from Japan in its 
engagement with Myanmar.
2.2.2 The Eastern Seaboard Development Plan and knowledge creation
The objective of  the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan (ESDP) was 
to build a coastal industrial complex composed of  two deep seaports 
and accompanying industrial estates at Laem Chabang and Map Ta Put 
in the southeast of  Bangkok. The plan also included the construction 
of  a dam and water pipeline system, railways, and roads (Mieno 2013) 
(see Figure 4). The ESDP was adopted in the Fifth Five-Year Plan 
(1982–86), suspended at the end of  1985 due to fierce disputes among 
the Thai leaders and strong objection from the World Bank, resumed 
one year later, and finally completed by the early 1990s with technical 
and financial assistance from Japan totalling ¥180bn. Even before its 
completion, the ESDP became a magnet for foreign direct investment, 
particularly because a lot of  Japanese manufacturers began to look for 
production sites abroad in an attempt to overcome the adverse effects 
of  the sharp yen appreciation resulting from the Plaza Accord of  1985. 
By early 2007, the ESDP area had attracted 14 private industrial estates 
(there were also two aid-funded ones) with more than 1,300 factories; 
most of  them were export-oriented and around 500 were automotive-
related. Most importantly, 360,000 jobs were created (Shimomura 
2013: 158). Referring to the fact that the ESDP generated 16 per 
cent of  Thailand’s GDP in 2010, the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) labelled ESDP as ‘the success story of  
Japan–Thailand cooperation’ (NESDB 2013). 
The achievements of  the ESDP are attributed to two aspects of  
knowledge. First, the ESDP emanated from the innovative idea of  the 
coastal industrial estate, which had been developed in Japan in the 1950s. 
It was innovative because most of  the large industrial areas, such as the 
Great Lakes in the US and the Ruhr region in Germany, were located 
inland in those days (Takeuchi 1984: 160–61). A coastal industrial 
estate had a big advantage because it enabled a drastic reduction in 
transportation costs due to its geographical closeness to ports. The 
technology for coastal industrial estate construction was provided by 
Japanese advisors and consultants as a set of  explicit knowledge in a 
traditional pattern of  technical transfer from donor to recipient.
Second, and more importantly, the ESDP furnished the Thai 
leaders with a chance to develop/create their own art of  large-scale 
development project management. Their mission was to construct a 
gigantic infrastructure project in an orderly manner and without notable 
corruption. The Thai government suffered from serious challenges but 
successfully overcame them (Shimomura 2013: 107–11). Challenges 
were caused primarily by the World Bank’s grave concern about the 
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fiscal burden of  such a gigantic investment. The Bank urged the Thai 
government to drop the construction of  two ports and utilise the 
existing ones, including the river port of  Bangkok. The Bank’s sceptical 
position was shared by a group of  Thai macroeconomists and provoked 
fierce disputes among technocrats about the macro- and microeconomic 
feasibility of  the plan. The Thai technocrats thoroughly re-examined 
the project’s feasibility, the balance of  payment sustainability, and so 
Figure 4 Locations of ODA loan projects in Eastern Seaboard Development Plan
Source JICA.
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on. In spite of  the disputes, the plan was duly completed, although with 
some delay due to the suspension. Although one major component, 
a natural gas-based fertiliser plant, was abandoned, the result of  an 
ex post evaluation showed that the project could have suffered a large 
loss if  realised owing to an appreciation of  the yen and the slump in the 
international price of  fertiliser (JBIC 2000: 81–82). Most importantly, 
there was no notable news of  corruption.
The Thai government’s achievement of  coping with challenges is 
primarily attributed to the fact that the rivalry and fierce disputes 
between the supporters and critics worked as an effective mechanism 
of  checks and balances. It worked well in spite of  the lack of  developed 
separation of  the three powers. Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond took 
advantage of  the rivalries and played the rivals off against each other 
by exploiting their fears of  each other. In this context, it should be 
stressed that technocrats could concentrate on pursuing professional and 
rational arguments, owing very much to the prime minister’s political 
insulation from pressure groups such as politicians and generals. 
Moreover, in conjunction with the aforementioned rivalries, the role 
of  the free press contributed to transparency in policymaking. The 
combination also effectively prevented serious corruption, as technocrats 
were afraid of  leaks to the press by opponents. Thailand in those days 
had its own functional mechanism of  checks and balances, as tacit 
knowledge (Shimomura 2013: 114–20). It could be labelled checks and 
balances ‘Thai-style’. In our view, the checks and balances Thai-style, 
being complemented by political insulation and the free press, took 
advantage of  faction rivalry among the Thai leaders. 
The effective administration of  the ESDP, in our opinion, can 
be attributed to the combination of  tacit and explicit knowledge. 
Obviously, the art of  getting things done Thai-style in the case of  the 
ESDP is far from textbook theory. In other words, there appears to be 
a kind of  tacit knowledge deeply embedded in the Thai sociocultural 
system. At the same time, the art of  getting things done in the Thai way 
was complemented by the explicit knowledge of  the worth of  political 
insulation and the free press. 
2.2.3 Thailand’s cooperation with Myanmar’s Dawei Special Economic Zone
The basic concept of  the Dawei Special Economic Zone (DSEZ) 
is the construction of  a deep sea port with industrial estates in 
south-east Myanmar. As the first modern coastal industrial complex 
in the Bay of  Bengal, the DSEZ is expected to become the engine 
of  Myanmar’s export-oriented industrialisation. Thai leaders are 
keen to assist Myanmar to realise the DSEZ, recognising the basic 
similarities between the DSEZ and the ESDP. What part of  their ESDP 
experience could be relevant and useful? According to the NESDB’s 
interpretation, it is the ‘policy and implementation mechanism’ of  
the Eastern Seaboard Development Committee (ESDC), which was 
chaired by the prime minister. The ESDC (a part of  the NESDB), 
had the authority and responsibility to supervise, examine, monitor, 
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and evaluate the implementation of  individual projects and to make 
strategic decisions.
When President Thein Sein of  Myanmar visited the ESDP area 
in 2012, Arkhom Termpittayapaisith, NESDB Secretary-General, 
strongly recommended the introduction of  an ESDC mechanism in 
the DSEZ (Termpittayapaisith 2013). The organisational structure of  
the Myanmar–Thailand Joint Working Mechanism was established 
in November 2012, in accordance with the experience of  the ESDC. 
Thailand, an emerging aid provider, transferred to a neighbour the 
essential features of  its success in coastal industrial estate management, 
which was developed during the time it was receiving aid.
2.3 Case C: A series of development endeavours in the downstream of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority
2.3.1 The four stages of the case
This case is composed of  four stages. The first stage (between the US 
and Japan) starts with Japan’s learning of  the model of  the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA)4 from Harvard University geographer Edward 
Ackerman, who visited Japan as a staff member of  the General 
Headquarters of  the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the 
early post-war era (Sato 2011: 83–85). Being heavily impressed by the 
TVA model, a group of  Japanese policymakers attempted to apply the 
model to their regional development plans. Although the attempts were 
basically aborted due to various bureaucratic impediments (Mikuriya 
1989: 270–72; Sato 2011: 90), one of  the applications, the Aichi Water 
Canal Project (‘Aichi Canal’), which was a part of  the Kiso River 
Comprehensive Development Plan, completed the job using World 
Bank loans and took the role of  incubator of  the Japanese approach 
to the TVA model. More specifically, the Aichi Canal, which had been 
implemented in the 1950s and 1960s, was recognised as Max Weber’s 
‘ideal type’ of  comprehensive regional development by Japanese 
development engineers. It evolved afterwards as a landmark of  Japan’s 
approach to aid. The second stage (between Japan and Indonesia) 
is Japan’s assistance to the Brantas River Basin Development Plan 
(‘Brantas Plan’) of  Central Java, Indonesia. In Tsuneaki Yoshida’s view, 
the plan was designed with the experience of  the Aichi Canal in mind, 
and the basic concept of  the Aichi Canal emanated from the TVA 
model (Yoshida 2006; Nissanke and Shimomura 2013: 25–30). The 
third stage (also between Japan and Indonesia) is the evolution of  the 
concept of  ‘one river, one plan, one management’. This concept, which 
emphasises integration, was created through a collaboration between 
Indonesian and Japanese engineers, according to Yoshida’s interviews 
with Japanese engineers5 who were in charge of  the Brantas Plan. The 
final stage (between Indonesia and participants of  the International 
Conference on Water and Environment held in 1992) led to the 
establishment of  Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), a 
regional institute in Asia. The basic philosophy of  IWRM was developed 
by fully taking into account the achievements of  the Brantas Plan. 
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2.3.2 The TVA and the Aichi Canal
The linchpin of  the TVA model is ‘integration’ (Sato 2011: 81). A 
large-scale dam was located at the centre of  the river basin development 
model. The achievements of  the TVA were introduced to Japan in the 
early post-war era by a group of  New Dealers who were influential at 
the General Headquarters of  the Allied Powers; among them Harvard 
scholar Ackerman was particularly influential. The intention of  the 
New Dealers was to promote reform and democratisation in rural 
areas in Japan through the dissemination of  the TVA model (Sato 
2011: 78–79). In response, a group of  Japanese policymakers of  the 
Economic Stabilization Board were attracted by the TVA as a symbol 
of  democracy (Mikuriya 1989: 269; Sato 2011: 83–87). Based on their 
study of  the TVA, this group began to seek ways in which to apply this 
model to regional development plans. However, serious institutional 
constraints, endemic in the Japanese bureaucratic system, prevented 
their attempt (Sato 2011: 88–91). The realisation of  an integrated plan 
like the TVA required the delegation of  power and authority to a single 
organisation in charge (Sato 2011: 80–83). It was difficult, however, 
to meet the requirement in Japan’s public sector, where several line 
ministries had claimed their share of  the decision-making power in line 
with their own missions, principles and vested interests in the area of  
river basin development. This constraint caused tremendous difficulty 
for TVA-type integration.
Although the attempted application of  the TVA model failed, the 
achievement of  the Aichi Water Canal Project, a part of  the Kiso 
River Comprehensive Development Plan in central Japan, became 
an incubator for the landmark of  Japan’s aid. The Aichi Canal, a 
community-based project, was initiated on the proposal of  a farmers’ 
group from the Chita Peninsula, Aichi Prefecture, whose area had 
suffered from water shortages for a long time. The Aichi Canal 
was composed of  irrigation, a portable and industrial water supply, 
and hydropower generation. The Aichi Canal was planned in 1949 
and financed by a World Bank loan (in 1957) for the amount of  
US$4.9 million or 4 per cent of  the total cost (Nissanke and Shimomura 
2013: 27). The canal was completed in 1961. The Aichi Canal Public 
Corporation, an implementation agency, was established in 1955 and 
played the central role in planning, implementing, and managing the 
canal project.
It should be noted that according to Atsushi Shimokobe, a leading 
architect of  long-term land development plans in Japan, pre-modern 
Japan had an idea similar to the comprehensive drainage management 
concept of  the TVA. In the Edo era, rivers were managed in a 
comprehensive manner, as a total system controlling upstream and 
downstream. Given the existence of  local and tacit knowledge of  
drainage management, it was possible for the Japanese stakeholders 
to accept the idea of  the TVA-type model of  comprehensive regional 
development (Shimokobe 1994: 12, 163–67), although the institutional 
constraints mentioned above hindered the wider application of  the 
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TVA-type model in Japan. The Aichi Canal emerged as the only case 
that could cope with the institutional constraints and became an origin 
of  Japan’s model of  comprehensive regional development, based on 
the interaction between Japanese traditional tacit knowledge and the 
external explicit knowledge of  the TVA model.
2.3.3 The Brantas River Basin Development Plan of Central Java
The experience of  the Aichi Canal provided an ideal example for the 
Brantas Plan of  Indonesia. Implementation of  the Brantas Plan started 
in the 1950s and lasted for more than 40 years. In the beginning, the 
South Trungagung Irrigation Project was constructed (1959–61) using 
Japan’s reparation scheme. Being highly impressed by the success of  
that project, the Government of  Indonesia instructed Nippon Koei, the 
Japanese consulting firm in charge of  the Trungagung Irrigation Project, 
to prepare a master plan for the comprehensive development of  the 
Brantas River Basin (Nippon Koei 1981; Okaji 1990). Since the 1960s, 
Japan has provided financial and technical assistance for the construction 
of  31 projects (nine multi-purpose dams, six barrage projects, eight 
irrigation projects, six river improvement projects, and two volcanic 
debris control projects) in the catchment area of  12,000sq km. The total 
amount of  aid has been nearly ¥170bn (Fujimoto 2013).
Nippon Koei has continuously held contracts for planning, designing, 
and advisory services for construction for the past four decades. While 
Nippon Koei itself  did not participate in the Aichi Canal and it was 
not in a position to directly inherit the knowledge created through the 
implementation of  the Aichi Canal, the Japanese irrigation and rural 
development engineers, including those from Nippon Koei, were inspired 
by the Aichi Canal and attempted to disseminate the experiences (Kato 
2013). The Nippon Koei engineers developed the essential features of  
the Aichi Canal and applied them to the Brantas River Basin, making 
the following achievements (Yoshida 2006, 2013). 
The Indonesian and Japanese engineers worked jointly and closely, 
sharing the same cognitive model based on the case of  the Aichi Canal. 
The outcome of  the long-term commitment from Nippon Koei is 
significant in the field of  human capital development. The Brantas office, 
which was established in 1965 in Malang, East Java, played a crucial role 
in Nippon Koei’s development of  human capital. The Brantas office 
repeatedly hosted workshops, seminars, and forums for the Indonesian 
engineers and technicians in order to transfer theoretical and practical 
knowledge. By 1990, the graduates of  the Brantas School reached 7,000, 
and Brantas alumni effectively contributed to the dissemination of  
knowledge nationwide (Fujimoto 2013: 184–85, 192; Yoshida 2013). 
2.3.4 One river, one plan, one management
‘One river, one plan, one management’ is the philosophy of  the Brantas 
Plan. Apparently, ‘one river’ refers to the Brantas River. ‘One plan’ is 
composed of  a series of  four master plans under Japanese aid. ‘One 
management’ refers to the Brantas office, which was established in 1965 
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as the Plan Implementation Unit with independent authority covering 
broad areas of  project implementation from budget administration to 
staff recruitment. What was unique about the Brantas Plan was that 
one charismatic figure, Suryono, led the organisation for 14 years from 
its inauguration (Fujimoto 2013). Many Japanese participants, both 
public and private, give their highest evaluation of  his capability and 
leadership (Fujimoto 2013; Yoshida 2006, 2013). Suryono’s strong 
leadership and long-term commitment, together with the full delegation 
of  power from the Indonesian and Japanese governments, enabled the 
integration and effective coordination of  this gigantic plan.
How did the idea of  ‘one river, one plan, one management’ evolve? 
Two former Nippon Koei engineers, Messrs Marusugi and Sawatani, 
state clearly that the concept was raised by Suryono around 1990, and 
that the Nippon Koei staff did not directly contribute to the evolution 
(Yoshida 2013); the philosophy evolved from within. The thinking of  
the Japanese irrigation and rural development engineers was gradually 
shared by the Indonesian engineers over the four decades of  working 
and living together, and the shared cognitive model between the 
Indonesian and Japanese participants finally led to Suryono’s remark of  
‘one river, one plan, one management,’ through the interaction between 
the engineers of  the two countries. It was tacit knowledge because it was 
not expressed in a concrete and definite manner. Here we have another 
case of  knowledge creation based on the experiences of  receiving aid.
2.3.5 Integrated Water Resources Management
In 1992, the International Conference on Water and Environment was 
held in Dublin. The main subject was how to improve the management 
of  river water resources in developing countries. The outcome of  the 
conference was the launch of  the concept of  Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM). The proposed concept of  IWRM reflects, to 
a large extent, the achievement of  the Brantas Plan, which is widely 
known internationally, and particularly in Asia, as a valuable reference 
case. Moreover, the lesson of  the Brantas Plan was adopted by the Asian 
Development Bank as a model for water policy (Yoshida 2006; Nissanke 
and Shimomura 2013: 29). The Asian Development Bank, together with 
the Japanese government, established the Network for Asian River Basin 
Organization (NARBO) with the participation of  around 50 organisations 
in charge of  river basin management in Asia. Assuming the mission 
of  disseminating the achievements of  the Brantas Plan, the NARBO 
nominated a high-ranking Indonesian official as its first Secretary-General 
(Yoshida 2013). The locally developed knowledge of  ‘one river, one plan, 
one management’ was finally transformed into internationally shared 
explicit knowledge through NARBO’s various documents.
3 Comparative summary and policy implications
This article has addressed the relationship between receiving and giving 
aid, based on a hypothetical model highlighting the aid recipient’s 
knowledge creation, or the evolution of  a new development knowledge. 
It tested the plausibility of  the hypothesis through three in-depth case 
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studies of  four East Asian aid recipients, namely China, Indonesia 
and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, and Thailand. These cases show 
that the aid recipients created new knowledge of  their own during the 
period they received aid through their interaction with the donors, by 
combining local and foreign knowledge, or tacit and explicit knowledge. 
The aid recipients also nurtured the acquired knowledge and attempted 
to distribute it around the developing world through financial and/or 
technical cooperation. 
The article confirmed that all the four recipients share the above 
behaviours. While such similarities are the main findings from the case 
studies, the article also found China’s uniqueness in comparison with 
others. China created knowledge in its pursuit of  a more sophisticated 
aid strategy; China had a long history of  aid-giving by the time it 
acquired Japanese knowledge. In contrast, others were interested 
in domestic sector management, for example comprehensive rural 
development and coastal industrial estate management. Afterwards, 
they began to utilise the newly created knowledge in their external aid. 
The latter case is likely to be more usual in the developing world.
How are these findings relevant to the current development agenda in 
the era of  Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?
A new partnership or collaboration with new actors, including emerging 
donors, has emerged as a central policy agenda in the international 
development community, as was emphasised in the Busan Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation in 2011 (OECD 2011). 
It was further developed in the SDGs, which are ‘based on a spirit 
of  strengthened global solidarity’ (UN 2015). The new partnership 
between traditional and new actors could work effectively, if  the latter’s 
comparative advantage is identified and appreciated correctly. As for 
the emerging donors, a source of  their strength is that an important 
part of  their knowledge has been formulated through the experience of  
receiving aid; this is unique to emerging donors. They could contribute 
to the stock of  knowledge in development cooperation and the global 
development agenda in their own ways. One crucial agenda item in the 
era of  SDGs is how to effectively utilise emerging donors’ experiences 
with knowledge creation. 
Notes
*  An earlier version of  this article was produced as a JICA-RI Working 
Paper.
1 Hosei University, Japan.
2 Guandong University of  Finance and Economics, China.
3 Indonesia recently started its technical transfer programme. One 
notable example is the assistance to the democratisation of  Myanmar.
4 The Tennessee Valley Authority was established by Congress in 
1933 to address a wide range of  environmental, economic, and 
technological issues. By the end of  the Second World War, the TVA 
had become the nation’s largest electricity supplier. Electricity drew 
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industries into the region, providing desperately needed jobs  
(www.tva.gov/About-TVA/Our-History). 
5 Interviews with the two former Nippon Koei engineers, Mr Kazuo 
Sawatani and Mr Yuzo Marusugi, which were conducted by Professor 
Tsuneyuki Yoshida on 5 July and 6 July 2013 (Yoshida 2013).
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Estimating China’s Foreign Aid 
Using New Data*✝
Naohiro Kitano1
Abstract This article presents updated estimates of China’s foreign aid 
between 2001 and 2014 as a proxy for China’s official development 
assistance (ODA) as defined by the OECD-DAC, and to compare this with 
the ODA of other DAC members. China’s net foreign aid increased from 
US$5.2bn in 2012 to US$5.4bn in 2013, but dropped to US$4.9bn in 2014. 
Since 2013, China has ranked at number nine. Its bilateral foreign aid 
has ranked at number six, alongside Japan and France, since 2012, while 
multilateral foreign aid has been relatively less significant. It is estimated 
that net disbursements of preferential export buyer’s credits decreased 
from US$4.9bn in 2012 to US$4.7bn in 2013, increasing to US$6.1bn in 
2014. China has increased the volume of its foreign aid, improved the 
quality of it, and diversified the fields of aid activity. It is important for the 
international community to carefully examine the magnitude of China’s 
foreign aid.
Keywords: China, foreign aid, development finance, ODA, 
concessional loans, OECD-DAC.
1 Introduction
This article aims to present updated estimates of  China’s foreign 
aid volumes between 2001 and 2014 as a proxy for China’s official 
development assistance (ODA) defined by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), and to compare the results with the ODA 
of  other DAC members. I draw on budget data from the websites of  
50 departments2 and from other relevant organisations within China, 
as well as from other relevant sources of  information. The estimation 
process I have chosen to use has been modified from the one proposed 
in the previous work of  Kitano and Harada (2014)3 so that I have been 
able to revise and update the previous estimates for the period between 
2001 and 2014.
The previous work showed that China’s net foreign aid has grown 
rapidly since 2004, reaching US$7.1bn in 2013. The share of  bilateral 
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aid is much larger than that of  multilateral aid. The results have 
presented a relatively realistic view of  China’s foreign aid; its ranking 
had been moderate, ranking below number 13 until 2008, before 
moving rapidly up to number six in 2012. As a point of  reference, the 
net disbursement of  preferential export buyer’s credits was estimated to 
have been US$7.0bn in 2013.
What distinguishes this estimate from the Chinese government’s official 
figures and other estimates is that as a practical definition of  China’s 
foreign aid it first introduces the concept of  net and gross disbursements 
of  foreign aid (net and gross foreign aid), in a way that is as comparable 
as possible to that for the net and gross disbursements of  ODA. 
Secondly, the estimate includes multilateral aid within the total aid; and 
thirdly, disaggregated department-level budget data sets are used to 
estimate grants and interest-free loans as well as multilateral aid.
The results of  the previous work were presented on a number of  
occasions and a number of  comments and suggestions were offered. 
Some examples of  these are as follows: an estimate of  0.072 per cent 
as China’s net ODA/GNI (gross national income) ratio4 in 2012 may 
be too high; the expected annual growth rate of  China’s foreign aid in 
the previous scenario, which is 15 per cent, is too high and should be 
level with the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate; it is important 
to capture the volume of  development finance and include not only 
foreign aid but also other official flows.
I have incorporated some of  those comments and suggestions into the 
present article. For example, in the previous work the annual rate of  
increase in gross disbursements of  concessional loans provided by the 
Export–Import Bank of  China (China Exim Bank) was simply assumed 
based on the average annual rate of  increase of  33 per cent from 2006 
to 2011. To incorporate the above-mentioned comments on net  
ODA/GNI ratio and the expected annual growth rate of  China’s 
foreign aid contained in the previous work, I have introduced a modified 
process for estimating the gross disbursements of  concessional loans 
in 2012, 2013, and 2014. I found that there might be weak regularity 
within a cumulative amount of  the framework loan agreement 
(‘the framework agreement’), the project loan agreement (‘the loan 
agreement’), and the gross disbursement of  concessional loans: the 
cumulative amount of  the gross disbursements of  concessional loans in 
a given year is similar to that of  the loan agreement signed two years 
ago, which is in turn similar to that of  the framework agreement from 
one year prior to that. This weak regularity has been used to estimate 
the gross disbursements of  concessional loans in this article.
As a result of  introducing this modified estimation process, it was found 
that China’s foreign aid volumes in 2012 and 2013 were significantly 
smaller than the previous estimates – China’s ranking was number ten 
in 2012 and number nine in 2013, rather than number six as it was 
estimated in the previous work. Furthermore, the estimate made in 
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2014 implied that China’s foreign aid had decreased from 2013. If  these 
results are close to accurate, the current estimates provide improved 
knowledge on China’s foreign aid budget data for grants and loans, and 
for comparison of  China’s foreign aid with DAC member countries.
The rest of  this article proceeds as follows: Section 2 will review recent 
official documents and relevant literature. Section 3 will reiterate the 
definition of  China’s foreign aid as a proxy for ODA. Section 4 will show 
the estimation process I employed in this article. Section 5 will present the 
revised and updated estimates of  China’s net and gross disbursements of  
foreign aid (net and gross foreign aid) through the estimation process, and 
compare the results of  this article with the estimates given in the previous 
article, the official figure given by China, and the DAC’s estimates. 
Section 6 will compare the results with the net and gross disbursements 
of  ODA extended by DAC members. Section 7 concludes.
2 Recent official documents and relevant literature
The 2011 White Paper on China’s foreign aid (Information Office 
of  the State Council 2011) was published in 2011, and was then 
followed by ‘the 2014 White Paper’ (Information Office of  the State 
Council 2014) released in 2014. The 2014 White Paper stated that 
the aggregate amount of  China’s foreign aid from 2010 to 2012 was 
RMB89.34bn (US$13.7bn).5 Even though the 2014 White Paper 
provided more information than the 2011 White Paper, there is still 
room for improvement; for example, the 2014 White Paper does not 
present the annual amount of  China’s foreign aid, the disaggregated 
amount by country and sector, or the consolidated amount of  all forms 
of  assistance described in the document as being covered not only by 
the foreign aid budget but also other budget items.
In November 2014, the Ministry of  Commerce (MOFCOM) 
released ‘Measures for the Administration of  Foreign Aid (For Trial 
Implementation)’ (MOFCOM 2014).6 According to MOFCOM, this was 
the first comprehensive departmental regulation on the management of  
foreign assistance.7 In this document, the term ‘foreign aid’ refers to those 
activities which provide economic, technical, material, human resources, 
and administrative support to recipient countries, supported by the 
Chinese government’s ‘financial resources for foreign aid’. The forms of  
foreign aid outlined in this document are similar to those in the 2011 and 
2014 White Papers: namely, grants, interest-free loans, and concessional 
loans. The regulations stipulate that MOFCOM is, in conjunction 
with the relevant departments under the State Council, responsible 
for formulating mid- to long-term foreign aid policy and country aid 
strategies, which shall be implemented upon approval. MOFCOM is 
responsible for collecting, collating, and preparing statistical material on 
foreign aid. The release of  this document is a significant step towards 
enhancing China’s institutionalisation of  aid mechanisms. However, 
due to the definition of  ‘foreign aid’ mentioned above, MOFCOM was 
unable to consolidate other relevant forms of  assistance covered by other 
budget items, such as ‘international organisations’. In Section 3, the 
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Table 1a Process of estimating China’s net and gross foreign aid (RMB million)
Ye
ar
Fi
na
l a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
ce
nt
ra
l-
le
ve
l 
pu
bl
ic
 b
ud
ge
t 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
fo
r 
fo
re
ig
n 
ai
d 
(1
)
Su
m
 o
f 
fi
na
l a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
ce
nt
ra
l-
le
ve
l g
en
er
al
 p
ub
lic
 
bu
dg
et
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 f
or
 f
or
ei
gn
 
ai
d 
an
d 
gr
os
s 
di
sb
ur
se
m
en
t 
of
 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
(2
)
O
ut
st
an
di
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
tw
o 
pr
ef
er
en
ti
al
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
(3
)
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
ag
re
em
en
t 
fo
r 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
(4
)
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
ag
re
em
en
t 
fo
r 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
(5
)
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
si
gn
ed
 (6
)
C
on
ce
ss
io
na
l l
oa
ns
 s
ig
ne
d 
(7
)
G
ro
ss
 d
is
bu
rs
em
en
t 
of
 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
(8
)=
(2
)-
(1
)
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
di
sb
ur
se
m
en
t 
of
 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
(9
)
R
ep
ay
m
en
t 
of
 c
on
ce
ss
io
na
l 
lo
an
s 
(1
0
)
N
et
 d
is
bu
rs
em
en
t 
of
 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
(1
1)
=(
8)
-(
10
)
O
ut
st
an
di
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 lo
an
s 
(1
2)
Su
bs
id
ie
s 
fo
r 
co
nc
es
si
on
al
 
lo
an
s 
(1
3)
O
ut
st
an
di
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
pr
ef
er
en
ti
al
 e
xp
or
t 
bu
ye
r’
s 
cr
ed
it
s 
(1
4)
=(
3)
-(
12
)
N
et
 d
is
bu
rs
em
en
t 
of
 
pr
ef
er
en
ti
al
 e
xp
or
t 
bu
ye
r’
s 
cr
ed
it
s 
(1
5)
R
ep
ay
m
en
t 
of
 p
re
fe
re
nt
ia
l 
ex
po
rt
 b
uy
er
’s
 c
re
di
ts
 (1
6)
G
ro
ss
 d
is
bu
rs
em
en
t 
of
 
pr
ef
er
en
ti
al
 e
xp
or
t 
bu
ye
r’
s 
cr
ed
it
s 
(1
7)
=(
15
)+
(1
6)
G
ra
nt
s 
an
d 
in
te
re
st
-f
re
e 
lo
an
s 
by
 M
O
FC
O
M
 (1
8)
G
ra
nt
s 
by
 o
th
er
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
 
an
d 
re
le
va
nt
 o
gr
an
is
at
io
ns
 (1
9)
Sc
ho
la
rs
hi
ps
 f
or
 f
or
ei
gn
 
st
ud
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 o
th
er
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 b
y 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 E
du
ca
ti
on
 (2
0
)
Fi
na
l a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
ce
nt
ra
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
pu
bl
ic
 b
ud
ge
t 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
fo
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
or
ga
ni
sa
ti
on
s 
(2
1)
Su
m
 o
f 
fi
na
l a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t 
pu
bl
ic
 b
ud
ge
t 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
fo
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
or
ga
ni
sa
ti
on
s 
(2
2)
Su
m
 o
f 
fi
na
l a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t 
pu
bl
ic
 b
ud
ge
t 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
fo
r 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
or
ga
ni
sa
ti
on
s:
 A
dj
us
te
d 
(2
3)
Ye
ar
2001 4,711 5,000 1,060 3,803 19 1,041 3,784 47 1,216 1,216 1,216 4,240 141 94 1,831 1,831 549 2001
2002 5,003 6,200 8,000 1,197 5,000 78 1,119 4,903 54 3,097 1,881 1,881 4,503 150 100 2,014 2,014 604 2002
2003 5,223 6,500 10,300 1,277 6,277 133 1,144 6,047 66 4,253 1,156 1,156 4,701 157 104 2,215 2,215 665 2003
2004 6,069 7,600 13,700 1,531 7,808 199 1,332 7,380 82 6,320 2,068 2,068 5,462 182 121 2,437 2,437 731 2004
2005 7,470 9,400 18,300 1,930 9,738 274 1,656 9,035 109 9,265 2,944 2,944 6,723 224 149 2,681 2,681 804 2005
2006 8,237 11,500 22,900 3,263 13,001 380 2,883 11,918 158 10,982 1,717 122 1,839 7,413 247 165 2,949 2,949 885 2006
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2014 18,457 165,448 21,781 142,737 19,863 16,231 104,720 3,110 13,121 92,220 1,231 163,705 37,473 2,849 40,322 14,203 674 1,301 7,372 7,363 2,211 2014
Rate of increase
2002 6% 60% 13% 31% 309% 8% 30% 16% 155% 55% 55% 6% 6% 6% 10% 10% 10% 2002
2003 4% 5% 29% 7% 26% 71% 2% 23% 21% 37% -39% -39% 4% 4% 4% 10% 10% 10% 2003
2004 16% 17% 33% 20% 24% 50% 16% 22% 24% 49% 79% 79% 16% 16% 16% 10% 10% 10% 2004
2005 23% 24% 34% 26% 25% 38% 24% 22% 33% 47% 42% 42% 23% 23% 23% 10% 10% 10% 2005
2006 10% 22% 25% 69% 34% 39% 74% 32% 45% 19% -42% -38% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 2006
2007 35% 51% 40% 91% 48% 31% 99% 48% 81% 31% 95% 155% 99% 35% 35% 22% 10% 10% 10% 2007
2008 13% 1% 36% -19% 26% 26% -23% 25% 31% 49% 108% 37% 102% 13% 13% 65% 10% 10% 10% 2008
2009 6% 26% 32% 75% 36% 24% 82% 36% -8% 27% -19% 49% -15% 6% 6% 32% 2% 2% 2% 2009
2010 2% 16% 48% 20% 11% 24% 30% 36% 36% 25% 37% 37% 38% 61% 190% 47% 176% -1% 16% 22% 19% 20% 80% 2010
2011 17% 15% 42% 19% 11% 20% 6% 13% 30% 32% 11% 30% 62% 53% 41% 20% 40% 28% 10% 15% 12% -1% 1% 2011
2012 5% 17% 11% 19% 10% 7% 25% 44% 3% 24% 26% 46% 32% 33% 32% 12% 31% 69% 50% 16% 34% 2012
2013 2% 17% 11% 17% 10% 7% 21% 24% 4% 20% 10% 30% -6% 50% -3% -11% -1% 9% -22% 60% 69% 2013
2014 8% 15% 7% 16% 10% 5% 18% 35% 0% 17% 15% 30% 30% 28% 30% -7% 2% 16% 31% -8% -51% 2014
Note Figures in bold were extracted from publicly accessible statistics and information: those in italics were obtained from graphs,  
those highlighted in grey were critical figures estimated by the setting of assumptions, and the remaining figures, neither in bold,  
italics, nor highlighted in grey were calculated from other columns.  
Sources Finance Yearbook of China 2002 and 2003;9 Chinese government relevant websites, etc.
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2009 6% 26% 32% 75% 36% 24% 82% 36% -8% 27% -19% 49% -15% 6% 6% 32% 2% 2% 2% 2009
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2013 2% 17% 11% 17% 10% 7% 21% 24% 4% 20% 10% 30% -6% 50% -3% -11% -1% 9% -22% 60% 69% 2013
2014 8% 15% 7% 16% 10% 5% 18% 35% 0% 17% 15% 30% 30% 28% 30% -7% 2% 16% 31% -8% -51% 2014
Note Figures in bold were extracted from publicly accessible statistics and information: those in italics were obtained from graphs,  
those highlighted in grey were critical figures estimated by the setting of assumptions, and the remaining figures, neither in bold,  
italics, nor highlighted in grey were calculated from other columns.  
Sources Finance Yearbook of China 2002 and 2003;9 Chinese government relevant websites, etc.
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definition of  foreign aid proposed in this article will be compared with 
MOFCOM’s official definition.
The DAC (OECD 2015) estimated China’s gross concessional flows 
for development cooperation, including bilateral cooperation and 
developmental funds channelled through multilateral organisations. 
The former was estimated based on the budget data (the final accounts 
of  central-level public budget expenditure for foreign aid) from 
China’s Ministry of  Finance, while the latter was estimated based on 
information from those multilateral organisations. My estimates have 
two differences with the DAC’s estimates: firstly, the net disbursements 
of  concessional loans have been included; secondly, as was the case 
for multilateral foreign aid, budget data from the Chinese government 
rather than information from multilateral organisations was used so 
that bilateral and multilateral foreign aid data could be compiled in a 
coherent manner.
A number of  relevant articles concerning China’s foreign aid have 
been published. Similar to the estimates by DAC, some of  the articles 
analysed China’s aid activities based on official data from the Chinese 
government and information from relevant sources (Lancaster 2007; 
Brautigam 2009; Kobayashi and Shimomura 2013; UNDP China 
2013). These attempts, however, only estimated bilateral gross foreign 
aid. Some other articles have tried to capture not only foreign aid but 
also other types of  development finance (Lum et al. 2009; Wolf, Wang 
and Warner 2013; Strange et al. 2014). Hwang, Brautigam and Eom 
(2016) have constructed a commitment-based database of  Chinese 
loans in Africa between 2000 and 2014, granted mainly by the China 
Exim Bank, China Development Bank (CDB), and Chinese contractors. 
Several pieces of  literature have focused on sectoral analyses in specific 
regions (Brautigam 2015; Gransow 2015).
3 Definition of China’s foreign aid
Following Kitano and Harada (2014), in this article China’s foreign aid is 
defined as the net and gross disbursements of  foreign aid (net and gross 
foreign aid) consisting of: (1) grants and interest-free loans8 managed by 
MOFCOM; (2) grants managed by other departments responsible for 
foreign aid; (3) scholarships provided by the Ministry of  Education to 
students from other developing countries; (4) the estimated amount of  
interest subsidies on concessional loans which is deducted from the total 
amount of  aid; (5) the net and gross disbursements of  concessional loans 
as bilateral foreign aid; and (6) multilateral foreign aid, which is defined 
as the cumulative amount of  expenditure by departments and other 
relevant organisations with a budget for international organisations, 
adjusted by the DAC-defined coefficients for core contributions.
What distinguishes these estimates from MOFCOM’s official definition 
of  foreign aid is that the MOFCOM definition does not cover points 
(3), (4), (6) or part of  (2) above. Further, MOFCOM’s official figures 
are aggregated amounts and in the case of  grant and interest-free 
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Table 1b Process of estimating China’s net and gross foreign aid (RMB million)
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2001 4,429 1,041 5,470 549 6,019 1,216 2001 535 126 661 66 727 147
2002 4,699 1,119 5,818 604 6,422 1,881 2002 568 135 703 73 776 227
2003 4,896 1,144 6,040 665 6,705 1,156 2003 592 138 730 80 810 140
2004 5,684 1,332 7,016 731 7,747 2,068 2004 687 161 848 88 936 250
2005 6,987 1,656 8,643 804 9,447 2,944 2005 853 202 1,055 98 1,153 359
2006 7,667 2,883 10,550 885 11,435 1,717 2006 962 362 1,323 111 1,434 215
2007 10,290 5,746 16,036 973 17,009 3,354 2007 1,353 755 2,108 128 2,236 441
2008 11,638 4,413 16,051 1,070 17,121 6,987 2008 1,675 635 2,310 154 2,464 1,005
2009 12,457 8,023 20,481 1,087 21,567 5,677 2009 1,824 1,174 2,998 159 3,157 831
2010 12,358 11,015 23,374 1,959 25,333 16,485 2010 1,825 1,627 3,452 289 3,742 2,435
2011 15,528 12,221 27,749 1,985 29,733 23,179 2011 2,403 1,891 4,295 307 4,602 3,587
2012 17,741 12,600 30,342 2,667 33,008 30,666 2012 2,811 1,996 4,807 422 5,229 4,858
2013 15,923 13,162 29,085 4,501 33,586 28,903 2013 2,570 2,124 4,694 726 5,421 4,665
2014 14,946 13,121 28,067 2,211 30,277 37,473 2014 2,433 2,136 4,569 360 4,928 6,100
Share percentage
2013 47% 39% 87% 13% 100% 86%
2014 49% 43% 93% 7% 100% 124%
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2001 4,429 1,060 5,489 549 6,038 1,216 2001 535 128 663 66 729 147
2002 4,699 1,197 5,896 604 6,500 1,881 2002 568 145 712 73 785 227
2003 4,896 1,277 6,173 665 6,838 1,156 2003 592 154 746 80 826 140
2004 5,684 1,531 7,215 731 7,946 2,068 2004 687 185 872 88 960 250
2005 6,987 1,930 8,917 804 9,722 2,944 2005 853 236 1,088 98 1,186 359
2006 7,667 3,263 10,930 885 11,815 1,839 2006 962 409 1,371 111 1,482 231
2007 10,290 6,246 16,536 973 17,509 3,664 2007 1,353 821 2,174 128 2,302 482
2008 11,638 5,041 16,679 1,070 17,749 7,412 2008 1,675 725 2,400 154 2,554 1,067
2009 12,457 8,804 21,261 1,087 22,348 6,309 2009 1,824 1,289 3,112 159 3,271 924
2010 12,358 11,989 24,347 1,959 26,307 17,411 2010 1,825 1,771 3,596 289 3,886 2,572
2011 15,528 13,502 29,030 1,985 31,015 24,289 2011 2,403 2,090 4,493 307 4,800 3,759
2012 17,741 14,447 32,188 2,667 34,855 32,142 2012 2,811 2,289 5,099 422 5,522 5,092
2013 15,923 15,458 31,381 4,501 35,882 31,121 2013 2,570 2,495 5,065 726 5,791 5,023
2014 14,946 16,231 31,177 2,211 33,388 40,322 2014 2,433 2,642 5,075 360 5,435 6,563
Source Author’s own.
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loans, they are most likely commitment-based. Additionally, in the 
case of  concessional loans, they are most likely to be framework 
agreement-based rather than disbursement-based.
4 Process used for estimating China’s foreign aid
This section will outline the process I used to estimate China’s net and 
gross foreign aid from 2001 to 2014, which was based on the definition 
presented in Section 3. Comprehensive spreadsheets were compiled 
in order to make the most of  statistics and information from a large 
number of  sources in a systematic way. Tables 1a and 1b present a 
detailed summary of  the estimation process. 
The figures in bold were extracted from publicly accessible statistics 
and information, those in italics were obtained from graphs, those 
highlighted in grey were critical figures estimated by the setting of  
assumptions, and the remaining figures (neither in bold, italics, nor 
highlighted in grey) were calculated from other columns. Figures 
from 2001 to 2011 and those from 2012 to 2014 were estimated using 
a different process. As mentioned in Section 1, at various seminars 
comments were offered on the net ODA/GNI ratio and the expected 
annual growth rate of  China’s foreign aid as discussed in the previous 
work; these comments have been incorporated into the current 
estimation process. It was found that there might be weak regularity 
in terms of  time lag among cumulative amounts of  the framework 
agreement, loan agreement, and gross disbursement of  concessional 
loans: the cumulative amount of  gross disbursements of  concessional 
loans in a given year is similar to that of  the loan agreements signed two 
years ago, which is similar to that of  the framework agreement from one 
year prior to that. This weak regularity was then used to estimate the 
gross disbursements of  concessional loans in 2012, 2013, and 2014, as 
follows.
Column (1), ‘Final account of  central-level public budget expenditure 
for foreign aid’, was obtained from the Finance Yearbook of  China 
for 2002 and 2003, and the website of  the Ministry of  Finance.10 
Column (2), ‘Sum of  final account of  central-level public budget 
expenditure for foreign aid and gross disbursement of  concessional 
loans’, was obtained from a bar graph.11 Column (3), ‘Outstanding 
amount of  two preferential facilities’12 by China Exim Bank was 
inferred from a line graph without scale.13 The figures for 2009 and 
2012 in column (4), ‘Cumulative amount of  framework agreement for 
concessional loans’, are given from the 2011 and 2014 White Papers 
(Information Office of  the State Council 2011, 2014). Then, I first 
estimated the figure for 2010 in column (5), ‘Framework agreement 
for concessional loans’, assuming the figure for 2010 in column (18), 
‘Grants and interest-free loans by MOFCOM’ as the commitment-
based amount of  grants and interest-free loans in 2010, and multiplied 
it by the ratio of  the cumulative amount of  the framework agreement 
for concessional loans (RMB49.76bn) divided by the cumulative amount 
of  grants and interest-free loans by MOFCOM (RMB39.58bn) from 
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2010 to 2012, as stated in the 2014 White Paper. I then estimated 
figures for 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013 using the inferred rate of  
increase between 2009 and 2013, which was 11 per cent.14
Regarding the figure for 2014, in order to incorporate one of  the 
comments mentioned in Section 1 that the expected annual growth rate 
of  China’s foreign aid in the previous scenario, which was 15 per cent, 
was too high and should be at the level of  the GDP growth rate, the 
annual rate of  increase in 2014 was assumed to be 7 per cent, which 
was the same range of  China’s GDP growth (7.3 per cent in 2014). 
The figure for 2009 contained in column (6), ‘Cumulative amount of  
concessional loans signed’, was given as RMB59.4bn, based on Hu 
and Huang (2012). I then inferred the figure for 2009 in column (7), 
‘Concessional loans signed’, through multiplying the figure for 2009 
in column (6) by the ratio of  the figure for 2009 in column (5) divided 
by the figure for 2009 in column (4). The figures from 2010 to 2014 
in column (7) were inferred by assuming the rates of  increase to be set 
by 30 per cent, 6 per cent, 10 per cent, 10 per cent, and 10 per cent 
for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 respectively, based on the weak 
regularity mentioned above.
Figures from 2002 to 2011 in column (8), ‘Gross disbursement of  
concessional loans’, were calculated by subtracting column (1) from 
column (2). Figures for 2001 came from the China Exim Bank 2001 
Annual Report in which annual gross disbursements from concessional 
loans from 1996 to 2001 were recorded. Figures from 2012 to 2014 were 
inferred by assuming the rate of  increase in column (7) as 7 per cent, 
7 per cent, and 5 per cent for 2012, 2013, and 2014 respectively, based 
on the weak regularity mentioned above. Column (10), ‘Repayment 
of  concessional loans’, was estimated using data in column (8) by 
assuming that a condition of  the loan was a 15-year repayment period 
with a five-year grace period. Column (11), ‘Net disbursement of  
concessional loans’, was obtained by subtracting column (10) from 
column (8). Column (12), ‘Outstanding amount of  concessional loans’, 
was calculated by adding this year’s figure in column (11) to the previous 
year’s figure in column (12). Column (13), ‘Subsidies for concessional 
loans’, was estimated by assuming that one third of  the interest rate 
difference between the lending rate of  concessional loans and the RMB 
benchmark loan interest rate has been subsidised by the government.
Figures from 2001 to 2011 in column (14), ‘Outstanding amount of  
preferential export buyer’s credits’, were calculated by subtracting 
column (12) from column (3). Those from 2012 to 2014 were derived 
by subtracting the outstanding amount of  export buyer’s credits in each 
annual report of  the China Exim Bank from the sum of  the outstanding 
amount of  export buyer’s credits and preferential export buyer’s credits. 
Figures in column (15), ‘Net disbursement of  preferential export buyer’s 
credits’, were calculated by subtracting the previous year’s figure from 
the current year’s figure in column (14). Column (16), ‘Repayment 
of  preferential export buyer’s credits’, was estimated using data in 
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column (14), and assuming the loan conditions of  a 15-year repayment 
period with a five-year grace period. Column (17), ‘Gross disbursement 
of  preferential export buyer’s credits’, was calculated by adding 
column (15) and column (16) together.
There are 11 departments and other relevant organisations that 
have the budget sub-item, ‘Foreign aid (20203)’, while 50 have the 
budget sub-item, ‘International organisations (20204)’ under the 
budget item, ‘Foreign affairs (202)’ for at least one year between 
2010 to 2014. The figures in column (18), ‘Grants and interest-free 
loans by MOFCOM’ between 2010 and 2014 were obtained from 
the final departmental accounts on public budget expenditure from 
MOFCOM. Figures between 2001 and 2009 were derived through the 
assumption that 90 per cent of  the final account of  the central-level 
public budget expenditure for foreign aid column (1) was appropriated 
to and implemented by MOFCOM (Grimm et al. 2011). Figures 
from 2010 to 2014 column (19), ‘Grants by other departments and 
relevant organisations’, consist of  the National Health and Family 
Planning Commission (the former Ministry of  Health), which has 
jurisdiction over the Chinese medical teams working abroad, and 
several other departments.15 Figures from 2010 to 2014 were obtained 
from the foreign aid expenditure in the final accounts of  the relevant 
departments. It was assumed that from 2001 to 2009, grants for other 
departments were 3 per cent of  the final account of  central-level public 
budget expenditure for foreign aid (see Annexe Table A1).
Column (20), ‘Scholarships for foreign students from other developing 
countries by the Ministry of  Education’, was estimated based on the 
assumption that two-thirds of  foreign students receiving Chinese 
government scholarships are from other developing countries. Thus, 
in the final accounts of  the Ministry of  Education from 2008 to 2014, 
two-thirds of  the total expenditure for scholarships for foreign students 
studying in China (budget second sub-item (2050602) was identified as 
foreign aid. The ratio of  scholarships for foreign students from other 
developing countries divided by the final account of  central-level public 
budget expenditure for foreign aid (column (1)), which was 2 per cent in 
2008, was used to estimate the figures from 2001 to 2007.
In relation to China’s multilateral foreign aid, the DAC defines 
multilateral ODA as contributions to multilateral agencies on the 
DAC List of  ODA-eligible international organisations. If  an agency’s 
core-funded activities are only in part development-related, the 
coefficients for core contributions are determined to assess the share 
which corresponds to their development activities. The DAC (OECD 
2015) estimated China’s development-oriented contributions to and 
through multilateral organisations as a three-year average between 2011 
and 2013 mainly based on the websites of  multilateral organisations. 
Referring to the DAC’s estimates, I attempted to estimate China’s 
multilateral foreign aid based on China’s budget information.
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Column (21), ‘Final account of  central government public budget 
expenditure for international organisations’, was obtained from the website 
of  the Ministry of  Finance16 and covers figures from 2007 to 2014. I 
assumed that from 2001 to 2007, budget expenditure for international 
organisations had increased annually by 10 per cent, which is an actual 
average rate of  increase between 2008 and 2013, reached through back 
calculation from 2007. Column (22), ‘Sum of  final account of  department 
public budget expenditure for international organisations’, shows the sum 
of  the final account of  public budget expenditure from 2010 to 2014 for 
50 departments and other relevant organisations described above. It is 
assumed that the figures from 2001 to 2009 are equal to those in column 
(16). Based on Table 49.3 in OECD (2015), I have selected 20 listed 
multilateral organisations and verified China’s annual contributions from 
2010 to 2014 based on publicly available documents such as the annual 
reports for each organisation. I have attempted to identify 12 out of  the 
50 departments within the Chinese government which are responsible for 
the above-mentioned multilateral organisations. Except for the Ministry 
of  Public Security (MPS), these departments are among the top 12 
departments in terms of  budget expenditure amounts for 2014.
Next, using the publicly available documents from multilateral 
organisations, I compared the sum of  the annual contributions derived 
for each respective department with each department’s final accounts of  
public budget expenditure for international organisations. In some cases, 
the former was larger than the latter; this is possibly attributable to a lack 
of  budget figures for particular years. There were also cases where the 
former was smaller than the latter because a department’s accounts may 
have included budget expenditure for other international organisations 
which I have not been able to identify. Thus, I have checked each year’s 
budget expenditure figures for each department and adjusted them 
where necessary. Finally, I calculated the core contributions for each 
department using the coefficients in the DAC List of  ODA-eligible 
international organisations. As for the other 38 departments, I assume 
a coefficient for core contributions of  30 per cent. The estimates from 
2010 to 2014 are shown in column (23), ‘Sum of  final account of  
department public budget expenditure for international organisations: 
Adjusted’ (for details, see Annexe Table A2). The figures from 2001 to 
2009 were estimated by using the figures in column (22) and assuming a 
coefficient for core contributions of  30 per cent.
Based on the estimation process described above, column (A) in 
Table 1b, ‘Bilateral: Grants and interest-free loans’, was derived 
by adding columns (18), (19), and (20), and deducting column (13). 
Column (B), ‘Bilateral: Net disbursement of  concessional loans’, is equal 
to column (11). Column (C), which is the sum of  columns (A) and (B), 
shows the bilateral net foreign aid, while column (D), ‘Multilateral: 
Government expenditure for international organisations’ presents 
the estimated amount of  multilateral foreign aid which is equal to 
column (23). Column (E), ‘Total net foreign aid’, equals the sum of  
columns (C) and (D). Column (F), ‘Bilateral: Gross disbursement of  
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concessional loans’, is equal to column (9). Column (G), ‘Bilateral: Gross 
foreign aid’, which is the sum of  columns (A) and (F), shows the gross 
bilateral foreign aid and column (H), ‘Total: Gross foreign aid’, equals 
the sum of  columns (G) and (D).
Finally, the net and gross disbursements of  preferential export buyer’s 
credits are listed in column (I) which is equal to column (15) and in 
column (J) which is equal to column (17).
5 Results of the estimation
Figures 1 and 2, which are derived from Tables 1a and 1b, depict 
China’s estimated net and gross foreign aid in US$ terms. Net foreign 
aid is estimated to have been US$5.2bn in 2012, US$5.4bn in 2013, 
and US$4.9bn in 2014. Compared with the previous estimates of  
Kitano and Harada (2014), figures were either upwardly or downwardly 
revised from 2001 to 2013. In particular, the previous estimate of  
the net foreign aid in 2012 and 2013 amounting to US$5.7bn and 
US$7.1bn was downwardly revised to US$5.2bn and US$5.7bn 
respectively due to the fact that net disbursements of  concessional loans 
were significantly downwardly revised from US$2.6bn to US$2.0bn in 
2012 and from US$3.5bn to US$2.1bn in 2013 respectively as a result 
of  the introduction of  the modified estimation process.
These results show several findings: first, it is rather surprising that net 
foreign aid has increased steadily since 2001; however, it decreased in 
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Figure 1 China’s estimated net foreign aid (US$ billion)
Source Tables 1a and 1b.
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2014 when compared with 2013. Looking at the figures in detail, the 
grants and interest-free loans in bilateral foreign aid were downwardly 
estimated for two consecutive years from 2012 to 2014. The ‘Audit 
results of  budget implementation and other government revenues and 
expenditures of  the Ministry of  Commerce for the year 2014’ issued 
by the National Audit Office (NAO)17 pointed out the reasons why 
MOFCOM’s final account on public budget expenditure for foreign aid 
consisting of  grants and interest-free loans was smaller than the original 
public expenditure budget in 2014, which were: that verification of  
feasibility studies of  part of  the projects at the project approval stage 
were not sufficient, that there were time differences between the planned 
and actual disbursement schedules of  some projects, and in some cases 
that project budgets were released late. The NAO audit report did 
not provide any further evidence on this issue. However, there is some 
secondary evidence. For example, at the media briefing on ‘Measures 
for the Administration of  Foreign Aid (For Trial Implementation)’ 
organised by MOFCOM, its officials emphasised the same point: the 
importance of  management of  the approval stages of  the project.18 This 
suggests that some projects might perform unsatisfactorily because of  a 
lack of  sufficient verification of  the feasibility of  studies in the approval 
stages, which may have partly caused a downward trend in grants and 
interest-free loans.
Second, the rate of  increase in the gross disbursements of  concessional 
loans dropped from 75 per cent in 2009 to 13 per cent in 2011: it then 
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Figure 2 China’s estimated gross foreign aid (US$ billion)
Source Tables 1a and 1b.
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continued to decrease to 5 per cent in 2014. This can be attributed to 
the change in the estimation process.19
Third, as for multilateral foreign aid, final accounts on public budget 
expenditure for international organisations by the Ministry of  Finance 
increased in 2013 and decreased significantly in 2014 (see Annexe 
Table A2). This was due to the fact that China had already completed 
the capital increase for the World Bank’s 2010 shareholding realignment: 
Selective Capital Increase (SCI) for the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – a reform of  voting power.20
In 2014, the share of  bilateral foreign aid is much larger, at 93 per cent, 
than that of  the previous year due to a six percentage point decrease 
in multilateral foreign aid. The proportion of  concessional loans to 
total foreign aid is 43 per cent. The difference between net foreign 
aid (Figure 1) and gross foreign aid (Figure 2) is still minimal, since 
the repayment of  concessional loans was a relatively low 3 per cent of  
outstanding loan amounts in 2014.
As a reference point, the net disbursements of  preferential export 
buyer’s credits, which some recipient countries treat as ODA, are 
estimated to have totalled US$4.9bn in 2012, US$4.7bn in 2013, and 
US$6.1bn in 2014. The revised figure in 2013 was substantially smaller 
than the previous estimate, which was US$7.0bn and was a decrease 
from the previous year. The figure in 2014 exceeded the amount of  total 
net foreign aid. If  this figure is combined as net concessional flows, the 
totals are estimated to have reached US$11.0bn in 2014.
6 Comparison with selected DAC members
This section will compare the previously stated estimates of  China’s 
foreign aid with the ODA to DAC members. Table 2 shows the ranking 
in terms of  net ODA and net foreign aid. 
In the previous estimates, China was ranked at either number 16 or 
number 17 until 2006, then moved up to number 14 in 2007 and to 
number 11 in 2011. China then sat at number six in both 2012 and 
2013. However, the results of  this article suggest that China actually 
moved up to number ten in 2012 and to number nine in 2013. In 
2014, China kept its ranking at number nine just behind Norway, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands. China’s net ODA/GNI ratio in 2012 was 
estimated as 0.066 per cent which is smaller than the previous estimate 
of  0.072 per cent. The ratio then dropped to 0.060 per cent in 2013 
and 0.049 per cent in 2014. With regard to the ranking, China was 
ranked at 29 in 2014.21
Figure 3 compares the trend of  China’s net foreign aid to trends in net 
ODA provided by a selected group of  DAC members: France, Germany, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, the UK, and the 
US. China’s level of  net foreign aid was similar to that of  South Korea, 
the second Asian member of  the DAC, until 2005 when it increased 
sharply as China began to catch up with high-ranking countries.
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In terms of  gross ODA shown in Figure 4, China’s gross foreign aid is 
almost equal to its net foreign aid which was estimated to have decreased 
between 2013 and 2014, as shown in Figure 3. Until 2013, Japan was 
second to the US but in 2014, it went down to fourth position.
7 Conclusion
This article has attempted to revise and update the estimates of  China’s 
foreign aid from 2001 to 2014, and to compare the results with the 
ODA of  DAC members based on the previous work. The results have 
presented an unexpected view of  China’s foreign aid. Net foreign aid 
is estimated to have decreased from US$5.4bn in 2013 to US$4.9bn in 
2014. My estimates of  2012 and 2013 were significantly smaller than 
the previous estimates which were US$5.7bn and US$7.1bn respectively. 
However, those figures need to be used with considerable caution which 
may overestimate or underestimate the actual figures depending on the 
rate of  increase in gross disbursement of  concessional loans.
Since 2013, China has been ranked at number nine, while in terms of  net 
bilateral aid, its ranking has been number six, next to Japan and France, 
since 2012. Importantly, the net disbursements of  preferential export buyer’s 
credits are estimated to have totalled US$4.7bn in 2013 and US$6.1bn in 
2014. My estimate for 2013 was also significantly smaller than the previous 
estimate which was US$7.1bn and was a decrease from the previous year.
With the announcement of  a number of  new initiatives and 
commitments, the Chinese government has recently engaged more 
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proactively in international development. The 13th Five-Year Plan 
(2016–2020)22 stated in Chapter 53 entitled ‘Assume International 
Responsibilities and Obligations’ that China will increase the amount 
of  foreign aid and improve the ways in which it is offered; offer more 
advice and training; expand foreign cooperation and aid in the field 
of  science, technology, education, medical care, disaster prevention 
and mitigation, environmental governance, the protection of  wild 
fauna and flora, and poverty alleviation; step up the provision of  
humanitarian aid; actively implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development; and actively participate in the peacekeeping operations 
of  the United Nations. It seems that China has not only increased its 
foreign aid volume, but has also improved its quality and diversified 
fields of  aid activities while trying to align with global agendas such as 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). On the other hand, some 
countries receiving loans from China are at particular risk of  debt 
distress (Hurley, Morris and Portelance 2018). It is therefore important 
for the international community to carefully examine the magnitude of  
China’s foreign aid.23
Lastly, I would like to outline a number of  future research topics relating 
to my work. The first possible area of  research is the disaggregation 
of  China’s foreign aid by regions/countries and sectors. As described 
in Section 2, some of  the previous literature has focused on estimating 
China’s development finance for specific regions such as Africa. 
A combination of  estimates based on both budget data and project-level 
data might be a direction towards a more comprehensive estimation. 
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The second research topic is to estimate foreign aid based on the DAC’s 
revised system for measuring development finance. At the DAC High 
Level Meeting (DAC-HLM) held in December 2014,24 DAC members 
agreed to modernise the reporting of  concessional loans by introducing 
a grant equivalent system. The Principles of  ODA modernisation 
on Private Sector Instruments and the boundaries of  ODA in the 
field of  peace and security were also agreed by DAC members at the 
DAC-HLM in February 2016. The final research topic aims to estimate 
China’s development finance in accordance with the definition of  Total 
Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), which has 
been under discussion in the international community.25
Notes
* An earlier version of  this article was produced as a JICA-RI Working 
Paper.
✝ This article is part of  the JICA Research Institute’s research project, 
‘Comparative Study on Development Cooperation Strategies: 
Focusing on G20 Emerging Economies’.
1 Director, JICA Research Institute, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) (Kitano.Naohiro@jica.go.jp).
2 In this article, ‘departments’ refers to ministries, commissions, 
administrations, institutions, and offices under the State Council.
3 Kitano and Harada (2014) originated during the process of  writing 
Kitano (2014). It was later published in the Journal of  International 
Development (Kitano and Harada 2016). In this article, the terms 
‘Kitano and Harada (2014)’, ‘the previous work’, ‘the previous 
estimates’, ‘the previous scenario’, or ‘the previous article’, all refer to 
Kitano and Harada (2014).
4 ‘Regarding the ranking in terms of  net ODA/GNI ratio, China 
(0.07) is 29th in 2012’ (Kitano and Harada 2014: 11, footnote 27).
5 Here the three-year average for exchange rates of  US$/RMB6.5147 
is used. This consists of  a grant of  RMB32.32bn (US$5.0bn), 
interest-free loans of  RMB7.26bn (US$1.1bn), and concessional 
loans of  RMB49.76bn (US$7.6bn).
6 As to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) China’s 
unofficial translation not being proofread by MOFCOM, see  
www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/South-South-
cooperation/measures-for-the-administration-of-foreign-aid-.html.
7 See MOFCOM’s media briefing on this regulation, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/
press/201412/20141200851923.shtml.
8 According to the 2011 and 2014 White Papers (Information Office 
of  the State Council 2011, 2014), in a similar manner to grants, the 
disbursements of  interest-free loans, which have a tenure of  20 years, 
including five years of  use, a five-year grace period, and a ten-year 
repayment period, are 100 per cent financed by central government 
expenditure. For this reason, and for the convenience of  estimation, 
interest-free loans were treated as though they were grants. Thus, the 
amount of  the above-mentioned debt relief  for interest-free loans 
was not included in the total amount of  aid.
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9 See https://tinyurl.com/y7n2sty9 [in Chinese].
10 See http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju/ [in Chinese].
11 This bar graph was uploaded as part of  a presentation on the website 
of  UNESCAP Sub-Regional Office for East and North-East Asia 
(SRO-ENEA). See www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Session1_
Li_China.pdf. 
12 China Exim Bank’s two preferential facilities consist of  concessional 
loans and preferential export buyer’s credits.
13 This line graph was included in a presentation uploaded on the website 
of  the China International Contractors Association. See  
www.chinca.org/cms/html/files/2013-12/16/ 
20131216102948872930302.pdf  [in Chinese].
14 I estimated this rate at which the cumulative amount of  the 
framework agreement for concessional loans from 2010 to 2012 in 
column (5) is nearly equal to the corresponding figure (RMB49.76bn) 
in the 2014 White Paper.
15 Regarding the relationship between MOFCOM and other 
departments and the Ministry of  Finance, the 2011 White Paper 
(Information Office of  the State Council 2011) stated that the 
Ministry of  Finance manages foreign aid expenditure in its budgets 
and final accounts system, while MOFCOM and other departments 
under the State Council that are responsible for the management 
of  foreign aid handle financial resources for foreign aid in their own 
departments in accordance with their respective jurisdictions.
16 See http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju/ or  
http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju/index_1.html 
[in Chinese].
17 See www.audit.gov.cn/n5/n25/c67488/part/31322.pdf  [in Chinese].
18 See MOFCOM’s media briefing on this regulation at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/
press/201412/20141200851923.shtml.
19 In the previous estimates, it was assumed that the annual rate of  
increase in gross disbursement of  concessional loans was set at 33 per 
cent for 2012 and 2013; this assumption was based on the fact that the 
average annual rate of  increase from 2006 to 2011 was 33 per cent.
20 See www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju/201507/
t20150716_1330771.html and http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/22553921/DC2010-006(E)
Voice.pdf.
21 See ‘Development aid in 2015 continues to grow despite costs for 
in-donor refugees’ on the OECD website, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/
ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf.
22 See People’s Republic of  China (2016).
23 Regarding the preliminary figures of  estimation beyond 2014, please 
refer to Kitano (2017, 2018, and forthcoming).
24 The DAC High Level Meeting, Final Communiqué, 16 December 
2014, www.oecd.org/dac/OECD%20DAC%20HLM%20
Communique.pdf.
25 As for the ongoing discussion on TOSSD, see www.oecd.org/dac/
financing-sustainable-development/tossd.htm.
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Annexe
Table A1 Grants by other departments and relevant organisations (RMB million)
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Notes 1. This table is a breakdown of column (19) ‘Grants by other departments and relevant organisations’ in Table 1a.  
2. Figures in bold were extracted from publicly accessible statistics and information; those not in bold were estimated. 
Sources Figures from 2010 to 2014 were obtained from the foreign aid expenditure shown in the final accounts of the relevant 
Chinese government department websites.
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Table A2 Process of estimating China’s multilateral foreign aid
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Emerging Economies, Disaster 
Risk Reduction, and South–South 
Cooperation: The Case of Mexico
Neil Renwick1
Abstract The emerging economies differ from each other in various 
economic, political, and cultural ways, but hold a broad understanding and 
approach on key challenges of sustainable development, climate change 
mitigation, and disaster risk reduction (DRR). This approach contributes 
to advancing South–South cooperation (SSC). This article focuses on the 
approach of these economies to DRR, using the case of Mexico to examine 
this question. Mexico, one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to 
natural disasters, has been applauded by leading international DRR figures 
for its commitment and practical response to DRR. The article explores 
this DRR response and what Mexico’s story has to offer to other countries 
in the context of SSC and its emerging role in international development 
cooperation (IDC). It argues that Mexico’s DRR story has many important 
positive aspects to contribute to SSC knowledge-sharing and IDC, but 
it also illustrates continuing challenges of financing, administration, and 
politics for emerging and developing economies alike. 
Keywords: emerging economies, disaster risk reduction, Mexico,  
South–South cooperation, international development cooperation, 
human security.
1 Introduction
It is the fortieth anniversary of  the Buenos Aires Plan of  Action 
for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries (BAPA) in 2018. The decades since the inception 
of  BAPA have seen South–South cooperation (SSC) play an increasingly 
important role in the global cooperation architecture. The 2nd 
High‑Level United Nations Conference on South–South Cooperation 
(HLCSSC) takes place in Argentina in March 2019. SSC is ‘the 
process by which two or more developing countries initiate and pursue 
development through the cooperative exchange of  multidimensional 
knowledge, resources, skills and technical know-how through different 
types of  cooperation’ (Delica‑Willison 2011: 4). Disaster risk reduction 
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(DRR) is central to making SSC work coherently and effectively, climate 
change adaptation, and sustainable development. This has been long 
recognised internationally, with the World Bank’s Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) explaining the critical 
relationship between SSC and DRR as far back as 2008:
South–South Cooperation is inspired by a spirit of  mutual solidarity 
as well as a shared and enlightened self‑interest in providing real 
benefits for the most vulnerable people. South–South Cooperation 
also fosters developing country leadership and ownership of  the 
disaster risk reduction agenda (GFDRR 2008: 1).
As the 2017 World Risk Report argues, ‘disasters prevent developmental 
progress, and a lack of  developmental progress increases disaster risk. 
In order to break this vicious circle, strategies for disaster risk reduction 
must in future be an integral component of  comprehensive strategies for 
sustainable development’ (Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft 2017: 15). DRR is 
a vital response to the risk of  natural disasters. DRR is 
aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and 
managing residual risk, all of  which contribute to strengthening 
resilience and therefore to the achievement of  sustainable 
development… DRR is the policy objective of  disaster risk 
management, and its goals and objectives are defined in disaster risk 
reduction strategies and plans (UN 2016: 1).
This article explores the contribution of  emerging economies to DRR. 
It does so with specific reference to Mexico, a so-called MINT (Mexico, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) emerging economy and widely regarded 
as an exemplar of  DRR practice and commitment. In the view of  the 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), ‘Mexico 
has a solid track record in managing and anticipating disaster risks and 
has a lot of  expertise to share with other countries’ (Leoni 2016: 1). 
Specifically, the article addresses the questions: ‘How do emerging 
economies approach DRR and have they distinctive stories to share that 
can contribute to the further development of  South–South cooperation 
as a practical multi‑stakeholder approach to sustainable development?’ 
As Jim O’Neill has argued: 
The BRIC countries… are already closely watched. The group 
I’m studying for this project [a 2013 BBC Radio 4 special report] 
– let’s call them the MINT economies – deserve no less attention. 
Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey all have very favourable 
demographics for at least the next 20 years, and their economic 
prospects are interesting (O’Neill 2013).
This selection illustrates one of  the central aims of  the present article, 
namely, to highlight and showcase the wider range of  emerging economies. 
Mexico is chosen for five reasons: (1) its high risk of  natural disasters; 
(2) the country’s national protection system, described by Robert Glasser, 
the then special representative of  the UN Secretary‑General for Disaster 
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Risk Reduction and the then head of  UNISDR, as ‘a shining example 
of  how to manage the threats posed by hazards’ (UNISDR 2017b: 1), 
a multi‑stakeholder system bringing together government, the private 
sector, civil society organisations, and international organisations; (3) the 
engagement of  Mexico with global and Latin American policy fora and 
action programmes, exemplified in its hosting of  the 2017 Global Platform 
for Disaster Risk Reduction; (4) Mexico’s dual role as both recipient and 
provider of  international development cooperation assistance; and (5) the 
continuing, substantial challenges of  DRR facing Mexico despite its 
substantial investment, political commitment, and operational progress. 
As such, this article argues Mexico’s story of  DRR contributes a practical 
experience to the evolving understanding, narrative and future orientation 
of  SSC as the HLCSS takes stock and prepares to take SSC to the next 
stage of  its development and to the global SSC epistemic community.
Strengthening DRR is a key component of  the interlocking, mutually 
reinforcing global ‘universal’ compacts on climate change and sustainable 
development. Clearly, this is a two-way process; progress at the global level 
requiring advances made at regional, national, and societal levels and a 
critical flow of  knowledge resources between the emerging economies 
and supra‑state structures, processes, and agencies. This article argues 
that the role and impact of  emerging economies, many of  which are the 
most exposed to natural disasters, are central to the realisation of  the 
aims and objectives of  these global pacts. The emerging economies have 
brought with them distinctive approaches to development grounded in 
their own historic experiences. These economies offer different principles 
of  partnership, equity and mutuality, and sovereign non-interference 
in their relations with other developing economies as well as focusing 
their commitment to South–South cooperation and to South–North–
South triangular cooperation on technical assistance and infrastructure 
capacity building (Stuenkel 2013; Gu, Shankland and Chenoy 2016). 
A key point, however, is that, while the ‘emerging economies’ share a 
number of  common characteristics, interests, and aims, there is a danger 
in overstating these shared features and understating important elements 
of  heterogeneity. Beyond the homogenising acronymic branding lies 
a landscape of  rich diversity in the way these economies understand 
and promote development domestically and internationally and in 
their approach to DRR. In the present article, the relationship between 
consolidating elements and those of  diversity is in creative rather than 
destructive tension. Given the welter of  recent commentary on the 
emerging economies, it is easy to forget that they are a recent addition 
to the pantheon of  systemic agencies and are on a steep learning curve 
to define their own response to their ‘rise’, relations with each other, and 
relations with the established Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and 
Development‑Development Assistance Committee (OECD‑DAC) system.
2 Brief review of the literature
There is a vast, growing, and wide‑ranging literature directly and 
indirectly associated with DRR. The body of  academic, governmental 
and intergovernmental, civil societal, and press literature encompasses 
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a broad range of  DRR topics, issues, and challenges, many of  
which intersect with the literature on climate change and sustainable 
development, generating a range of  emerging issues (Sudmeier‑Rieux 
et al. 2017). The range of  topics include: the relationship between 
human security and DRR (HSN 2017; FAO and UNTFHS 2016; 
Renwick 2016; Kitaoka 2015; Futamura, Hobson and Turner 2012; 
Hobson, Bacon and Cameron 2014; JICA 2010); the terminology 
of  DRR as a key implementation instrument for Sendai Framework 
benchmarking indices (UN 2016); provisions, implementation, and 
monitoring of  the Sendai Framework on DRR (UNISDR 2015a, 
2015b), for example with respect to: health (Aitsi‑Selmi and Murray 
2015); gender (UNISDR 2018; Lovell 2014; Enarson and Dhar 
Chakrabarti 2010); food security (FAO and UNISDR 2017; WFP 2012; 
de Haen and Hemrich 2007); infrastructure investment (GPDRR 2017); 
financing (UNISDR 2017c; VOICE 2013); DRR synchronisation with 
climate change and sustainable development structures, processes, and 
agencies of  action (JICA 2018a, 2017; UNISDR 2015b; Mitchell 2012); 
displaced persons (iDMC 2017); managing DRR at the global, regional, 
national, and sub-national levels and local governance (Yao 2016; 
Al-Nammaria and Alzaghalb 2015); ‘smart’ agriculture (FAO 2015); the 
impact and potential of  emerging technologies (AIDF 2016); private–
public partnership, the contribution of  business and best practices, 
for example, through the work of  ARISE, the Private Sector Alliance 
for Disaster Resilient Societies (ARISE 2017; UNISDR 2013, 2014, 
2017a); South–South knowledge transfers (Aboubacar 2014); DRR 
and conflict zones (International Alert 2015; ODI 2013; Ferris 2010); 
the need for greater citizen DRR awareness and participation and civil 
societal engagement (Ruiz-Rivera and Melgarejo-Rodríguez 2017); and 
the role of  cities and urban centres, a good example being the initiative 
to develop resilient mountain cities (UNISDR 2015c). 
Key findings in this literature are a need to ensure effective governance 
at the global, regional, and national levels and recognition of  the 
importance of  the emerging economies and SSC. DRR is framed by 
the distinctive approach to sustainable development and its intersection 
with climate change brought by the growing economic and political 
importance of  emerging economies. The emerging economies promote 
a broadly common approach to ‘inclusive’ and ‘innovative’ sustainable 
development and global economic growth grounded in principles 
of  equity, mutuality, reciprocity, and partnership and backed by new 
structures and agencies (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank reifying these principles into practical project support). This 
approach both reflects and contributes to processes of  SSC and 
technical cooperation (Gu 2015, 2017). The literature indicates a 
deeper aspect related to the emerging and developing economies and 
their call for the reform of  the funding and managerial principles 
and practices of  the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to better reflect the shifting importance of  the emerging and 
developing economies. 
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Despite the juggernaut of  writing projecting common purpose and 
implementation progress, the literature also contains writings that run 
counter to the prevailing wisdom that the holistic approach weaving 
together the troika of  DRR, climate change mitigation, and sustainable 
development is translating into a changed approach on the ground. A 
survey by Peters identified a range of  challenges: 
 l ‘the confines of  institutional mandates’,
 l ‘the lack of  an evidence base to guide policy and programming’, 
 l ‘fear of  the unknown’, 
 l ‘lack of  funding for experimentation and trialing new or unproven 
approaches’,
 l ‘practical concerns around accessibility and operational security’,
 l ‘a tendency to prioritise peace and security over DRR’ in fragile and 
conflict-affected contexts (2017: 10).
Illustrative of  this literature are commentaries expressing concern about 
financing for DRR and particularly disaster recovery preparedness. For 
example, Francis Ghesquiere, Head of  the GFDRR, and Jo Scheuer, 
Director for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction in the United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Bureau for Policy and 
Programme Support, have argued that ‘With limited time and resources, 
however, adequate preparedness for these common events is often 
neglected in developing countries. The result is a pattern of  deficient 
recovery that is imperiling sustainable development, and leaving millions of  
the most vulnerable behind’, and explained international efforts to address 
this challenge, including by the World Bank’s GFDRR–UNDP–European 
Union, Japan, and Luxembourg (Scheuer and Ghesquiere 2017). 
The sixth of  the seven Sendai Framework’s global targets is to 
‘Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries 
through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national 
actions for implementation of  the present Framework by 2030’ (UN 
2015: 1). The issue of  DRR finance is also raised with respect to DRR in 
fragile and conflict-affected states, Peters and Budimir arguing that there 
is a ‘funding blind spot’ when it comes to these countries (2016: 1). An 
important 2013 analysis of  20 years of  DRR financing exposed critical 
weaknesses. A GFDRR and Overseas Development Institute (ODI) study 
(Kellet and Caravani 2013) found that money spent on DRR constitutes a 
small share of  aid funding. For every US$9 that had been spent on disaster 
response, only US$1 had been allocated to prevention and preparation 
and, for every US$100 of  development assistance, 40 cents was invested 
in protecting that aid from the impact of  disasters. Moreover, funding 
originated from a few donors – the World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, and Japan – and the main recipients were middle‑income countries, 
particularly China, and Indonesia. Particularly concerning was the finding 
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that the funding had primarily been directed into protecting economic 
assets rather than people (Kellet and Caravani 2013: vi).
3 Natural disasters and human security
Natural disasters and the impact of  climate change strike at the very heart 
of  human security. Human security seeks to promote freedom from fear 
and want and freedom to live in dignity. The Commission on Human 
Security’s definition of  human security is ‘to protect the vital core of  all 
human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’ 
(CHS 2003: 4). This impact of  natural disasters and climate change is 
experienced disproportionately, with the poorest in society and women 
hardest hit; in other words, those most dependent on natural resources for 
their livelihoods. These sections of  society are those with the least capacity 
and least pillars of  resilience to respond to such events. In particular, it 
is women who often experience greater risks and consequential burdens 
in conditions of  poverty and unequal access and participation in DRR, 
climate change, and sustainable development governance and responses, 
limiting and weakening the effectiveness of  implementation strategies. 
The challenge of  natural disasters and DRR also has an important 
intergenerational dimension (Caruso 2014), including short‑ and 
long-term consequences for mental and physical health and development, 
displacement, insecurities of  income, food, shelter, sanitation, exploitation 
and abuse, and education. An important component of  this experience 
is the disorienting impact on an individual’s sense of  time and space. 
This is most evident in post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Trauma 
arising from natural disasters is especially potent because they traumatise 
large groups of  people simultaneously, giving rise to feelings of  individual 
and collective anxiety and guilt among survivors, in some cases giving 
rise to suicidal tendencies (Lau et al. 2010: 504). Such trauma is defined 
both by the experience of  being in the event itself  and by a person’s or 
population’s reactions to it (APA 2013; Babbel 2010).
The case for recognising a close link between human security and DRR 
is evident in the literature. According to the Human Security Network: 
At its core, human security reinforces the notion that peace and 
security, human rights, and development are interlinked and 
mutually reinforcing. It is about protecting people from threats to 
their life, safety, fundamental rights and dignity… Strengthening all 
three pillars of  human security can contribute to greater resilience 
to disaster risk, decrease the vulnerability of  people in vulnerable 
situations, and speed up recovery processes. A human security 
approach has a strong potential to help mitigate the multidimensional 
consequences of  disasters and strengthen the capacities of  
communities to manage these risks (HSN 2017: 1).
This argument has been made in more detail by the President of  the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Shinichi Kitaoka, in 
his Keynote Speech at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster 
Risk Reduction in 2015. In this address, President Kitaoka made the 
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important point that the human security–DRR relationship is not, 
as many commentaries seem to imply, solely about how DRR can 
contribute to enhanced human security but is also about how a human 
security approach and understanding can contribute to more effective 
DRR: ‘I believe that by making the human security approach more 
explicit in our disaster risk reduction efforts, we will be able to better 
plan and prepare for disaster prevention without leaving the most 
vulnerable people behind’ (Kitaoka 2015: 1). 
4 Mexico, DRR and SSC
4.1 Mexico’s natural disaster profile
As noted in the Introduction, Mexico’s DRR experience has been 
regarded as a good example to other countries of  how to establish an 
effective DRR response. The Mexican government has recognised this 
and contributes its story to South–South knowledge‑sharing and action 
programmes through regional and global fora, and networks. The point 
of  departure is the nature of  the multiple natural threats facing Mexico. 
Owing to the nature of  its geographical location, topography and 
anthropomorphic history, Mexico has high exposure to a wide spectrum 
of  hazards, raising the threshold of  threat to human security. These 
hazards include earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, hurricanes, wildfires, 
floods, landslides, and droughts. Mexico’s Disaster Risk Profile underlines 
this high‑level exposure and risk, with over 30 per cent of  Mexico 
affected every year by disasters (Leoni 2016; Pérez-Campos et al. 2008). 
Mexico ranks 94th on the 2017 World Risk Index. The Index calculates 
the risk posed to 171 countries worldwide by means of  a multiplication 
of  risk and vulnerability. The 2017 Report presents a five-year 
perspective for the period 2012–16 (Bündnis Entwicklung 2017: 40). 
4.2 Human security impact
Climate change critically affects Mexican DRR and human security 
(Ruiz‑Rivera and Lucatello 2017). This was recognised by the Mexican 
government itself  in a 2009 submission to the UN Secretary‑General 
addressing climate change and human security, which argued that 
‘impacts, magnitude and projected persistence of  environmental, 
social and economic phenomena derived from climate change turn 
this issue in[to] a priority matter that has direct repercussions in all 
abovementioned security spheres’ (UN 2009: 1). More recently, the 
current president, Peña Nieto, has recognised that ‘Climate change 
is creating new risks and we need to rethink the way we produce and 
consume, the way we are doing things, as the challenges ahead are big’ 
(UNISDR 2017b). Mexico is the 14th largest greenhouse gas emitter 
in the world, and the second largest in Latin America. Natural disasters 
impact upon over 30 per cent of  Mexico every year, ranging from 7,000 
seismic shocks to hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and forest fires. 
Mexico is experiencing significantly more severe droughts, floods, and 
storms including hurricanes. Simultaneously, rainfall is decreasing, 
exacerbating the development of  arid zones, degrading agricultural 
land, lowering production, weakening incomes, and providing 
additional impetus for rural depopulation and increased urbanisation. 
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The impact on Mexican human security has been high. In the period 
1970–2009, Mexican data estimates that around 60 million people 
were affected by natural disasters in the country (World Bank 2012). 
A decade ago, a study of  the impact of  Mexico’s natural disasters at 
the municipal level demonstrated ‘a significant impact from natural 
disasters on reducing the Human Development Index and also on 
increasing poverty levels’ (Rodríguez‑Oreggia, de la Fuente and de la 
Torre 2008: 17). Mexican insecurities arising from natural disasters 
are broad and complex. In addition to the intensity of  human loss and 
suffering and detrimental impact upon children’s psychology, Mexicans 
confront the loss of  employment and income, dignity and status, with 
a disproportionately adverse impact upon women, indigenous peoples 
and the poorest at their most vulnerable in the favelas around Mexico 
City. Compounding this experience is the economic cost, loss of  human 
capital, and destruction of  communications, transport and essential public 
services infrastructure; agricultural degrading and industrial dislocation; 
and ecological devastation.
4.3 Mexico’s DRR approach
What is it that Mexico’s DRR offers to SSC? The response of  Mexico 
to DRR has been described as a ‘shining light’ and an ‘icon of  risk 
management’ (UNISDR 2017b: 1). In the view of  Robert Glasser, the 
then special representative of  the UN Secretary‑General for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, ‘The way Mexico manages disaster risks shows the 
effectiveness of  its civil protection system and its enormous capacity to 
mobilise and unite all Mexicans against disasters’ (UNISDR 2017b: 1).
The Mexican National Civil Protection System (SINAPROC) was 
created in 1986. The galvanising factor was the 1985 earthquake 
that devastated the country, causing 10,000 deaths and thousands 
more casualties; the earthquake impacting most severely on Mexico 
City. SINAPROC was created as an inclusive and multi‑level system 
integrating stakeholders from all over the country and from the 
three levels of  government, the private and social sectors, academia, 
and scientific organisations. Its initial objective was to provide an 
institutional framework for the improved coordination of  emergency 
response and worked with UNISDR and the World Bank to establish 
the new system (World Bank 2013a, 2013b).
Since inception, SINAPROC has seen an evolutionary progression of  its 
risk assessment, early warning, preparedness, and disaster risk financing 
functions. The system’s administrative structure has been strengthened 
and coordination made more effective. Emergency response plans have 
been more clearly elaborated and supported by training provision in 
strategic sectors, particularly at the federal level. In addition, the system 
has been technically upgraded with the deployment of  a grass‑roots 
early warning system, a system that would prove its worth in the capital 
during the September 2017 earthquake, with invaluable seconds of  
warning given to the population. 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 3 July 2018: ‘Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation’ 73–92 | 81
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
In terms of  generalising from Mexico’s experience, the country’s 
story of  DRR response and resilience-building provides a significant 
example, and potentially transferrable, model of  effective DRR 
financing for SSC, albeit with important warning caveats. The context 
for this is the present government’s setting of  four national foreign 
policy priorities to include international development cooperation 
(IDC). The country’s 2013–18 National Development Plan states that 
‘cooperación internacional para el desarrollo, como una expresión de 
solidaridad y, al mismo tiempo, un medio para impulsar al bienestar 
y la prosperidad’ [‘Foreign policy will be based on international 
development cooperation, as an expression of  solidarity and, at the 
same time, a means to promote wellbeing and prosperity of  our country 
and the international community’] (Government of  Mexico 2013: 99). 
Mexico’s IDC is coordinated by the Mexican Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (AMEXCID), basing its activities on the Law 
on International Development Cooperation (LIDC).
As noted above, a central issue in DRR has been finding the funding 
necessary to tackle the varied and complex implementation challenges, 
a challenge recognised in the Sendai Framework and in the Fifth Session 
of  the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, held in Cancún, 
Mexico, in May 2017. For some governments, such as Bolivia, the root 
of  this problem is the historical legacy of  environmental and economic 
debasement left to the developing countries of  the global South by 
the excessive emissions of  advanced economies of  the North. In this 
perspective, climate change mitigation and DRR are issues of  global 
justice and the controversial arguments advocating a ‘climate debt’: 
Developed countries are thus responsible for compensating 
developing countries for their contribution to the adverse effects 
of  climate change… Failure to honour payment of  financing and 
compensation constitutes an ‘adaptation debt’ owed by developed 
countries to developing countries. Excessive use of  atmospheric space: 
An emissions debt. As well as causing adaptation harm, developed 
countries’ historical and current excessive emissions are limiting 
atmospheric space available to developing countries (GoB 2009).
According to one estimate, Mexico’s share of  global ‘climate debt’ was 
0.72 per cent in 2010 and remained unchanged in 2015 but declined 
to 0.67 per cent in October 2017, and the country was ranked 23rd out 
of  199 countries (163 full reporting; 36 estimated; USA declining share 
33.6 per cent, China increasing share 17.59 per cent, Japan stabilised 
share 4.80 per cent). Mexico’s climate debt per capita, accumulated 
since 2000, has increased from US$105 in 2010, to US$291 in 2015 
and totalled US$377 in October 2017 ranking it 62nd in the global list 
(Andersen 2017).
Mexico’s response to DRR financing has attracted international attention 
and centres on FONDEN, its Fund for Natural Disasters, to support 
disaster relief  and reconstruction. A World Bank review of  FONDEN 
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in 2012 concluded that ‘FONDEN now provides one of  the most 
sophisticated disaster financing vehicles in the world’ (World Bank 2012: 
vi). FONDEN became operational in 1999. Funds from FONDEN could 
be used for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of: public infrastructure at 
the three levels of  government (federal, state and municipal); low-income 
housing; and certain components of  the natural environment (e.g. forestry, 
protected natural areas, rivers and lagoons). The financing system 
operates through two main programmes: for reconstruction and for 
prevention. Both programmes operate under the financial responsibility of  
BANOBRAS, Mexico’s state‑owned development bank. Since its inception, 
the government has steadily moved the focus and funding for FONDEN to 
emphasise prevention rather than post‑disaster risk management. 
However, despite the political plaudits, this funding story also illustrates 
the fundamental challenges faced by many emerging and developing 
countries in maintaining their commitments. The shift to prevention has 
not yet been fully implemented. The OECD undertook a review of  the 
Mexican National Civil Protection System in 2012, noting the strengths 
of  the system, a number of  weaknesses, and areas for strengthening 
the system (OECD 2013). Yet, early signs of  concern with the system 
emerged in 2014, as Mexico’s federal auditor heavily criticised the 
government for spending less on disaster preparation and prevention 
than on reconstruction. This concern has continued to escalate as 
budgetary cuts have eaten into DRR funding and impacted adversely 
on the system. In 2017, Enrique Guevara, a former head of  Mexico’s 
National Centre for Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED) argued that ‘We 
should be investing more in prevention. Firstly because you save lives, 
and secondly you save money’ (Stargardter 2017: 1).
This takes us to the heart of  the issue of  DRR implementation for 
emerging economies such as that of  Mexico. Some years ago the 1992 
American presidential economy was defined by the slogan ‘It’s the 
economy stupid!’. So too today, as Mexico’s economic circumstances, 
political priorities, and tensions of  governance are potentially derailing 
substantive advances made since the devastating 1985 earthquake. 
Mexico’s economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues, financing 
about 20 per cent of  Mexico’s federal budget. A decline in oil prices has 
cut income, created budgetary shortfalls, and necessitated budgetary 
cuts. Consequently, disaster budgets have been halved in recent years. 
In 2017 alone, budgets for disaster and civil protection efforts were 
reduced by 25 per cent, from about 8.6 billion pesos (US$475 million) 
in 2016 to 6.4 billion pesos. The budget for FOPREDEN, the fund 
for the prevention of  natural disasters, was reduced by 50 per cent. 
FONDEN, the fund for disaster relief, lost 25 per cent of  its budget. At 
CENAPRED, expenditure fell by 20 per cent between 2012 and 2016, 
and a senior official claimed that this damaged the upkeep of  a national 
risk atlas and lowered morale at the institution. In the light of  these 
cutbacks the Mexican Congress issued a highly critical report concluding 
that ‘the state is relinquishing its responsibilities to its population, given 
inevitable and unknowable disaster risks’ (Stargardter 2017).
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The economic condition also led to criticism that the government had 
failed to provide the necessary funding to ensure early warning systems 
were as robust as technically possible, specifically the earthquake 
early warning system giving Mexico City’s inhabitants sufficient 
time to evacuate buildings before tremors arrive. The system needs 
more monitors to detect even more tremors. For the 7.1‑magnitude 
earthquake in September 2017 (USGS 2017), as noted above, although 
the system provided some warning, the system’s director stated that 
better detection could have given Mexico City’s residents up to five 
seconds more warning that day, with many locals stating that they 
heard the alarm only once the ground began shaking. The government, 
and specifically the president, stands accused of  having rejected 
funding requests to upgrade the system. In addition, even with regard 
to disaster reduction, concern has been raised over the effectiveness 
of  the decentralisation mitigation works. Given Mexico’s high risk, 
provincial and municipal projects have been limited in number, due to 
lower prioritisation and particularly as a result of  a critical technical 
and administrative undercapacity to identify risk and propose concrete 
measures. This is especially the case in those sub‑regions of  the country 
facing the highest level of  risk (Saldana‑Zorrilla 2015). While President 
Nieto has acknowledged the need for more funding and has called 
for this to be provided by Congress, the concerns over the system 
run contrary to the picture provided by Luis Felipe Puente, head of  
SINAPROC, who has argued that 
It has taken us some time to build it but it works, is efficient and 
involves all Mexicans. Today, Civil Protection works at the Federal, 
State and Municipal levels and is supported by strong legal 
instruments and good monitoring systems. It is a vital system to help 
us face not only natural emergencies but any threat that can put our 
country in danger (Leoni 2016: 1).
In terms of  South–South cooperation and the sharing of  Mexico’s 
experience, while the internal strategic development was being 
implemented, Mexico developed important mechanisms for multilateral 
cooperation, for example with respect to tropical storm forecasting. 
The government was an active participant in the Hyogo Framework for 
Action 2005–15 for the formulation of  strategies and policies for disaster 
risk management. This laid the foundation for the country’s regional 
multilateral cooperation during this period through the Regional 
Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in The Americas organised by 
UNISDR (the Sixth Regional Platform to be held in Cartagena, Bolívar, 
Colombia in June 2018) and, post‑2015, through the Regional Action 
Plan for the Implementation of  the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in the Americas. As is the case with many 
other emerging economies, they are simultaneously new providers and 
recipients of  international development assistance (Renwick 2016). 
As a middle‑income country recipient, ‘it is a recipient of  technical, 
academic and financial cooperation (mostly non-concessional) from 
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other countries and multi‑lateral organisations’2 (González 2017: 3). 
As a provider it contributes to ‘South–South Cooperation (CSS) in 
bilateral, regional, triangular schemes (in association with another 
provider to reach a third country)’ (ibid.: 3). Mexico provides funding 
resources in extra‑budgetary funds or public trusts for international 
cooperation purposes with three primary SSC objectives: (1) to offer 
financial support and strengthen cooperation programmes and projects; 
(2) to contribute to international development through technical 
cooperation, exchange of  experiences (experts) and knowledge; and 
(3) to improve the effectiveness of  public policies (capacity building). 
This IDC commitment is based on the National Fund for International 
Cooperation for Development (FONCID) and Sectoral Research 
Fund SRE–CONACYT and a range of  joint funds: Mixed Fund for 
Technical and Scientific Cooperation Mexico–Spain, Joint Cooperation 
Fund Mexico–Chile, Joint Fund of  Cooperation Mexico–Uruguay 
and Joint Cooperation Fund Mexico–Germany; and on multilateral 
funds with international organisations: Mexican Fund for International 
Cooperation for Development with Ibero‑America (FOMEXCIDI‑
SEGIB), Mexican Fund for Cooperation with Latin America and the 
Caribbean (through the Organization of  American States (OAS)), and 
Mexico Fund for the OAS. Together, these funds helped underwrite 
101 cooperation projects. In 2015, 74 per cent of  Mexico’s IDC 
was its contribution to international organisations, 11.4 per cent 
for scholarships for international students, 7 per cent for financial 
cooperation, 3.9 per cent for technical cooperation and 0.2 per cent for 
humanitarian assistance (González 2017: 5–6). 
Triangular cooperation forms an important component of  Mexico’s 
SSC. With respect to Japan, for example, an important DRR project 
has been the El Salvador–Mexico–Japan TAISHIN (Earthquake-
Resistant Popular Housing) project. This ran in two stages: December 
2003–November 2008 and May 2009–April 2012. Nonetheless, 
bilateral cooperation remains a central pillar of  Mexico’s IDC. 
For example, in 2017, the Japan–Mexico Joint Programme (JMPP) 
prioritised ‘Assistance in Cooperation Policy for International 
Development’ and the goal of  triangular cooperation (JICA n.d.). 
Project work included knowledge and skills transfers in adolescent 
sexual and reproductive health. Cooperation also included a major 
programme to promote Scientific-Technical Cooperation and for the 
Strengthening of  Capacities to face Climate Change. This programme 
includes assessment of  the Diversity and Development of  the 
Sustainable Use of  Genetic Resources of  Mexico, Development of  the 
Aquaponics System Combined with Open Cultivation Adapted to the 
Arid Zones for the Sustainable Production of  Food. 
This Mexico–Japan bilateral cooperation in 2018 includes an important 
DRR project: Assessment of  the Risk of  Large Earthquakes and 
Tsunami in the Mexican Pacific Coast for Disaster Mitigation. This 
US$4 million project (2016–21) focuses on the occurrence of  large 
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earthquakes and tsunamis on the Mexican Pacific coast, with emphasis 
on the state of  Guerrero, a region 140km in length very likely to 
experience a major earthquake in the near future. The project is intended 
to better inform the civil protection authorities of  the state and to develop 
an educational programme with an emphasis on disaster prevention for 
the construction of  more resilient communities (JICA 2018b).
5 Conclusions
This article has addressed the central questions of  ‘How do emerging 
economies approach DRR and have they distinctive stories to share that 
can contribute to the further development of  South–South cooperation 
as a practical multi‑stakeholder approach to sustainable development?’ 
It has explained the global DRR challenge and, having established 
a human security–DRR analytical approach, explored emerging 
economies and their contributory potential for DRR in the context 
of  the evolving process of  SSC. The article argued that the emerging 
economies are important drivers of  DRR and the wider processes of  
SSC. The study’s key findings are: 
 l The emerging economies offer an important new contribution of  
knowledge and practical experience to South–South cooperation, 
both in general terms and in relation to DRR.
 l These economies, as a collective grouping, are highly diverse but 
demonstrate common principles, perspectives, and approaches to 
sustainable development, climate change adaptation, and disaster risk 
reduction.
 l Their experiences as simultaneously recipients and providers of  
international development assistance, humanitarian aid and disaster 
relief  support offers a very distinctive way of  evolving their South–
South, triangular, and technical cooperation.
 l There is, however, a danger in over‑homogenisation of  this 
experience; BRICS members have their own particular ways of  
approaching the global agenda, as do MINT economies.
 l Nonetheless, the global frameworks, action plans, regional platforms, 
and national strategies in DRR demonstrate an overall coherence of  
purpose and coordination of  practice.
 l Mexico’s practical experience illustrates what can be achieved 
positively in national, regional, and global DRR cooperation, 
offering a story of  multi-stakeholder engagement for other economies 
facing natural disaster threats.
 l Although the positives of  Mexico’s DRR story are clearly 
important, perhaps even more telling are the continuing financial, 
administrative, and political challenges that remain in building 
resilience, protecting people, and strengthening human security from 
the threat of  natural disasters.
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Notes
1 Coventry University.
2 Quoted text in this paragraph has been translated from Spanish 
using Google Translate.
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India’s Role as a Facilitator of 
Constitutional Democracy*
Hiroaki Shiga1
Abstract How can the unique knowledge, experiences, institutions, norms, 
and ideas from developing countries contribute to the political, economic, 
and social development of other developing countries? This question is 
worth asking, as ongoing discussions regarding emerging donors have 
failed to explore the possible contribution of developing countries to 
governance issues through the utilisation of their unique resources. This 
article examines the realities and potential of India’s contribution to 
the enhancement of democratic governance in developing countries. It 
argues that India’s enduring experience with constitutional democracy has 
attracted attention from other developing countries, particularly those 
who are tackling the daunting challenge of consolidating democracy in 
tandem with the projects of building a coherent nation and legitimate and 
functioning state within the inherently hostile environment of an ethnically 
and religiously divided society. 
Keywords: India, emerging donor, democratic governance, democracy 
promotion, constitution, constitutional democracy.
1 Introduction
How can the unique experiences, institutions, norms, and ideas 
of  developing countries contribute to the development and good 
governance of  other developing countries? This question has been left 
unexplored in the ongoing discussions about the so-called ‘emerging 
donors’ that have gained impetus since the mid-2000s. Worse still, 
we have witnessed persistent speculation that, through their alleged 
indifference and negligence of  ‘good governance’ issues such as 
democracy, rule of  law, human rights, and anti-corruption, emerging 
donors are spoiling the concerted efforts of  traditional donors to 
improve governance in developing countries (Naím 2007). 
A notable exception to the general lack of  interest and research into 
developing countries’ positive contributions to governance issues is 
the recent attention in Western literature given to the role India plays 
in facilitating democratic governance. I would argue, however, that 
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conventional literature fails to duly evaluate the holistic picture of  
India’s contribution to the promotion of  democracy. My main argument 
is that India’s enduring experience of  constitutional democracy offers 
an attractive model for other developing countries facing the triple 
challenge of  building a legitimate state, a cohesive nation with a 
sense of  national unity, and a sustainable democracy, and that India’s 
potential as a promoter of  democratic governance is promising.
2 Review of conventional literature 
2.1 Background on the recent attention given to India
Since the 2010s, Western observers have begun to pay more attention 
to India’s role in the enhancement of  democratic governance. A major 
factor that facilitated this increase in attention was the slowdown of  
the global trend towards democratisation in the 2000s. Contrary to the 
Western euphoria that saw democracy gain a ‘near universal normative 
acceptance’ (McFaul 2004), the ‘Third Wave of  democratisation’ 
(Huntington 1993) lost momentum in the 2000s. Many countries failed 
to consolidate their democracy and some slid back to authoritarianism. 
Currently, we are witnessing a world where ‘the resilience of  undemocratic 
regimes and the trend towards authoritarianism has become the global 
rule’ (Burnell and Schlumberger 2011: 3). The democratisation of  Iraq 
by force in 2003 was fatal to Western-led efforts for the promotion of  
democracy as it ‘tarnished its reputation beyond repair’ (Whitehead 2009: 
215). Western countries were driven into a situation in which they could 
not go back to the excessive self-confidence of  the 1990s but nonetheless 
were not able to discard the normative commitment to the promotion of  
democracy (Whitehead 2009: 225). Thus, Western countries began to look 
for a reliable partner to help reverse the ‘trend towards authoritarianism’. 
It was exactly at this time that Western policymakers and academics 
interpreted several signs from the Indian government as showing a 
significant change in the Indian traditional diplomatic posture towards 
the promotion of  democracy. Before the 2000s, India never presented 
itself  in the international arena as an active and principled promoter 
of  democracy.2 ‘Non-interference’ had been one of  the main pillars 
of  Indian diplomacy and aid policy (Kondoh et al. 2010), and India 
carefully eschewed the role of  ‘proselytising’ an authoritarian regime 
into a democratic one.3
The first sign of  change appeared in its neighbourhood policy. In the 
face of  protracted socio-political instability and civil war in Nepal, 
India proactively engaged in the peaceful settlement of  the civil war 
and democratisation of  Nepal in cooperation with Western nations 
including the United States.4 In 2005, India showed another sign 
of  change by taking the lead in establishing the United Nations 
Democratisation Fund (UNDEF) in cooperation with the United 
States; since then it has been the second-largest contributor only after 
the United States. In his address at the launch ceremony of  UNDEF, 
the then Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, emphasised the 
significance of  democracy in facilitating development:
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Poverty, illiteracy or socioeconomic backwardness do not hinder the 
exercise of  democracy. Quite the contrary, our experience of  more 
than fifty years of  democratic rule demonstrates how democracy 
is a most powerful tool to successfully overcome the challenge of  
development… India has been sharing its rich experience, institutional 
capabilities, and training infrastructure with nations that share our 
values and beliefs and request our assistance. We are prepared to do 
much more, both as active participants in the Democracy Fund and in 
the Community of  Democracies (Singh 2005).
Singh’s depiction of  democracy as the ‘most powerful tool’ in 
overcoming the challenge of  development was interpreted by Western 
observers as a remarkable change in India’s long-standing commitment 
to ‘non-interference’ and as a sign of  proactive engagement in the 
Western-led enterprise of  democratisation. It was expected on the 
Western side that ‘shared values and adherence to democracy’ would 
work as ‘natural common ground for closer cooperation’ in the 
promotion of  democratic governance (Kugiel 2012: 1). 
2.2 Review of conventional literature
Against this background, much of  the conventional literature is 
motivated by the same research question: ‘Will India be a reliable 
Western partner in the promotion of  democracy?’ The title of  a 
publication by Carothers and Youngs (2011), Looking for Help: Will Rising 
Democracies Become International Democracy Supporters?, succinctly describes 
the shared concern of  Western authors. However, the prognosis in 
the conventional literature is gloomy. They are almost unanimous in 
concluding that India will not be a principled partner in promoting 
democracy, at least in the near future, and that the Indian model of  
democracy is not attractive due to its defective nature. 
An example of  this comes from Burnell and Schlumberger (2011: 11) 
who criticise India’s commitment to the promotion of  democracy as 
still being quite weak. They argue that in order for the Western-led 
promotion of  democracy, which was tarnished in Iraq, to regain 
international legitimacy, regional actors such as India should stand at 
the front line; they also argue that India’s initiative in South Asia will 
be an important barometer for determining whether democracy or 
authoritarianism would be a dominant direction in the future. Likewise, 
Grävingholt et al. (2011: 1) argue that India is making no significant 
contribution to the enhancement of  democracy in its neighbourhood 
and hardly acts as a democratic counterbalance to China and Russia. In 
sum, the literature argues that India still does not contribute in a visible 
manner to the West’s concerted effort to undertake a counteroffensive 
against the ‘trend towards authoritarianism’ (Burnell and Schlumberger 
2011: 3) by proselytising undemocratic regimes. 
To date, there has been only a limited assessment of  those Indian 
activities for the promotion of  democracy that fall within the category 
of  development aid (South–South cooperation). Many commentators 
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discuss India’s comparative advantage in delivering democracy 
assistance and recommend that India’s rich experience in organising 
and monitoring elections should be shared with other developing 
countries (Faust and Wagner 2010: 4; Kugiel 2012). No reference is 
made to India’s development aid for institution-building or capacity 
development, which are both indispensable for democratic governance. 
Regarding the possibility that India could serve as an ‘exemplar’ of  
democracy for other developing countries and thus differentiate itself  
both from a ‘crusading and domineering West and a cynical China’ 
(Mohan 2011), the assessment in conventional literature is also pessimistic. 
For example, Faust and Wagner point to Indian ‘political deficiencies’ 
such as clientelism, patronage, and corruption, and argue that ‘only a 
credible domestic assault on bad governance will be able to promote the 
basis of  [India’s] international soft power’ (2010: 4). 
3 Causes of the underestimation of India’s role in the promotion of 
democracy 
Both the reality and the potential of  India’s role in democracy promotion 
are underestimated in the conventional understanding. The defects in 
conventional literature are twofold: first, conventional literature tends 
to focus narrowly on the role of  a foreign state in the ‘proselytising’ 
of  authoritarian regimes into democracy; this leaves India’s active 
development aid for the consolidation of  democracy, as well as its 
potential to serve as an ‘exemplar’ of  democracy, virtually unexplored.
Second, conventional literature employs a minimalistic definition 
of  democracy that places weight on the right of  people to choose 
their leaders by means of  regular, free, and fair elections (Diamond 
2009: 21). This narrow definition of  democracy, which leaves the 
imminent danger of  majoritarian democracy and the importance of  
the sound development of  constitutional democracy in divided societies 
unattended, unfortunately excludes India’s contribution to democracy 
promotion. For, as we shall see later, constitutional democracy is the 
very mode of  democracy for which India has been serving as a model 
for other developing countries.
3.1 Problems in the scope of research
The first defect in conventional literature relates to its scope, as it fails 
to assess the holistic picture of  India’s contribution to democracy 
promotion. 
In general, as an external actor, a state can contribute to the 
enhancement of  democratic governance in other countries in 
various ways (see Table 1). A state can cajole, prod, or even pressure 
authoritarian regimes into democratising, or it can mediate negotiation 
among conflict parties and thus facilitate democratic transition. After 
the transition, a state can facilitate democratic consolidation by assisting 
with institution-building and capacity development within various 
organisations, which is essential for democracy to function. There 
is an abundance of  policy instruments available: a state can employ 
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military intervention or economic sanctions, or extend development aid. 
Much less focused, but nonetheless an important contribution to the 
enhancement of  democracy, are cases where a state serves as a model to 
garner interest and be studied and emulated by other countries. 
In conventional literature on the various options, the focus tends to 
be on the phase of  democratic transition – a revolutionary phase of  
democratisation in which the incumbent authoritarian regime is toppled 
Table 1 Multiple ways to contribute to democratic governance
Type Example Phase Nature of state 
action
Active promotion 
of democracy
Vis-à-vis 
undemocratic 
regimes
Exerting pressure 
on the leadership 
of undemocratic 
regimes by 
sanctions, etc.
Western sanctions 
to Myanmar 
military regime
Democratic 
transition
Strategic and 
diplomatic
Mediation and 
brokering of 
democratic 
transition
US and India’s 
engagements in 
democratisation 
of Nepal in the 
2000s
Assistance to 
anti-government 
political parties, 
non-governmental 
organisations, and 
mass media
US engagements 
in the ‘colour 
revolutions’ in 
the former Soviet 
Union
Development aid
(South–South 
cooperation)
Vis-à-vis 
democratic /
democratising 
regimes
Assistance to 
democratic 
institution-
building and 
democracy-
related capacity 
development 
of government 
and civil society 
organisations
Poland’s assistance 
to Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, 
and Georgia 
(Petrova 2012). 
Democratic 
consolidation
Provision of 
expertise 
and materials 
necessary for 
democratic 
procedures 
(i.e. elections)
Japan’s election 
assistances
Serving as 
a model of 
democracy
Unique norms, ideas, institutions, and 
practices are studied and emulated by 
other countries
India’s role as 
a model of 
constitutional 
democracy
Democratic 
transition and 
consolidation
No state action 
required 
Source Author’s own.
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and power is transferred to the democrats. They regard visible measures 
for facilitating democratic transition, such as diplomatic pressure, 
sanctions on authoritarian regimes, or direct support for democratically 
minded forces, as evidence of  a principled commitment to the cause of  
global democratisation. 
The unfortunate consequence of  this tendency to focus on the more 
radical measures is that much less attention has been paid to those 
methods that facilitate the long and difficult process of  democratic 
consolidation after transition,5 not to mention India’s role as a model of  
democracy for other developing countries. This has a pernicious effect 
on the fair evaluation of  India’s role, as development aid for democratic 
consolidation is India’s main field of  activity. Moreover, being able to 
serve as a model of  democracy is the most distinctive aspect of  India’s 
contribution to the enhancement of  democratic governance in other 
developing countries. 
3.2 Definitional problems with ‘democracy’ and ‘democratisation’
3.2.1 Importance of an inclusive and pluralistic democracy
The second problem with the conventional literature of  democracy 
promotion is that its evaluation of  Indian activities and resources for the 
promotion of  democracy is based on an inadequately narrow definition 
of  the term ‘democracy’ to be promoted. My argument here is that it is 
necessary to extend the definition of  democracy by departing from the 
minimalist one advanced by Robert Dahl. Dahl’s concept of  democracy, 
or ‘polyarchy’, is made up of  two components: people’s participation 
in politics through free and periodic elections, and freedom of  political 
speech (freedom of  public contestation) (Dahl 2000). It is clear that 
these two components are vital for democracy; however, they are the 
minimum requirements of  democracy. The problem is that Dahl misses 
the indispensable elements for tackling the daunting challenge prevalent 
in many developing countries: that democracy must be consolidated 
in tandem with the projects of  nation-building and state-building 
within the inherently hostile environment of  a divided society.6 Here, 
nation-building refers to the creation of  common national identities 
that serve as a locus of  loyalty that trumps attachments to tribe, region, 
or ethnic group (Fukuyama 2015: 39). Also, state-building is defined as 
the creation of  a political organisation that possesses a monopoly on 
legitimate coercion and exercises that power over a defined territory 
(Fukuyama 2015: 9–10).
In a divided society, the ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities are 
doomed to be constant minorities in the political scene, no matter how 
many times ‘free and fair elections’ are implemented; the minorities 
are therefore virtually marginalised from the political decision-making 
process. In other words, the interchangeability of  the majority and 
the minority is not guaranteed through the electoral process. From the 
viewpoint of  minorities in such situations, elections, parliament, and 
laws are nothing more than instruments of  the ‘tyranny of  majority’, if  
the majoritarian will expressed through elections is deemed omnipotent 
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in legislative and political decision making. Worryingly enough, Jon 
Elster’s concern that after democratic transitions in Eastern European 
countries, ‘dictatorship by communists was just replaced by majoritarian 
dictatorship’ (Elster 1992: 19) is now becoming a reality in many other 
countries. In such situations, the cleavage between the majority and the 
minorities would be hard to overcome, and any sense of  national unity 
beyond parochial ethnic or religious group identities would be difficult 
to form, thus making the projects of  nation-building and state-building 
remote goals. Indeed, this is the very problem that dominates politics in 
many ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that India emphasises the importance 
of  inclusive and pluralistic democracy to make democracy sustainable and 
enduring. The former prime minister, Manmohan Singh, said that both 
authoritarianism and majoritarianism are an aberration, and that: 
Our commitment to democracy is conjoined with a commitment to 
the deeper values of  pluralism and liberalism. India’s embrace of  
diversity as an essential ingredient of  our democracy what today is 
characterised as multiculturalism is deeply rooted in our culture… 
This is a model of  democratic practice that has great relevance to 
this fractured world, in which we often hear seductive arguments 
equating ethnicity or language or religion with nationhood. Such 
flawed hypotheses do not create states or civilisations. Democracy 
cannot be based on exclusion; it has to be inclusive because it 
celebrates plurality… Multicultural nations like ours, will remain the 
targets of  the protagonists of  bigotry because our societies invalidate 
their thesis (Singh 2004).
This notion of  inclusive and pluralistic democracy, which embraces 
ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, is the defining characteristic 
of  Indian democracy and a model that has been emulated by other 
developing countries striving for the triple challenge of  nation-building, 
state-building, and the consolidation of  democracy. The point to be 
noted here is that India itself  has long been, and still is, facing this 
daunting challenge of  building a functioning and legitimate state, 
coherent nation, and sustainable democracy. It means that India has 
been, and still is, grappling to overcome the malfunction and corruption 
of  the government, exclusion and marginalisation of  particular groups, 
and the resultant activation of  parochial ethnic and religious identities, 
communal violence, and secessionist movements. In other words, India’s 
historical challenge has been to translate the ideal of  constitutional 
democracy as epitomised in the Indian Constitution into practice and to 
realise an inclusive and pluralistic democracy.
3.2.2 Importance of prudent constitutional design
Having said that, inclusive and pluralistic democracy is a vague notion. 
It needs to be institutionalised in a constitution and duly exercised 
through actual implementation, interpretation, and reinterpretation 
of  the constitution. Focusing on constitutions is important, as 
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democratisation never fails to be accompanied by the drafting of  a 
new constitution. Additionally, a constitution is critical for the future 
of  a country not only as it establishes a government framework and 
new rules of  the political game, but also as it stipulates the defining 
characteristics of  a newly established state, polity, and nation. Especially, 
it is a powerful instrument to inscribe a particular version of  ‘We, the 
People’ in a divided society that is grappling with the definition of  its 
unity (Malagodi 2010: 57). 
The imminent problem in drafting a new constitution is that democratic 
transition does not necessarily guarantee the formulation of  a 
constitution that works as a solid base for an inclusive and pluralistic 
democracy. Worryingly, in many developing countries Elster’s concern 
for ‘majoritarian dictatorship’ becomes a reality during the process 
of  constitutional drafting. The advent of  the so-called ‘constitutional 
nationalism’ is a manifestation of  such danger. ‘Constitutional 
nationalism’ is a term that was coined by Robert Hyden in his 
examination of  the situation in the newly independent republics of  the 
former Yugoslavia, and is defined as ‘a constitutional and legal structure 
that privileges the members of  one ethnically defined nation over other 
residents in a particular [polyethnic] state’ (Hyden 1992: 655, emphasis 
added). Under this regime, a nation is defined not in civic terms but 
in the ethnic or religious terms of  the dominant majority group; this 
results in the legal, political, social, and cultural exclusion and alienation 
of  other minorities. In other words, constitutional nationalism 
undermines the creation of  an inclusive and pluralistic democracy. 
The danger of  ‘constitutional nationalism’ is especially imminent in 
India’s neighbouring states of  Nepal (Malagodi 2013a: 1), Bhutan, 
and Sri Lanka. For instance, in Nepal’s first democratically drafted 
constitution, which came into force in 1990, the Nepali nation was 
defined in the ethno-cultural terms of  the dominant ethnic group, 
namely, Hinduism, the Shah monarchy, and the Nepali language, 
in defiance of  the country’s remarkable ethno-cultural, religious, 
and linguistic diversity.7 As Malagodi put it, the 1990 Constitution 
provided ‘a homogenising vision of  how Nepalis ought to be’ (Malagodi 
2010: 76). Worse still, no institutional measures aimed at protecting 
minorities, such as a federal system, reservation of  seats in parliament 
for minorities, or affirmative action, were adopted in the Constitution. 
As a result, minorities felt that they were excluded and marginalised. 
The government was blamed for discriminating against and excluding 
many social groups on the basis of  ethnicity, religion, or language 
(Malagodi 2013a: 3). The Constitution was accused of  institutionalising 
and legitimising discrimination and exclusion of  minorities, and 
thereby failing to guarantee fundamental rights, in particular, the right 
to equality. Thus, the Constitution progressively became an embattled 
document. Political instability was exacerbated, and civil war ensued 
when the Communist Party of  Nepal (Maoist) launched an armed 
struggle against the government in 1996, claiming to rectify the 
inequality prevalent under the Constitution. 
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This example testifies to the importance of  prudent constitutional 
design as a means of  ensuring the smooth functioning of  inclusive 
and pluralistic democracy by entrenching the protection of  minorities. 
More concretely, a civic rather than an ethnic definition of  the word 
‘nation’; a guarantee of  a minority’s cultural, religious, and linguistic 
rights; the separation of  powers; an independent and active judiciary; 
the separation of  state and religion; and self-government by minorities 
via federal arrangements, are vitally important. Furthermore, to rectify 
the situation where marginalised people are substantially deprived of  
the opportunity to participate in the political and judicial processes, 
constitutionally entrenched measures for their empowerment are 
indispensable. 
Having said that, as James Madison sarcastically said (1788), a 
constitution itself  is a mere ‘parchment barrier’ that is too meagre 
to check and contain the arbitrariness of  the political strongmen or 
majoritarian will expressed through elections. Hence, constitutional 
democracy must be exercised through the vibrant implementation 
of  constitutional provisions: the separation of  powers as a system 
of  checks and balances must be well functioning, and, above all, the 
courts must be bold enough to challenge the democratic government 
when its behaviour is unconstitutional and infringes on minority 
rights. In summary, the inculcation and maintenance of  sustainable 
norms and cultures of  constitutional democracy is a sine qua non for 
the consolidation of  inclusive and pluralistic democracy (Harbeson 
2013: 88).
4 India’s unique role as a facilitator of constitutional democracy
As the discussion so far suggests, inclusive and pluralistic democracy 
should be a form of  democratic governance for developing countries 
that consolidates democracy and makes it sustainable. In order for 
inclusive and pluralistic democracy to be consolidated, it must be 
institutionalised in a constitution and duly implemented. This means 
that contributions to the promotion of  democratic governance in 
developing countries must be discussed and evaluated accordingly. From 
this perspective, two facts are important for examining India’s unique 
role as a facilitator of  democratic governance. 
The first point to be noted is that India’s constitution is one of  the 
oldest of  any developing country and is virtually the only constitution 
that has been vibrantly implemented almost without suspension or 
significant amendments to its fundamental structure. The remarkable 
experience of  Indian constitutional democracy is widely studied, 
utilised, and referred to by many developing countries, especially by 
neighbouring states and African countries. The second fact is that 
India has been offering assistance for constitutional drafting to other 
developing countries, thereby making the most of  its own experience 
with constitutional democracy. These two facts will be explored further 
in the following sub-sections. 
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4.1 The attractiveness of Indian constitutional democracy
The attractiveness of  Indian constitutional democracy is evident in the 
fact that the country’s experience is often referred to and utilised in 
other developing countries. Overall structures, individual provisions, 
institutions, case law, and the underlying ideals and norms of  the Indian 
constitution have been studied by the constitutional drafters of  countries 
such as South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Nepal, Bhutan, and Malaysia. 
For example, the Constitutional Commission of  Uganda chose four 
foreign constitutions that they then referred to when drafting the new 
Ugandan constitution in the late 1980s – the Indian constitution was 
the only one from a developing country (Odoki 2005: 83). Not only was 
the Indian constitution studied but some institutions were emulated and 
introduced by other countries. For example, public interest litigation 
(PIL), an Indian constitutional innovation and powerful institution for 
the empowerment of  the marginalised in accessing judicial procedures, 
was introduced in South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and Bhutan as well as African countries such as South Africa, Kenya, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Tanzania (Oloka-Onyango 2015). In addition, 
case law accumulated in the course of  the implementation of  the 
Constitution and judgments by the Indian Supreme Court are often 
referred to and cited in the judgments of  courts in other countries.8 
Needless to say, the common historical experience of  being colonised 
and governed by the British Empire and the resultant proximity 
between the legal systems partly explains the above-mentioned flow of  
knowledge and experiences between India and the adjacent countries 
and anglophone African states. In particular, neighbouring states had 
been exposed to the British model of  legal and political institutions as 
revised in the Indian context, and as a result this Anglo-Indian model 
was the institutional framework with which many leaders of  those states 
were most familiar and comfortable (Go 2002). 
However, a more important factor in explaining the attractiveness 
of  Indian constitutional democracy is that the Indian Constitution 
was virtually the first constitution designed to tackle the challenge of  
building a thriving democracy, coherent nation, and functioning and 
legitimate state simultaneously. The Indian Constitution was adopted in 
1950 and is one of  the oldest constitutions of  any developing country. 
The constitution is the fruit of  deliberations by constitutional framers 
facing the imminent danger of  failing to create an ‘Indian’ nation and 
democracy, and the dismemberment of  the state. It is a well-balanced 
hybrid of  imported and indigenous components, and it opened up an 
‘innovative period of  alternative constitutional arrangements shaped 
by the difficulties of  underdevelopment and cultural diversity’ (Klug 
2000: 11). The constitution introduced the parliamentary system of  its 
colonial master, whereas the Bill of  Rights was adopted mainly from 
the constitution of  the United States. In contrast, affirmative action 
measures to empower minorities and the poor were largely home-grown. 
For example, PIL was created and developed out of  a series of  case law 
formulated from the judgments of  the Supreme Court of  India.
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Another important factor is that Indian constitutional democracy has 
survived under the inhospitable conditions of  multiple ethnic, religious, 
and cultural cleavages and a hierarchical social structure. The Indian 
Constitution has been exercised almost uninterruptedly since its 
adoption in 1950. The only interruption of  Indian constitutional rule 
was the 21-month period of  a State of  Emergency from June 1975 to 
March 1977 declared by Indira Gandhi’s administration. However, 
the events after the ‘Emergency’ demonstrated the resilience of  Indian 
democracy: the Congress Party suffered a crushing defeat in the election 
in 1977, and the prime minister herself  lost her seat in the Parliament. 
As Hewitt observed, ‘the sheer decisiveness through which the Indian 
electorate reaffirmed its commitment to an elected parliament, gave 
the event widespread international coverage, and became part of  
the mystique of  India as the world’s largest democracy’ (Hewitt 
2008: 13). The separation of  powers functions well, and the Supreme 
Court is sometimes bold enough to declare parliamentary laws to be 
unconstitutional and thus null and void. PIL is actively utilised in favour 
of  the marginalised. In this sense, it would not be an exaggeration to 
argue that India is virtually the sole example of  a developing country 
that has been operating successfully under a constitutional democracy 
for such a long time. The prudent structure of  the Indian Constitution 
and its long-standing and vibrant implementation have raised its 
status to one of  the most studied constitutions in the world (Khilnani, 
Raghavan and Thiruvengadam 2013: 12–13). 
4.2 India’s support for the promotion of constitutional democracy
The attractiveness of  Indian constitutional democracy as a relevant 
model is a solid foundation for India to continue to promote 
constitutional democracy, especially constitutional drafting in other 
developing countries. To begin with, in 1947 the Indian government 
dispatched B.N. Rau, a member of  the Indian Constituent Assembly 
and a father of  the Indian Constitution, to Rangoon to assist with the 
drafting of  a democratic constitution (Gupta 2013: 85). Since then, 
India has assisted with constitutional drafting in Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
South Africa, Uganda, and Tanzania. Most recently, India helped 
with the drafting of  Bhutan’s first constitution in 2008 by dispatching 
K.K. Venugopal, a senior advocate of  the Supreme Court of  India, to 
assist. Moreover, in 2014 the Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma 
Swaraj pledged India’s continuous support for the constitutional 
drafting process in Nepal. A noteworthy fact is that in many cases India 
was the only developing country to extend assistance of  this kind. For 
example, its support for the making of  a constitution in Uganda in 
the late 1980s was provided in conjunction with Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
which are all developed countries (Odoki 2005: 34). 
Supporting constitutional drafting in other countries is an inherently 
difficult endeavour, since a constitution is a country’s most fundamental 
legal and political document and hence its drafting is a politically 
sensitive process in which the presence of  foreign advisors could easily 
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be interpreted as infringement of  constitutional autonomy. This is 
particularly true of  India’s engagement in constitution-making in other 
countries, because of  its intimidating size and power, as well as India’s 
previous ‘Indira Doctrine’ – an interventionist foreign policy toward 
its neighbours. One of  the most illustrative incidences of  how difficult 
it is for India to engage in the constitutional affairs of  its neighbours 
was the intervention by the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi, in the 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. In 1987, India brokered a peace agreement 
between warring parties and put pressure on Colombo to relinquish 
the constitutionally entrenched ‘Sinhalese-first policy’ and to accept 
a constitutional amendment to accommodate the demand of  ethnic 
minority Tamils. The Indian ‘advice’ was to introduce an India-like 
decentralised governance system to expand the autonomy of  Tamils, 
as well as to elevate the Tamil language to the status of  an official 
language alongside Sinhalese (Jacobsohn and Shankar 2013: 196). 
The Sri Lankan government’s reticent acceptance of  India’s ‘advice’ 
elicited violent protests by the majority Sinhalese, which resulted in the 
reoccurrence of  civil conflict. After the adoption of  the Gujral Doctrine 
in 1996, in which India pledged a new neighbourhood diplomacy 
designed to foster mutual trust among South Asian countries, India 
abstained from taking a high-handed policy of  interventionism in order 
to win the confidence of  neighbouring countries that it would no longer 
conduct ‘big stick diplomacy’.
Having said that, India cannot afford to be indifferent to the 
constitutional arrangements of  its neighbours, as it duly recognises 
that ‘constitutional nationalism’ would bring about political and social 
destabilisation in adjacent countries and thus threatens India’s own 
security. Therefore, the dilemma for India is that it must eschew any 
high-handed actions that could be interpreted by recipient countries as 
India’s undue intervention in domestic affairs, while at the same time 
it must make sure that its neighbours formulate a solid constitutional 
foundation for an inclusive and pluralistic democracy.
However, the conditions favourable to India strengthening its 
engagement are being put into place. First, inclusive and pluralistic 
democracy is steadily being adopted in neighbouring countries. For 
instance, in Nepal, the argument that the majoritarian democracy 
adopted in the 1990 Constitution should be replaced by more inclusive 
and pluralistic democracy has gained impetus, and, as a result, 
elements of  ‘constitutional nationalism’ in the 1990 Constitution were 
substantially eradicated from the Interim Constitution adopted in 2007 
(Malagodi 2013b). 
Second, in neighbouring countries where antipathy and vigilance 
against India is still prevalent, a willingness to learn from the Indian 
experience is growing. This is partly because these countries have begun 
to learn from the bitter experiences of  constitutional nationalism in 
the past. For instance, legal experts in Nepal are increasingly ready to 
learn from the Indian experience of  constitutional democracy. The 
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argument given by Bipin Adhikari, dean of  the Kathmandu University 
School of  Law, seems to suggest this change. He argues that most of  
the important modern examples of  success in getting a new democratic 
constitution through an elected constituent assembly, including an Indian 
one, have some common features, such as the presence of  a charismatic 
leader and a leading political party, and a common commitment to 
constitutional democracy (Adhikari 2010, emphasis added).
In a country where anti-Indian sentiment is still prevalent, it is 
meaningful that an influential legal expert such as Adhikari has 
advocated the need to learn from the Indian experience. This change 
might be a reflection on the constitutional nationalism embodied in the 
1990 Constitution, which was built on ‘the rejection of  the Indian-style 
constitutional approach to socio-cultural diversity’ (Malagodi 
2010: 78). The hand has also been outstretched by the Indian side: 
Indian constitutional lawyers went to Kathmandu to share the Indian 
experience and recommended that their Nepali counterparts learn from 
the Indian failure to manage affirmative action programmes designed 
to empower the estranged ethnic minorities in Darjeeling (Malagodi 
2010: 70). 
The growing interest in the Indian experience is not limited to South 
Asian countries. For instance, in 2012 an international seminar was 
convened in Zambia to discuss the potential of  PIL with financial 
assistance from the India-funded UNDEF. It was argued in the seminar 
that PIL has a high potential to realise the right to health care for 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such as those infected with  
HIV/AIDS, and that it provides a useful avenue for improved access to 
justice (SALC 2012). 
In summary, there are growing prospects for Indian constitutional 
democracy to be a promising model for democratic governance, and 
thus it would be an important resource that India could mobilise for the 
enhancement of  democratic governance in developing countries. India’s 
recent diplomatic effort to impress upon its neighbours its abdication of  
the role of  ‘gendarme of  South Asia’ and the increasing readiness on 
the side of  recipients to accept Indian engagement would enable Indian 
assistance to assume a more apolitical and technical nature, and thus 
further enhance the attractiveness of  Indian constitutional democracy.
5 India’s long history as a promoter of democracy 
India has long been an active provider of  South–South cooperation 
in the field of  democracy promotion with the participation of  a wide 
range of  organisations. The flagship programme for Indian technical 
assistance is the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) 
programme, established in 1964. It is managed by the Ministry of  
External Affairs (MEA), and various government organisations and 
institutions offer a series of  training courses to accommodate trainees 
from other developing countries.
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Among these organisations, the Election Commission of  India (ECI) has 
the longest history and was active before the establishment of  the ITEC. 
Indeed, election in India, or ‘the largest democracy in the world’ (Nehru 
1963: 457), is the ‘world’s biggest carnival of  democracy’ (Chand 2014) 
in terms of  its scale and complexity. Making the most of  their expertise 
in election management, the ECI has been a supporter of  democratic 
elections in other developing countries and has been extending 
assistance for many history-making elections, such as Ethiopia’s first 
general election in 1954 and Cambodia’s first general election after 
the Paris Peace Accord in 1991. In addition, the ECI facilitates the 
exchange of  experiences among developing countries facing the 
challenges of  under-representation of  women and minorities who are 
disadvantaged in exercising their right to vote (PTI 2013). 
It is notable that numerous countries are the beneficiaries of  Indian 
democracy promotion assistance. For example, during the period from 
2010 to 2015, the Bureau of  Parliamentary Studies and Training 
offered training and internship programmes for 566 participants from 
87 countries. Sub-Saharan African countries (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and South Africa) are the largest beneficiaries, followed by 
South Asian countries (e.g. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan), 
countries from the former Soviet Union (e.g. Belarus, Lithuania, 
Uzbekistan, and Ukraine) and Southeast Asian countries (e.g. Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) (see Figure 1).
6 Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that India plays a unique role in 
facilitating democratic governance in other developing countries by 
making the most of  its own experiences with constitutional democracy. 
Moreover, it has explored the possibility of  assistance for constitutional 
Figure 1 Regional distribution of trainees accommodated by the Bureau of 
Parliamentary Studies and Training, 2010–15
Source Author’s own, calculated from Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training data.9
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drafting, which is one of  the least explored issues in the literature on the 
promotion of  democracy, good governance, law and development, and 
development aid.
The implications of  these findings are that the unique experiences, 
norms, and institutions of  developing countries can be more attractive 
than those provided by advanced countries, as they are born out of  
developing countries and are continuously tested in relation to the 
ongoing challenges that many developing countries commonly face.
In Western literature, a long-standing and entrenched belief  that 
Western expertise is based on superior knowledge, science, and 
institutions that are universally applicable has been brought under 
critical investigation (Mawdsley 2012). A sober examination and fair 
recognition of  India’s role in the promotion of  democracy would be 
a good starting point for further investigation into the huge potential 
of  developing countries in facilitating political, economic, and social 
development in fellow developing countries. There is much evidence 
that a network of  knowledge transfer and sharing among developing 
countries has been created (Shimomura and Wang 2015), and future 
research is warranted. 
Notes
* An earlier version of  this article was produced as a JICA-RI Working 
Paper.
1 Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute.
2 One reason for this position relates to India’s diplomatic aspiration 
to garner support from other developing countries and thus to take 
a leadership role in the developing world as a ‘spokesperson of  the 
global South’. Presenting itself  as an ardent promoter of  democracy 
was not a good policy since it was reminiscent of  crusading Western 
interventionism, and thus attracted displeasure from the leaders of  
the undemocratic regimes prevalent in developing countries. The 
other reason is that India had been obliged to remain engaged with 
whichever government was exercising authority in any country in 
its neighbourhood, whether they were democratic or undemocratic 
(Saran 2005). 
3 However, India sometimes joined concerted international efforts 
to demand democratisation. For instance, India’s long-standing 
denouncement of  apartheid in South Africa was apparently a 
demand for democratisation. Also, the Indian government expressed 
support for democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and demanded the 
military junta democratise in the face of  coup d’état in Burma in 1988.
4 Pratap Mehta remarked that India promoted Nepalese democracy 
‘more constructively than the thousands of  foreign consultants who 
are distorting that troubled country’s internal negotiating process’ 
(2011: 108).
5 It is clear that the study of  democratisation is shifting its focus from 
democratic transition to democratic consolidation. Nonetheless, studies 
on democracy promotion have failed to change their focus accordingly.
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6 In a divided society, political decision-making on important public 
policies is hampered by the lack of  mutual trust among ethnic groups 
(Choudhry 2008: 5).
7 Nepal has 92 languages, 102 caste and ethnic groups, and 10 religions 
(Malagodi 2010: 56).
8 For instance, the judgment of  South Africa’s Constitutional Court in 
2002 cited the rulings of  the Indian Supreme Court in PIL in dealing 
with the question of  whether courts can enforce the socioeconomic 
rights of  South African citizens.
9 http://164.100.47.194/bpstnew/Participants_Details.aspx.
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Triangular Cooperation in East Asia: 
Challenges and Opportunities for 
Japanese Official Development 
Assistance
Jin Sato1
Abstract The article examines the potential contribution of triangular 
cooperation (TrC) as an emerging form of foreign aid. By reviewing the 
Japanese TrC practices, it addresses some critical questions from the 
perspective of national interests, development impact, and ownership. 
Under the declining trend of foreign aid as a form of resource transfer to 
the global South, future TrC should address questions beyond the realm of 
technical cooperation. The article claims that the primary function of TrC is 
to maintain donor relationships with emerging powers that are graduating 
from aid recipient status, while highlighting its potential and limitations 
for promoting TrC among China, South Korea, and Japan.
Keywords: triangular cooperation, East Asia, national interests, Japan, 
technical assistance.
1 Introduction
What role can triangular cooperation (TrC)2 play amidst the declining 
impact of  official development assistance (ODA) relative to other 
sources of  international transfers? What implications does TrC offer in 
light of  the rising presence of  new donors in East Asia such as South 
Korea and China? If  ODA is included in foreign policy derived from 
donor countries’ national interests (Gulrajani 2017), what implications 
are there for TrC that transfers substantial leverage to a third party? 
Exploring these questions from the perspective of  Japanese foreign aid 
is the central topic of  this article. 
The declining proportion of  ODA accompanies the general rise of  
developing countries’ economic power in global production. Today, 
developing countries as a whole produce about half  of  world economic 
output, up from about a third in 1990 (UNDP 2013). Perhaps more 
relevant to this article is the fact that the landscape of  foreign aid is 
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increasingly influenced by new donors, including China, Saudi Arabia, and 
Brazil, which were primarily aid recipients until the 1990s. In fact, many of  
these countries have a long tradition of  foreign assistance; the designation 
‘new donors’ is used here simply to denote that their impact has become 
significant enough to catch the attention of  the traditional Western donors. 
In response to these trends, aid communities led by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic 
Co‑operation and Development (OECD) have not only increased their 
efforts to coordinate with each other through such mechanisms as a 
sector‑wide approach, but they have also started to explore ways to involve 
former aid‑recipient countries as resource providers in project planning, 
financing, and implementation. TrC emerged in this context. One 
important role expected in ODA today for a country such as Japan, which 
has used ODA not only as a development tool but more importantly as a 
diplomatic tool, is for developed countries to maintain their connections 
with middle‑income countries that are graduating from ODA recipient 
status (Lancaster 2010). As will be discussed later in this article, this 
appears to be the main motivation for traditional donors to engage in TrC. 
This article makes three claims pertaining to TrC: (1) TrC is a new 
practice invoked by some donors such as Japan and Germany primarily to 
maintain their relationships with emerging powers; (2) Given the historical 
emergence of  South–South cooperation as an additional alternative 
to North–South aid, the promotion of  South–South cooperation, at 
least in part via TrC, contains inherent contradictions, because it is, in 
principle, an effort by the North to support South–South cooperation; 
and (3) China and South Korea may be too close to each other in various 
aspects of  development cooperation, which points to co‑financing rather 
than TrC in technical cooperation. How one addresses the latter two 
challenges will determine the future of  TrC in East Asia.
A brief  justification of  the treatment of  South Korea towards the end 
of  the article may be needed. The conventional understanding of  TrC 
is to have a Northern country teaming up with a pivotal country (usually 
from the South) and a Southern recipient country. South Korea joined 
the DAC in 2010 and is technically a ‘Northern’ country, yet the key 
element of  TrC is to combine strengths of  countries at various stages 
of  development, possessing a varied aid portfolio to offer. Thus, the 
relative relation between countries is what matters and not the absolute 
classification as North or South. It is in this context that I treat South 
Korea as a pivotal country making up a critical part of  TrC.
2 A brief literature assessment 
While there is a proliferation of  literature on South–South cooperation 
and emerging donors in general, only a few have treated directly the 
question of  TrC. Among the few, Fordelone (2011) argued that although 
TrC is widely practised around the world, further efforts in ownership, 
alignment, and harmonisation are required to promote further 
development effectiveness. Schaaf  (2015) focuses on the rhetoric and 
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reality of  ‘partnership’, which is a central concept embedded in TrC, 
to highlight pitfalls including reductions in effectiveness, difficulties in 
implementation and conflicts of  interest.
However, because the implementing agencies often undertake and 
fund most of  these TrC-related works, research tends to focus more on 
technical and managerial issues than on political ones.3 Most research 
treats TrC as an enhanced form of  South–South cooperation, and it is 
viewed in a positive light. Furthermore, the literature mostly deals with the 
evolution and potential of  this new scheme, often as something separate 
from the conventional bilateral aid that donors have been utilising.
As McEwan and Mawdsley (2012: 1186–87) claim, however, ‘strategic 
and political motivations of  different actors – northern, pivotal and 
recipient – are still poorly understood’ and ‘[p]olicy-oriented analyses 
of  TDC [Trilateral Development Cooperation] are generally reluctant 
to confront explicitly the inherently political nature of  “development” 
and the uneven power relations between different actors enrolled within 
it’ (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012: 1187). This article agrees with these 
authors that the question of  power is central to understanding how aid 
relationships begin, sustain, and evolve. 
By ‘power’, I mean the ability to influence the behaviour of  others. 
However, unlike the conventional assumption that nations compete 
for power and hegemony in international politics, the field of  foreign 
aid has an inherent complication because its aim is in empowering 
others to some extent. The topic of  triangular cooperation is even more 
complicated, since it has a nested structure of  power relations within 
the group of  three. Exclusive focus on the collaborative aspect of  the 
‘triangular’ should not obfuscate the effects it may create in changing or 
maintaining the relationship between the three. 
Alongside an increasing tendency to emphasise security issues under 
the Abe administration in Japan, there has been a strong tendency to 
emphasise ‘national interests’ reflected in the ODA (Gulrajani 2017). 
Because of  the conservative budget, particularly in comparison to the 
expanding defence budget, there is increasing political pressure in Japan 
to recover the explicit link between ODA and national interests to justify 
spending taxpayer money; this political pressure is due in large part to 
the Japanese private sector’s interests. TrC is an interesting theme to 
be discussed in this context, as TrC is apparently a scheme that at least 
partially hands over initiatives to pivotal middle‑income countries. The 
relevant question coming to the fore is how national interests factor into 
TrC calculations.
In short, the literature has shortcomings in the relative absence of  
(1) the critical and political analysis of  triangular cooperation; (2) the 
recipient countries’ perspectives; and (3) the role of  the private sector 
in the implementation processes, which bypasses the inner workings, 
project identification and funding. 
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3 Triangular cooperation in practice
3.1 TrC’s placement in aid policy
While Japan is one of  the few countries along with Spain and Germany 
that has explicitly stipulated TrC policies, this does not mean that TrC is 
given a high place in ODA policy at large (Lengfelder 2016). How much 
importance is given to TrC in the Japanese government’s present ODA 
policy? The ODA Charter of  2003, which has the highest authority, 
touches explicitly on the role of  South–South cooperation under the 
subheading ‘Basic Principles (5): Partnership and Collaboration with the 
International Community’, as follows:
Japan will actively promote South–South cooperation in partnership 
with more advanced developing countries in Asia and other regions. 
Japan will also strengthen collaboration with regional cooperation 
frameworks, and will support region-wide cooperation that 
encompasses several countries (MoFA 2003: 3).
In which areas does Japan find the benefit in TrC? The official 
brochure on TrC produced by the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) highlights two points (JICA 2009). The first point 
is the recognition that South–South cooperation is an effective 
tool for developing countries, as countries placed at a similar level 
of  development can offer more relevant ideas based on their own 
development experience. Additionally, Japan had an emotional rationale 
for being an aid recipient in the past, which offered moral strength in its 
justification for engagement with South–South cooperation (Sato 2013). 
It is in this context that Japanese development experts have started 
to tap into Japan as an aid recipient to extract lessons for developing 
countries today, particularly since the 2000s.4 
3.2 Trends in TrC by JICA
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of  trainees who participated in 
JICA’s Third Country Training Program (TCTP), which amounted to 
Table 1 Number of TCTP participants (by region, 2011) 
Number of TCTP participants trained (by regional origin)
Asia–Pacific LAC Middle East Europe SSA Total
Number of TCTP 
participants received
Asia–Pacific 885 15 50 0 279 1,229
LAC* 16 598 0 0 96 710
Middle East** 78 0 647 0 472 1,197
Europe 30 0 28 6 0 64
SSA*** 0 0 0 0 381 381
Total 1,009 613 725 6 1,228 3,581
Notes *Latin America and the Caribbean; **Middle East includes North Africa; ***Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Source JICA (2011).
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3,581 participants in the year 2011. The TCTP is a technical Japanese 
ODA cooperation scheme that takes place in developing countries 
with trainers from neighbouring regions. It is funded by JICA. The 
idea is not just to reduce training costs but also to make the particular 
technology relevant and appropriate to the beneficiaries’ level. Table 1 
demonstrates the general tendency of  training targeted at participants 
in their own region, with JICA’s main activity concentrated in the  
Asia–Pacific region. One should also note that a large number of  
participants from Africa are trained in the Asia–Pacific region as well. 
The training’s content tends to focus on issues particularly relevant to 
the region such as tropical diseases, energy conservation, agricultural 
techniques, and environmental management.
3.3 Patterns of triangular cooperation
Most of  JICA’s TrC consists of  third-country training, where training 
is conducted in pivotal countries with JICA’s funding and support 
(see Figure 1). Very small numbers of  dispatched experts from pivotal 
countries add to the list of  TrC activities occurring. There are four basic 
patterns of  TrC; while the schematic patterns below do not necessarily 
form the shape of  triangles, the figures represent the way multiple 
parties are jointly implementing aid projects.
1. Bilateral TrC integrating Southern country knowledge
This is a pattern wherein JICA mobilises knowledge resources from 
Southern country partners, either through TCTP or third‑country 
expert dispatch in the field, where Japan may not have a comparative 
advantage relevant to the needs of  the beneficiary countries (see 
Figure 2). Capacity Development for Public Administration in Ghana 
was one such project where resources from Singapore, Malaysia, and 
South Africa were called on to improve Ghana’s Civil Service Training 
Centre (Honda, Kato and Shimoda 2013). This pattern’s success 
depends on the extent to which pivotal countries could join forces in 
enhancing the effectiveness of  technical assistance to the beneficiaries. 
Human resource development 
Diffusion of Japanese achievement
Improvement of investment climate
Cost reduction and appropriate technologies
Knowledge-sharing, networking
Assisting middle-income countries to become 
new donors
Maintaining and improving diplomatic relations
Third-country training
Third-country expert dispatch
International seminar
Project-type cooperation
Triangular 
cooperation
Figure 1 Elements of Japanese TrC
Source Author’s own, based on MoFA (2013).
Components Examples of functions
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2. Dissemination of best practices information 
This is the most standard form of  TrC conducted by JICA (see 
Figure 3). The training and dispatch of  experts are the typical 
instruments. This pattern can also expand into a regional network of  
knowledge dissemination. Examples include JICA’s assistance both 
in finance and substance to the Kenya Forestry Research Institute, 
which then offered a vocational training programme in Senegal’s 
Vocational Training Center; these activities were built on previous 
bilateral cooperation with Japan (Honda et al. 2013). This scheme gives 
more initiative to the pivotal countries and may evolve into a broader 
programme of  nurturing pivotal countries into becoming donors 
beyond just assistance to a particular sector.
3. Support for South–South cooperation organisational capacity development
By dispatching technical cooperation experts to Southern country 
partners, this pattern expects those partners to disseminate knowledge 
to other Southern country partners (see Figure 4), in the expectation 
that eventually partner countries become donors. Examples of  this 
Figure 2 Bilateral TrC integrating Southern country knowledge
Notes J = Japan; S1 = pivotal countries; S2 = beneficiary countries. The inputs 
represented in the arrows can range from financial contributions to technical transfers 
to human resources. 
Source Honda (2013).
J S2
S1 resource
S1 resource
S1 resource
Figure 3 Dissemination of information on best practices
Notes J = Japan; S1 = pivotal countries; S2 = beneficiary countries. 
Source Honda (2013).
S2
J
S1
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pattern include JICA’s assistance to Indonesia in its effort to strengthen 
capacity to provide South–South cooperation (Shimoda and Nakazawa 
2012). This is another form of  TrC that gives more initiative to pivotal 
countries, but with more explicit intentions on the pivotal side to 
become future donors operating projects in multiple recipient countries.
4. Collaborative support by Japan and its Southern development partners
This is a pattern wherein JICA and its Southern country partner(s) 
jointly support a beneficiary country through equal partnership(s) 
(see Figure 5). This type of  collaborative work is sought with new 
donor countries that have already developed their own expertise and 
resources to become donors by themselves. An example of  this is JICA’s 
collaboration with Brazil in assistance for the Mozambique ProSavana 
Project. This scheme is possible only between an emerging donor that 
has independent capacity to implement projects on its own. Because of  
the nearly equal participation by both donors, coordination efforts on 
the ground become critical. 
In short, most of  the TrC by JICA is an extension of  the bilateral 
cooperation that had previously been conducted in the pivotal countries. 
They are extended efforts to tap into the resources nurtured during 
bilateral times. This is the key feature of  TrC that determines the range 
Figure 4 Support for South–South cooperation organisational capacity development
Notes J = Japan; S1 = pivotal countries; S2, S3, S4 = beneficiary countries.  
Source Honda (2013).
S2
S3
S4
S1
J
S2
Figure 5 Collaborative support by Japan and its Southern development partners
Notes J = Japan; S1 = pivotal countries; S2 = beneficiary countries.  
Source Honda (2013).
J
S1
118 | Sato Triangular Cooperation in East Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for Japanese Official Development Assistance
Vol. 49 No. 3 July 2018: ‘Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation’
of  activities in the Japanese ODA context. TrC, therefore, is more of  a 
scheme to maintain relationships with middle‑income pivotal countries 
that otherwise graduated from Japanese assistance as beneficiary 
countries. It has not been utilised enough as an opportunity to increase 
Japan’s aid portfolio (i.e. the menu of  what Japan can offer as aid) by 
learning from the pivotal countries. 
4 Incentives for cooperation
Why then do countries bother to play the role of  a pivotal country? 
Given that major emerging countries such as Brazil, China, and India 
are all regional powers having the capacity to conduct aid on a bilateral 
basis, one may wonder why such countries would bother to engage 
themselves with TrC.
Knodt and Piefer (2012) addressed this issue systematically. They made 
the point that even among the new donors, a distinction should be 
made between countries that have significant geopolitical importance 
in the global economy, such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Indonesia, 
and South Africa, and relatively smaller providers such as Thailand, 
Chile, Malaysia, Colombia, and Vietnam (Knodt and Piefer 2012: 
38). For the regional powers, engaging with traditional donors through 
ODA may be a single tool among many to establish their status; trade, 
investment, and military power may work more effectively towards such 
a goal. However, for the rest of  the pivotal countries, ODA can be a 
vital connection to maintain and enhance their economic and political 
relationships with other developing countries. The incentives to engage 
in TrC differ accordingly. Below is the analysis of  incentives based on 
the donor’s position in the triangle.
Knodt and Piefer (2012) highlight two motivations for these new donors 
to engage in TrC: (1) reducing political tension through the presence of  
a third party; and (2) capacity building to become donors.
First, in countries where political tensions resurge periodically, such as 
those between Thailand and Cambodia, the presence of  traditional donors 
helps soften the tension in implementing projects in such beneficiary 
countries. Through such incentives, the new donors aspire to become 
regional leaders. By including a third party as a catalyst, pivotal countries 
can lessen otherwise sensitive political tensions and build strategic regional 
and inter-regional alliances through the TrC mechanisms.
Second, many new donors have the incentive to become independent 
donors in the future by learning how to plan and implement projects 
through collaboration with traditional donors. As aid officers of  the 
Thailand International Cooperation Agency (TICA) told me,5 it is 
sometimes efficient to learn from jointly implementing projects in a 
third beneficiary country to become independent and capable donors. 
The presence of  this incentive demonstrates that foreign aid is not just 
about meeting needs or providing resources, but more about the actual 
mechanism of  delivery, which requires skills and experience. 
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On the other hand, the new donors’ eagerness to establish independent 
donor status comparable to the DAC donors may create challenges, as 
some new donors still fall short in the financial and human resources 
needed to meet expectations. The TICA, for example, is an entity 
within a key pivotal country aiming to establish itself  as a leading donor 
in Southeast Asia. However, as TICA officials admitted themselves, their 
budget is extremely limited, which hinders their ability to establish a 
truly equal partnership with traditional donors.6 The cost-sharing ratio 
between JICA and its partner countries is one important indicator. A 
survey conducted by Japan’s International Development Center in 2010 
reported that the burden shared by the pivotal countries ranged from 
30 per cent to 50 per cent for Thailand, 50 per cent for Singapore and 
Malaysia, and about 15 per cent for the Philippines (IDC 2010). 
Regarding incentives for traditional donors, as was recently announced 
by the prime minister, Abe Shinzo, in his trip to several Latin American 
countries, Japan made a commitment to provide ODA to countries that 
have already reached ‘graduation’ status from a traditional standard 
based on per capita income. This will probably include Japanese 
support for such middle-income countries to assist their neighbours, 
that is, the seeds of  the triangular scheme. This announcement reveals 
the traditional donors’ incentives in triangular cooperation: some of  
the traditional donors prefer to rely on ODA mechanisms to maintain 
their diplomatic relationships with middle-income countries, which are 
increasing their presence in the global economy. Unlike countries in 
Southeast Asia, which have strong economic relations with Japan, many 
countries in Latin America will have weaker ties with Japan if  all ODA 
pulls out from the region. For traditional donors, maintaining connections 
through ODA with middle‑income countries can be a strong incentive. 
More questionable are the incentives for the beneficiary countries. In 
principle, few countries will turn down offers of  assistance.7 Perhaps the 
only real incentive may be the traditional donors’ financial guarantees 
that stabilise the projects implemented, mainly by the pivotal countries. 
Yet, if  beneficiary countries have already established bilateral relations 
with existing donors, there is no clear reason why they should pursue a 
‘triangular’ form of  foreign assistance. It is for this structural reason, as 
this article addresses below, that each beneficiary country’s ownership 
becomes questionable. 
5 Critical questions for the triangular approach 
Given foreign aid’s political nature and the institutional requirements 
for sustaining the aid business, we must ask the following questions to 
analyse whether TrC has the potential to become a major option in 
foreign aid. Three issues stand out: (1) national interests, (2) development 
impact, and (3) ownership. These are by no means arbitrary (Ashoff 
2010).8 The first question on national interest is particularly serious 
in Japan, where causal relationships between taxpayer money and its 
contribution to benefits in Japan are increasingly voiced under declining 
public expenditure trends. The second question on development impact 
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is an obvious one that requires little explanation. While the promotion 
of  partnerships should be valued, its development impact should be 
assessed separately. Finally, the question of  ownership: who controls the 
process of  TrC projects? We shall examine each of  these below.
5.1 The national interest question
One of  the key questions posed regarding the triangular approach in 
the Japanese context is its connection with national interests. Under the 
new ODA Charter of  2015, which stipulated securing ‘national interests’ 
for the first time as an important goal of  development cooperation, 
the Abe administration has been emphasising how offering a varied 
menu of  international assistance can help enhance Japan’s national 
interests. TrC can easily be classified into the types of  cooperation that 
contribute to national interests through maintaining human channels 
with middle‑income pivotal countries, and more importantly include 
them structurally in the traditional donors’ aid regime. In Japan’s case, 
it has been common practice to hire a foreign consultant who has been 
working with the Japanese counterpart to carry out projects on behalf  
of  the Japanese staff (MoFA 2013).9 It is expected that the utilisation 
of  foreign resources can further enhance Japanese national interests in 
certain areas (such as improving the investment climate in Africa through 
using foreign consultants who know more about the African context).
5.2 The development impact question
The evaluation of  development impacts is one topic that should be 
addressed in discussing each scheme’s desirability. Evaluation faces 
further challenge because most triangular projects by Japan consist 
of  technical assistance emphasising knowledge transfer and training, 
the impacts of  which are difficult to quantify. Given that there are 
no standard ways to measure the development impact of  triangular 
cooperation, JICA discloses only quantitative trends using the number 
of  Japanese experts dispatched to pivotal countries and the number of  
trainees as measurement instruments (Honda 2013). In reality, however, 
many projects are pre-designed by consultants of  donor countries in 
close consultation with the recipient country governments. 
Such realities aside, international recognition of  triangular cooperation’s 
effectiveness seems to be on the rise. The Organisation for Economic 
Co‑operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) have high regard for this scheme’s 
potential effectiveness (OECD 2011; UNDP 2004). Moreover, Japanese 
TrC projects were awarded the South–South Cooperation Award from 
the United Nations (UN) in November 2012 during the South–South 
Cooperation Expo. We need to examine more closely the nature of  the 
power structure among the nations in which TrC plays a role. 
5.3 Ownership question
One of  the repeated critiques in aid administration is ‘fragmentation’: 
aid received in many small pieces from many donors inviting less 
competition, which can reduce the total effectiveness of  development 
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efforts (Frot and Santiso 2010). From the perspective of  administrative 
efficiency, TrC is complicated, which leads to the question of  ownership. 
In the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) Conference 
on Triangular Cooperation, 19–20 September 2013, I addressed this 
question to the floor: ‘Has there ever been a triangular project initiated 
by the recipient country?’ There was no response from the audience. 
One cannot overgeneralise from this lack of  response, but it is still 
plausible to infer that there has not been a triangular arrangement 
undertaken on the recipient country’s initiative. Reasonably enough, 
there is no particular reason why a recipient country should make the 
arrangement triangular rather than bilateral. Li and Bonschab agree 
that ownership is one of  the central challenges for effective triangular 
cooperation: ‘It often seems that donors prefer profound discussions 
among themselves, before, in a second step, they look for a recipient 
country for implementation’ (2012: 187).
My interview with a senior GIZ officer found that German citizens in 
general emphasise philanthropy and aid to alleviate poverty.10 Germans 
will support such initiatives even if  their feedback on national interests 
is unclear. Under such circumstances, it is hard to justify continuous 
investment into countries that have already graduated from low‑income 
status. TrC in this sense is a device to justify continuing commitment to 
middle‑income countries, giving them a new role as pivotal countries to 
benefit their poorer neighbours. 
The three questions highlighted above set a certain limitation on 
how the existing structure of  inequality can be reduced among 
the stakeholders of  three countries. While the technologies being 
transferred in the process of  TrC originate from a country that is closer 
in their development stage, there is no explicit mechanism to uplift the 
position of  the beneficiary country. 
6 Implications for East and Northeast Asia
6.1 A perspective on Chinese aid 
As we have seen, Japanese foreign aid’s central feature is its strong 
engagement with the private sector from policy formulation to 
implementation (Sato 2018). Research undertaken in the recipient 
countries of  Chinese aid have found that the private sector also plays a 
significant role in formulating development projects (Sato et al. 2011). 
Perhaps one of  the most highlighted trends affecting the ODA 
landscape is the rise of  China as an economic superpower. Some 
consider Chinese aid a threat, not because of  China’s increasing 
volume of  investments, but rather because of  the alternative norms and 
principles it posits towards beneficiary countries. China is widely viewed 
as providing aid ‘without Western lectures about governance and 
human rights’ (The Economist 2010). Chinese loans, for example, include 
the condition that a proportion must be spent on Chinese contractors, 
equipment, and services, thereby providing capital for Chinese exports 
(Park 2011). While the tying of  aid may therefore result in mutual 
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benefits, a key aspect of  partnership, it contradicts the definition of  
ODA, for which the main objective should be economic development 
and welfare. It also arguably creates more benefits for the donor than 
for poor people in the recipient country. Little progress was made at 
Busan11 on the issue of  tied aid, beyond agreeing a commitment to 
make progress towards an unspecified deadline (Oxfam 2012).
Many commentaries on Chinese aid lack empirical foundation and are 
often based on subjective impressions. However, a firmer ground has 
begun to be prepared. A recent study by Kitano and Harada (2014) 
found that the total volume of  Chinese aid has increased sharply since 
2004, with a rate of  increase of  24 per cent until 2011. China’s net 
foreign aid dropped from US$5.2bn in 2013 to US$5.0bn in 2014 but 
rose to US$5.4bn in 2015 (Kitano 2017). Although its ranking in terms 
of  aid volume had been lower than one would expect, China increased 
rapidly to number six in 2012. Given its constant growth rate, the total 
amount of  China’s aid is expected to surpass the top‑tier DAC members 
in the next few years. 
It is interesting that China is also pursuing a trilateral approach to 
development cooperation. Zhang and Smith (2017) convincingly 
document the recent trend of  China’s seeking partnership with the UN 
and Western donors by putting growing emphasis on its identity as a 
great power in the development sector, using trilateral cooperation to 
build its global image.
6.2 Possibility for collaboration?
Based on the existing practices of  TrC initiated by Japan, this section 
examines the future possibility of  establishing a triangle (or any other 
form of  development cooperation) with Japan’s neighbours: China 
and South Korea. Countries in East Asia, including Taiwan, have been 
most exposed to ODA from Japan and thus should be considered the 
first partners with which Japan could work. Periodic political tensions 
aside, there has already been a substantial record of  cooperation 
between Japan, China, and South Korea in foreign aid. Between the 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) of  South Korea 
and JICA, there have been annual meetings held periodically since 
December 2010 – joint training programmes have been implemented 
in the fields of  energy, environment, economic development policy, and 
disaster education. Other notable collaborations include co‑financing 
the Climate Change Mitigation Program in Vietnam, an electronic 
cable extension project in Tanzania, and a road improvement project in 
Mozambique (Sato pers. comm. 2014). 
Japanese collaboration with China is less extensive compared to that 
with South Korea, yet occasional meetings between the concessional 
loan agencies (i.e. Export–Import (Exim) Bank of  China, Korea 
Eximbank’s Economic Development Cooperation Fund, and JICA) 
have been held since 2010. Kitano reports that projects on the ground 
are also beginning, for example, in rice production in African countries, 
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road construction in Tajikistan and urban transport in Kyrgyzstan 
(Kitano 2012). Although political tensions between Japan and China 
have intensified recently, many upcoming joint initiatives continue to be 
implemented on the ground. 
A wealth of  experience in jointly implementing projects with South 
Korea and China, however, does not automatically lead to the proper 
utilisation of  triangular modalities or any other form of  development 
cooperation. Political tensions aside, three specific future challenges 
should be highlighted. First, because of  their geographic and 
cultural proximity, it is often difficult to find areas of  expertise that 
have complementarity. There are agricultural techniques for arid 
environments, for example where expertise from China can be utilised 
to assist countries such as Mongolia, but the list is not extensive. A 
similar condition applies to South Korea. 
The second challenge is that the East Asian neighbours have quickly 
passed through the status of  middle‑income countries to the level that 
requires a partnership arrangement with Japan. Triangular cooperation, 
in a traditional sense, puts them in a resource‑providing status, and 
thus may not be acceptable. Third, because the East Asian region has 
been going through some political tensions, development operations 
requiring long‑term commitments may be seen as being vulnerable and 
thus not worth the effort to make an investment. While ODA activities 
should be treated independently from politics, it is undeniable that the 
circumstances will be heavily influenced by such ups and downs. 
South Korea and China are countries that seek a certain level of  
recognition in the international donor community, though their styles 
may be different. My interview with JICA’s staff12 confirmed that one 
of  China’s key interests is establishing an evaluation scheme to defend 
its approach against Western criticisms.13 Increasing pressure to disclose 
various data and statistics also creates an additional motive to install an 
evaluation scheme that can be an effective communication tool with 
traditional donors and multilateral banks. 
Abundant documentation asserts that both China and South Korea 
adopted and learned from their experiences as major recipients of  
Japanese foreign aid. Brautigam (2009) claimed that Chinese techniques 
such as allowing recipients to pay in-kind (i.e. with raw materials) 
were adopted from the Japanese method in the 1970s.14 The KOICA’s 
administrative system is documented as being modelled after the JICA 
system (Kondoh 2013). Korean policymakers themselves do not hesitate 
to admit that they have ‘copied’ the Japanese aid system, where many 
of  the JICA laws and regulations were translated into Korean as a basis 
for the KOICA (Kim and Seddon 2005: 170). The focus on economic 
infrastructure is another commonality among East Asian donors. In 
Japan, as we have seen, this inclination has a strong link to ODA and 
the private sector implementers. 
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As a vehicle for collaboration, working through international 
organisations can help reduce any tension when political conflicts 
hinder effective collaboration for development assistance. Even the 
recent tendency to create a new economic block by China (represented 
by the agreement to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
in 2015) may enhance China’s accountability and transparency in 
implementing international development projects that must be approved 
collectively by this new bank. Through such regional forums, South 
Korea, China, and Japan could perhaps begin to list some comparative 
advantages, particularly in the field of  technical cooperation, relevant to 
the poorer parts of  the world. 
7 Conclusion
Unlike some Western traditional donors such as the UK, which has 
an inclination to outsource most of  its implementation to private 
actors regardless of  their national origin, JICA has been emphasising 
Japan’s own development experience and capitalising on such assets 
for the purpose of  development in poorer nations. The long tradition 
of  an intimate connection with ministries and private sectors and the 
utilisation of  domestic firms and expertise under ‘tied aid’ represent 
one such legacy. This experience‑based approach has a strong affinity 
to TrC, which is also experience‑based; TrC is not usually made out 
of  random combinations of  three actors with respective expertise, but 
is rather a development of  existing partnerships and the accumulated 
knowledge based on such partnerships. 
South–South cooperation’s significance will inevitably expand as the 
influence of  non‑DAC donors increases. This will have significant 
impact on the process of  the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
as it expects wider participation from the actors in developing countries 
who were mostly outside the scope of  the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). As we have seen in the examples above, TrC is 
particularly suitable for including private actors as pivotal agents 
soliciting investments from the donor countries. It is thus critical for 
private sectors to integrate SDGs into their business and employment 
practices, particularly in the field of  gender and environment where 
such private investments will have direct impact.
TrC will have a positive impact on the efficiency as well as the 
effectiveness of  development cooperation in the long run, if  not 
immediately, because its main feature is to nurture middle-income 
countries to become effective donors in the future. Despite such 
promising features, however, I found a number of  reasons why this 
may not prevail as a dominant mode of  development aid in the context 
of  Japanese ODA. The main reasons why TrC does not quite take off 
on the scale that it should is because the Japanese system places more 
emphasis on prior clearance at the administrative level, and because 
personnel shift their positions every two or three years, which limits 
any project’s smooth continuity. Despite these vulnerabilities, Japan 
wishes to support TrC not because of  its potential effectiveness (and 
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cost savings), but also because it may become the pivotal mechanism 
to maintain connections with middle‑income countries; Japan invested 
substantially through ODA in the past. 
TrC involves three main actors. The stylised format, however, should 
not be the preoccupation. A more important dimension is the initiative 
and ownership in the configuration of  multiple stakeholders. The 
clear point is that the development scene will increasingly be coloured 
by a network of  actors rather than bilateral donors. If  such a trend is 
confirmed, what we need is fertile soil to allow different combinations of  
resources and expertise for the purposes of  international development. 
Various forums of  human resources exchanges, interactions, and 
training may be a strong way to enrich this soil, which can turn into 
concrete triangular projects in the future, if  not immediately. 
As the number of  donors multiplies with the increased participation 
of  non‑DAC members, what becomes increasingly important is the 
beneficiary countries’ absorptive capacity. If  TrC has the tendency to 
leave behind the interests of  the beneficiary countries, as this article 
argues, traditional bilateral aid should continue to assume a key role 
in capacity development in less developed countries. Discussion on the 
way to enrich TrC should go hand in hand with the appropriate role of  
traditional bilateral aid, which should address more directly the needs 
of  the poorer countries. 
Notes
1 University of  Tokyo.
2 ‘Triangular cooperation’ is commonly defined as ‘joint projects in 
development cooperation among established and newly emerged 
donors within the new global context’ (Li and Bonschab 2012: 
185). This article defines TrC as ‘a partnership between DAC 
[Development Assistance Committee] donors and providers of  
South–South cooperation to implement development cooperation 
projects in beneficiary countries’ (Fordelone 2011: 4), as DAC donors 
carry common norms regarding general objectives and means of  
development despite diversity in country allocation and preferred 
modalities. 
3 Major publications by implementing agencies include Honda (2013), 
UN (2012), BMZ (2013), and MoFA (2013).
4 A typical example of  a research topic along this line is the application 
of  the kaizen (improvement) approach in enhancing the efficiency and 
working conditions of  employers in developing countries (Higuchi, 
Nam and Sonbe 2015).
5 Mr Amornchewin Banchong, interview, 22 August 2016.
6 Mr Amornchewin Banchong, interview, 22 August 2016.
7 Offers to assist in emergencies such as natural disasters may 
be refused, particularly by middle-income countries, owing to 
insufficient capacity to receive and handle incoming aid in short 
periods of  time. Thailand’s initial refusal of  foreign aid during the 
2004 tsunami is one such example. 
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8 Ashoff (2010) highlights related risks pertaining to TrC such as 
lowering quality standards, neglecting beneficiary countries, 
increasing transaction costs and fragmentation.
9 The Triangle of  Hope was a project (August 2009 to August 2012) to 
enhance the investment climate in Zambia; it was implemented by a 
consultant from Malaysia.
10 Anon., interview, 20 September 2013.
11 The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness took place in 
Busan, South Korea, in 2011.
12 Anon., interview, 20 April 2017.
13 While China has been severely restrictive in disclosing information 
on its foreign aid activities, there is a sign of  change represented 
by its recent White Papers on foreign aid. China published its first 
White Paper in April 2011 and a second in July 2014 (UNDP 2014). 
While there is no description of  specific projects, the two White 
Papers demonstrate the trend that China is willing to disclose more 
information on its aid activities.
14 See Watanabe (2013) for a detailed study on how China learned from 
its major foreign aid donors, i.e. the Soviet Union and Japan.
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The BRICS Effect: Impacts of 
South–South Cooperation in 
the Social Field of International 
Development Cooperation*
Geovana Zoccal Gomes1 and Paulo Esteves2
Abstract The growing number of development stakeholders and initiatives 
in developing countries has added complexity to international development 
cooperation (IDC). Recipient countries have witnessed the increasing 
presence of emerging countries such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa), offering South–South cooperation as an 
alternative model for development. We call the impact of the new practices 
of South–South cooperation providers on the prevailing IDC structure the 
‘BRICS effect’ – an effect that ultimately destabilises established positions 
and interaction patterns between agents, and even between traditional 
donors and recipients. Combining the Bourdieusian notion of social fields 
with international relations (IR) perspectives on the changing geopolitics 
of international aid, this article discusses how the BRICS effect challenges 
established principles and practices from the field of IDC, indicating at least 
three dimensions: (1) new positions beyond the donor vs recipient dyad; 
(2) new modes of development cooperation; and (3) transformation of 
institutional architecture and governance mechanisms.
Keywords: South–South cooperation, development, international 
cooperation, Pierre Bourdieu, BRICS, OECD, DAC.
1 Introduction 
Donors that are not members of  the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), also known as ‘non-DAC donors’ or 
‘emerging donors’, have shaken the international aid landscape 
in recent years. Indeed, the footprints of  emerging donors within 
the development cooperation landscape are becoming increasingly 
significant. While a United Nations Economic and Social Council 
report estimated that in 2006 these contributions ranged from 7.8 per 
cent to 9.8 per cent of  all international aid, the OECD reported that 
non-DAC countries’ contributions reached 18.7 per cent in 2014 and 
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15.8 per cent in 2015 (ECOSOC 2008; OECD 2017b: 156). These 
figures are, at once, somewhat equivocal and highly revealing. The 
standards and methodologies for measuring non-DAC development 
cooperation contributions are extremely heterogeneous. Furthermore, 
many emerging donors neither report to the OECD-DAC nor share 
a common set of  definitions or parameters.3 Development experts 
frequently attribute the inaccuracy of  these figures to a lack of  
transparency on the part of  emerging donors (OECD 2011b; Ciommo 
2017), but while the figures may hide the true foothold of  emerging 
donors within the development aid system, they also reveal the erosion 
of  the system itself. Most non-DAC countries neither identify themselves 
as donors nor consider their development cooperation practices as 
equivalent to official development assistance (ODA).4 On the contrary, 
most non-DAC providers identify themselves as development partners 
and classify their practices under the umbrella of  South–South 
cooperation (SSC). Against this backdrop, both the act of  alluding to 
SSC partners as ‘emerging donors’ and the measurement activities 
such as those conducted by the OECD-DAC are not so much technical 
exercises as political attempts to subsume SSC to the existing aid 
structure. Hence, rather than revealing a lack of  transparency on the 
part of  SSC partners, these attempts to frame and measure SSC under 
the established categories of  ODA are indicative of  a political dispute 
within the development aid landscape. 
This article tries to understand how the emergence of  SSC partnerships 
has impacted upon the field of  international development cooperation 
(IDC). To do so, we draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological toolbox 
and the bourgeoning Bourdieu-inspired approaches in international 
studies to assess how the rise of  new agents within a given social field 
may transform the structures of  the field itself.5 As Richard Ashley 
rightly points out, Bourdieu’s toolbox allows us to understand social 
structures like the social field of  IDC as ‘arbitrary and contingent effects 
that are imposed in history, through practice, and to the exclusion of  
other ways of  structuring collective existence’ (1989: 253). Indeed, 
this sociological approach serves to make inroads into understanding 
how emerging Southern development partners are being constituted 
as agents and authorised to play specific roles within a field structured, 
so far, around traditional donorship. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s toolbox 
allows us to address the power struggles embedded (and hidden) within 
such apparently ordinary and technical activities as categorisation 
(e.g. emerging donors, non-DAC donors) and measurement (e.g. ODA 
from non-DAC donors). 
The concept of  the social field is our entry point for assessing 
the impacts of  SSC partnerships on established international aid 
structures. A social field is composed of  a number of  agents that 
interact according to different hierarchies of  power. Hence, it is under 
constant transformation, and IDC, when understood as a social 
field, is no different (Fonseca 2014; Gomes 2013).6 In this social field, 
the agents have well-structured positions and a specific pattern of  
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relationships through which they interact with each other: official 
development assistance (ODA). The social relations among the agents 
are circumscribed by a common understanding of  the rules, which can 
be articulated either formally or informally (Bourdieu 1990). The agents 
occupy hierarchical positions defined by authorised and legitimised 
forms of  capital. Each field follows a specific logic and ascribes value to 
capital in distinct ways.7 It is the distribution of  this capital that permits 
or restricts agents’ capacity to exert power and influence on the field 
(Bourdieu 1990; Leander 2008).
We contend that in the last two decades we have witnessed growing 
competition, and sometimes even contestation, between established and 
emerging powers over their set positions. From the perspective of  IDC, 
the emergence of  SSC has decentred and transformed the practices 
adopted by traditional donors, moving the boundaries of  the field of  
IDC away from the strict lines drawn up with the concept of  ODA. 
In this article, we call the impact of  SSC practices on the prevailing 
structures in the field of  IDC the ‘BRICS effect’. 
The BRICS effect ultimately destabilises established positions and 
interaction patterns between agents, even between traditional donors 
and recipients. As this article tries to demonstrate, the BRICS effect 
comprises at least three dimensions: (1) the articulation of  new positions 
beyond the donor/recipient dyad; (2) the induction of  new modes of  
development cooperation; and (3) the transformation of  the institutional 
architecture and governance mechanisms in the field of  IDC. The 
remainder of  this article comprises four sections. Section 2 presents a 
historical redescription of  the field of  IDC and the emergence of  SSC 
in the light of  Bourdieu’s concepts. This is necessary to set the stage for 
the analysis we conduct in Section 3, in which we present the BRICS 
effect as an analytical tool and unpack the impacts of  the rise of  SSC 
upon the field of  IDC. Finally, in Section 4 we seek to advance some 
preliminary conclusions, suggesting that the BRICS effect has eroded 
the established boundaries of  the field of  IDC, scrambling long-held 
positions and mixing development cooperation with a growing variety 
of  development flows.
2 The field of international development cooperation and the rise of 
South–South cooperation 
Even though foreign assistance activities date long before, it was only 
in the aftermath of  the Second World War and the Bretton Woods 
Conference that a framework for international aid started to be 
drawn up. The emergence of  development aid as a set of  practices 
was conditioned by the bipolar core of  the international system and 
by the national liberation movements at its periphery. Under these 
circumstances, development aid was underpinned by modernisation 
theories (Rostow 1960; Finnemore 1997; Rist 2008; Pieterse 2010) 
and became an important foreign policy tool for expanding the areas 
of  influence of  the major world powers (Antonini and Hirst 2009; 
Mawdsley 2012; Gu, Shankland and Chennoy 2016). Notwithstanding 
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their role in advancing Western interests in general and the US liberal 
agenda in particular (Ruggie 1982), modernisation theories also 
contributed to the consolidation of  spatial–temporal dynamics which 
ultimately enabled agency within the field of  IDC (Kapoor 2008). 
The dichotomies of  centre versus periphery and developed versus 
underdeveloped unfolded into the positions and roles of  donor versus 
recipient within the field of  IDC. Modernisation theories reinforced 
an authoritative position from which former Western imperial powers 
could keep a quasi-tutelary position with their former colonies 
(Grovogui 2001; Kothari 2005). This so-called scientific body of  
knowledge supported a practical belief, a ‘set of  instituted dogmas and 
doctrines’ (Bourdieu 1990: 68), enabling a specific set of  practices, later 
called official development assistance. ODA was then defined as
government aid designed to promote the economic development 
and welfare of  developing countries. Loans and credits for military 
purposes are excluded. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor 
to recipient, or channelled through a multilateral development 
agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Aid includes 
grants, ‘soft’ loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of  
the total) and the provision of  technical assistance. The OECD 
maintains a list of  developing countries and territories; only aid to 
these countries counts as ODA (OECD 2015).
The establishment of  ODA set the boundaries of  the field of  IDC, 
distinguishing its specific practices from other economic flows, such 
as trade or investments. Furthermore, the concept of  ODA fixed the 
hierarchical positions of  donor and recipient within the same field. A 
‘stage of  development’ became a vantage point from which donors 
could assert what policies and development paths were right for the ‘less 
developed’ recipient countries. The donorship credo embraced a notion 
of  responsibility in which ‘advanced’ or ‘industrialised’ economies 
became responsible for international development and for promoting 
‘economic development and welfare of  developing countries’. Bourdieu 
has called this kind of  practical belief  ‘doxa’. Doxa ultimately enables 
agency, generates classificatory schemas, structures positions, and 
guides practices, which become naturalised over time (Bigo 2011). The 
donorship doxa was gradually taken for granted and ODA became 
its main doxic practice.8 Moreover, the donorship doxa transformed a 
contingent and arbitrary choice into a necessary requirement, thereby 
excluding other policy options which did not follow the generally 
accepted credo. Considering that objective relations structure the social 
field and the positions occupied by agents, it is possible to argue that the 
field of  IDC was consolidated when this system of  oppositions between 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ gained force (Mawdsley 2012).
Doxa refers to the specific experience of  the moment when objective 
order and subjective organisational principles are in a quasi-perfect 
correspondence, making the natural world and the social world 
seem self-evident. It represents an absolute recognition of  legitimacy, 
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without, however, any recognition of  arbitrariness, and generates a 
spontaneous and widely held idea of  what is taken for granted. In this 
logic, unspoken knowledge is what constitutes social reality, meaning 
the fundamental structures of  a social field which themselves exercise a 
sort of  structural power over the practices within the field. The field of  
IDC is therefore organised around the donorship doxa, which establishes 
specific positions, responsibilities, and roles for developed and 
developing countries as either donors or recipients. ODA has become 
the key practice within the field, bringing together donors and recipients 
around the development credo. Through the strategic mobilisation of  
the forms of  capital at stake, the agents engage in a constant battle for 
the doxa of  a specific field (Guzzini 2000; Bourdieu 1977; Berling 2012). 
The institutional structure of  the field of  IDC has also followed the 
donorship doxa. Indeed, since the 1960s the frontiers and practices of  
the field have been defined by a small group of  key donors, members 
of  the DAC. The DAC was built from an earlier institution, the 
Development Assistance Group (DAG), when the OECD was created. 
DAG was a consultation forum established in early 1960 among the 
main donors under the leadership of  the USA during the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower administration. DAC replaced DAG in September 1961 
with the main goal of  defining and monitoring global patterns of  
international development in key areas. 
Donation within the framework of  ODA, performed along the 
North–South axis, has become the normal and expected behaviour 
of  a developed country within the field of  IDC. Nevertheless, the 
consolidation of  this field is itself  the result of  a doxic battle. Indeed, 
as seen above, while donorship might be considered a by-product of  
the Cold War and a fixture at the heart of  the international system, it 
was also a response for the national liberation movements that were 
mushrooming at the periphery. These movements not only defied 
colonial rule but also challenged the structural inequalities which 
underpinned donorship practices.9 At the periphery, Southern countries 
articulated a new narrative around the concepts of  individual and 
collective self-reliance, emphasising autonomy or self-determination 
and non-intervention as key dimensions of  development cooperation. 
This SSC narrative was articulated both as a political tool to reinforce 
national liberation movements and as an alternative to the emerging 
donorship doxa. Although the burgeoning field of  IDC was structured 
around this doxa, it was challenged from inside by Southern countries 
keen to assert two new modes of  development cooperation: Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries and Economic Cooperation 
among Developing Countries, both under the umbrella of  SSC, as 
discussed below. Furthermore, while the donorship doxa articulated 
Southern countries’ positions as recipients, the SSC narrative was a way 
for them to renegotiate their positions in the field of  IDC, setting the 
limits of  the donorship doxa while calling for more horizontal patterns 
of  relationship. 
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Keen to enhance their capital and maximise their interests (whether 
symbolic or material) in the international arena, countries from the global 
South began to articulate their own strategies and initiatives, envisioning 
more autonomous avenues towards development: the Non-Alignment 
Movement, the launch of  the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the inception of  the G77 and the Declaration on 
the Establishment of  a New International Economic Order (Mawdsley 
2012; Esteves and Assunção 2014; Toye 2014). The tensions between 
developed and developing countries gave rise to the North–South 
debate, through which the global South aimed to expand its influence 
on the rules of  the international order (Hurrel and Woods 1999; Woods 
1999). Under the umbrella of  UNDP, the Buenos Aires Action Plan 
(1978) focused on the promotion and implementation of  technical 
cooperation among developing countries, forming the first framework 
in which the term ‘horizontal cooperation’ was used, as opposed to 
the vertical notion of  cooperation that traditionally predominated in 
North–South cooperation (UN 1978; UNDP 1994; Mawdsley 2012; 
Gu 2017). While the Buenos Aires Action Plan consolidated Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries as one form of  SSC, the 
G77 recognised Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries in 
1981 at the Caracas Programme of  Action on Economic Cooperation 
among Developing Countries as another legitimate practice for fostering 
development among Southern countries (UN 1978; G77 1981). Even 
if  SSC partners lacked the material capacities to implement these 
programmes in any significant way, the establishment of  these modes 
of  cooperation became a landmark in the field of  IDC, stressing the 
differences between hierarchical donorship practices and the supposedly 
horizontal forms of  SSC.
The 2000s witnessed a weakening of  the imposition of  conditionalities. 
The demise of  the Washington Consensus accompanied the rise of  
new powers, such as China and India. In this context, policies favouring 
structural reforms lost ground. Moreover, even while recognising that 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth was an important component 
of  development policies, new agents in the field were keen to stress the 
need to expand the development agenda (Stiglitz 2003). Dissatisfied 
with many of  the results of  ODA, middle-income countries kept up 
the pressure for increased participation and involvement for Southern 
countries in the field of  IDC. 
The Paris Declaration may be seen as an attempt to rebuild the 
field’s boundaries in a context of  increasing contestation and 
declining legitimacy of  donors’ practices (Esteves and Assunção 
2014). Indeed, the final document of  the second High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness, which took place within the scope of  the 
OECD, introduced the principles of  harmonisation, alignment, and 
coordination as essential for the effectiveness of  international aid. The 
declaration stressed the principle of  ownership, highlighting the ways 
donors and recipient countries relate to each other (OECD 2008).
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 3 July 2018: ‘Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation’ 129–144 | 135
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Even with greater emphasis on the principle of  ownership, the donorship 
doxa was not able to redress structural asymmetries and the power games 
played among donors and recipients. For many developing countries, 
donors’ practices were still seen as ways to influence or impose a 
predetermined agenda on recipient countries or even smaller donors 
(Eyben 2010). In this context, SSC was put forward as an alternative way 
to foster development – a set of  practices free from conditionalities and 
based upon horizontal and mutually beneficial results.
Despite the growing relevance of  SSC, it was only in 2008, at the High 
Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (Accra HLF), that 
these practices were recognised as a constitutive and legitimate part 
of  the field of  IDC. The Accra Agenda for Action recommended that 
developing countries should strengthen their capacity to conduct and 
manage development through strong institutions and local expertise, 
counting not only on traditional cooperation, but also on SSC, 
which was recognised as ‘a valuable complement to North–South 
co-operation’ (OECD 2008: 18).
3 The BRICS effect
During the 2000s, rising powers started to play an increasingly 
important role within the field of  IDC. Their main impact on the 
field was the recognition of  SSC as a legitimate set of  practices. 
While the Accra HLF mentioned SSC for the first time, the Nairobi 
outcome document of  the High-level UN Conference on South–South 
Cooperation re-established the principles of  SSC in line with the 
concepts set forth in the Paris Declaration. If, as discussed above, the 
Paris Declaration can be seen as a response to the eroding legitimacy 
of  donor practices (particularly conditionalities) and to the rise of  new 
donors, the Accra HLF and the Nairobi outcome document constitute 
an attempt to introduce SSC partnerships into the donorship doxa. From 
Accra and Nairobi on, the effects of  the rise of  SSC within the field of  
IDC became more acute. 
We call these movements of  competition and differentiation within 
the field of  IDC the BRICS effect.10 This analytical tool allows us to 
understand the multidimensional impacts generated by the rise of  
SSC in the field and the interplay between two distinct but articulated 
dynamics: competition and differentiation. For Bourdieu, competition 
struggles are not designed to transform the principles, but to modify 
the positions of  the agents in the field. Struggles for differentiation, 
on the other hand, are aimed at transforming the current legitimate 
definition of  reality in a given field, subverting the established order 
(Bourdieu 1990). By emphasising an alternative set of  principles, SSC 
partnerships do not compete to occupy established positions; indeed, 
they generate an original narrative in which different positions are 
articulated. Meanwhile, the attempts by traditional donors to bring SSC 
into the established structure of  the field indicate a struggle to establish 
a competitive environment, where traditional donors and agents of  
SSC play under the same rules. In any case, the interplay between 
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competition and differentiation decentres the entire field, challenging 
the donorship doxa, displacing the monopolistic position of  traditional 
donors at its core and multiplying the practices considered legitimate by 
its agents. Hence, the BRICS effect is a multidimensional phenomenon, 
comprising: (1) the articulation of  new positions beyond the donor 
vs recipient dyad; (2) the induction of  new modes of  development 
cooperation; and (3) the transformation of  the institutional architecture 
and governance mechanisms in the field of  IDC.
The creation of  the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation (GPEDC) is the most important outcome of  the rising 
powers’ foothold in the field of  IDC. It was established at the fourth 
HLF on Aid Effectiveness, held in 2011 in Busan, South Korea (OECD 
2011a). Reinforcing the importance of  SSC agents, the meeting 
addressed the need to enlarge the participation of  the various actors and 
practices in the field of  IDC, highlighting at the same time the principle 
of  ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. The main priority of  the 
GPEDC was the inclusion and representativeness of  emergent actors. 
The Busan Forum may be seen as the ‘beginning of  the end’ of  a 
development governance controlled by the West (Mawdsley 2012).
Nevertheless, it is necessary to bear in mind that despite claiming 
common principles for a new model of  international cooperation – 
such as non-interference in internal matters, no conditionalities, and a 
demand-driven approach – SSC is not a homogeneous set of  practices. 
As early as 2006, Richard Manning, former president of  OECD-DAC, 
presented an effort to map out the diversity among the agents of  
SSC. During a lecture at the UK Overseas Development Institute, he 
presented four categories of  emerging donors: (1) OECD members 
that are not part of  DAC, such as Mexico; (2) new EU members, who 
are not part of  the OECD; (3) Middle Eastern countries which are 
members of  the Organization of  the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC); and (4) emerging donors that are not members of  OECD, such 
as Brazil, China, and India (Manning 2006).
New EU members are not opposed to the current international aid 
system, and are looking forward to joining it, not reforming it. Arab 
donors have their own model, which does not correspond to but also 
does not cast into question the practices of  OECD-DAC. Hence, the 
tensions over the boundaries of  the field of  IDC and its doxa are caused 
by the struggle of  those disputing the DAC model: the fourth group 
demarcated by Richard Manning.
These countries position themselves as providers of  a different 
model of  development assistance, a model based on more equal 
partnerships that encompass not only technical and financial 
assistance, but also strengthened trade and investment, and on the 
sharing of  knowledge and experiences that are closer to, and more 
relevant for, the low-income countries that they provide assistance to 
(de Renzio and Seifert 2014: 1865).
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The cleavage between the OECD-based GPEDC and the United 
Nations Development Cooperation Forum is indicative of  a process of  
differentiation within the field of  IDC. New development cooperation 
providers from outside the OECD which do not identify themselves 
with the donor position tend to question the legitimacy of  the 
Global Partnership. This group of  new providers has put pressure 
on the frontiers of  the field while establishing new flows of  expertise, 
goods, and investments as legitimate practices. Northern donors 
are no longer alone, and ODA is no longer the only legitimate form 
of  development assistance. While emerging powers have exerted 
external pressure to establish their positions and consolidate their 
practices, traditional donors have seen their monopolistic positions 
challenged and the borders of  the field disputed. This has led to an 
effort advanced by the OECD-DAC to attract the new agents, SSC 
practitioners, to its own umbrella of  common practices, specifically 
those involving quantification, monitoring, evaluation, and the Aid 
Effectiveness agenda.
On the one hand, OECD-DAC has established mechanisms such as the 
China-DAC study group in a bid to share its own practices with new 
agents. On the other, traditional donors such as the UK and Germany 
have modified their own strategies towards emerging countries, 
introducing new triangular cooperation programmes. It is possible to 
regard both of  these strategies as forms of  advocacy designed to align 
the new practices and modalities with the Aid Effectiveness agenda 
and to co-opt Southern agents to adjust their actions to the traditional 
practices from the field of  IDC. This situation would seem to confirm 
the theoretical assumption that new agents should adapt to existing 
norms within the field. 
These attempts to co-opt emerging countries into traditional practices 
can be observed in various fields, such as the climate change agenda. 
The failure of  the Kyoto Protocol is allegedly due to the unwillingness 
of  emerging countries to shoulder their burden of  responsibility for 
mitigation or adaptation. The final document from COP 21, the 
Paris Agreement, itself  builds on a bottom-up methodology, allowing 
countries to join efforts to address climate change, spreading the burden 
of  mitigation and adaptation beyond just industrialised countries. 
Another example from the development agenda is the construction of  
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), based on the principle of  
universality. Oddly, UN Resolution A/RES/70/1, which outlines the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, reaffirms the principle of  
common but differentiated responsibilities. Nevertheless, departing from 
the principle of  universality, the SDGs set international goals to be met 
by all countries, not only from the developing world. This suggests that 
‘we are all developing countries now’ (Esteves 2017) and that developed 
and developing countries must share responsibility for climate change 
and development. 
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While there seems to be a trend for the agents of  SSC to adapt to 
the established doxa of  the field of  IDC, the actual practices and 
doxa of  the field are themselves in flux. The notion of  differentiation 
developed by Bourdieu thus appears to be the second effect brought 
by the increasingly strengthened agency of  the BRICS in the field. 
Different agents are starting to develop their own patterns to deal with 
international development, eroding the entire field.
The concept of  ODA put agents in the position of  donors or recipients, 
where donors had responsibilities towards recipient countries and 
international development, demarcating the legitimised practices of  
the field. In October 1970, the UN called for countries to allocate 
0.7 per cent of  their gross national income (GNI) to ODA. However, 
very few countries have actually reached this goal. According to 2017 
data, Norway, Luxemburg, Sweden, Denmark, and the UK are the 
only countries allocating 0.7 per cent or more of  their GNI to ODA. 
Moreover, the DAC members’ net ODA represented 0.31 per cent of  
their total GNI (OECD n.d.), one of  the highest levels since 2005.
Nevertheless, this concept has been transformed over time and has 
lost ground in recent years. There has been an attempt to stretch the 
concept of  ODA, which has also come to be understood as a flow that 
allows donors to invest in public–private partnerships, for instance, in 
order to lessen the risks of  private investment in developing countries. 
Also, in-donor expenditure on refugees beyond the one-year term 
normally imposed has been included in calculations of  ODA (Esteves 
2017). Related to the dwindling importance of  ODA, the struggle 
by emerging countries for differentiation can be observed in the 
formulation of  a new statistical measurement framework, the Total 
Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD). TOSSD is 
based on the notion of  measuring all development flows contributing 
to sustainable development, which include private investments and 
non-concessional loans, making ODA just one of  many other flows 
contributing to the achievement of  the SDGs (Besharati 2017). 
Surprisingly, the TOSSD proposals include the principle of  mutual 
benefits, which is one of  the SSC principles defined in the 2009 Nairobi 
Declaration, and which has been highly criticised by many traditional 
donors as a way of  doing business under a rhetoric of  fostering 
development. This indicates a remarkable transformation in the 
practices and doxa of  the field, as traditional donors are having to adapt 
to new modes of  behaviour put forward by emerging countries and SSC 
agreements, and not the other way around. 
4 Concluding remarks: is the field of IDC in decline? 
After decades of  prominent discourse about development, there is no 
more place for innocence (Ribeiro 2007: 275).
Particularly since the end of  the 1990s, the field of  IDC has become a 
true battlefield (Esteves and Assunção 2014) in which the Western-centric 
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discourse on international development, grounded strongly in a belief  
in linear progress, has been questioned and defied. The purposes 
and practices considered legitimate by the ODA framework since 
its demarcation by the OECD-DAC are no longer seen as being as 
representative and credible as they were when it was first defined.
At the beginning of  the 2000s, development agents had to deal with 
an increasingly contested field. Both the donor positions and the 
practices of  donorship were disputed. In addition, the fundamental 
goals of  development policies and the ways to achieve them became 
problematic… This doxic battle had a germane effect on the field, 
since it drew attention to its borders, problematising what would be 
considered legitimate practices within the international development 
field (Esteves and Assunção 2014: 1781).
Traditional donors now need to accommodate the major new forces 
operating in the field of  IDC. If  there ever was a clear division 
between developed and underdeveloped, or donor and recipient, which 
determined the zones of  dominance in the field, now this distinction is 
significantly blurred. Moreover, new agents such as transnational social 
movements and the private sector have been incorporated into the field. 
Interestingly, these transformations in the configuration of  the capital 
and relative positions in the field have not only been seen between 
traditional and emerging donors.
At the same time as the borders and doxa of  the field of  IDC have been 
challenged, the legitimacy of  the agency of  Southern actors has also 
been contested. Domestically, many of  these countries still face struggles 
against poverty and inequality, making it hard for them to justify their 
new international role to their own people. Internationally, although 
they have devised joint strategies that have put pressure on the current 
order, these agents do not form a homogeneous or cohesive group.
Countries such as Mexico or South Korea, despite positioning 
themselves as agents of  SSC, have joined the OECD and adopted 
its principles. This group are in a competitive struggle to increase 
their capital, but are not yet in a position to contest the status quo. 
Meanwhile, countries such as Brazil and India have repeatedly stood 
up against the traditional principles of  cooperation. In a bid for 
differentiation, they are keen to challenge the value of  the prevailing 
forms of  capital, practices, and borders in the field of  IDC.11
Analyses focusing on struggles in the field of  IDC indicate that the 
consolidation of  SSC has brought to the fore considerable tension over 
the frontiers of  and practices in the field. As the analysis of  the BRICS 
effect has revealed, these tensions are manifested at the same time 
in terms of  positions, practices, and institutional arrangements. The 
historical redescription shows that the practical logics, the configuration 
of  capital relevant to the field, and the relative positions occupied 
by agents have been in constant transformation since the first time 
140 | Gomes and Esteves The BRICS Effect: South–South Cooperation in the Social Field of International Development Cooperation
Vol. 49 No. 3 July 2018: ‘Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation’
the boundaries of  the doxa in the field of  IDC were set. Considering 
Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) indication that doxa is a quasi‑perfect 
correspondence between the objective order and the subjective 
organisational principles of  a social field, and bearing in mind that the 
field of  IDC has been marked by a trajectory of  constant tussles over 
its guiding principles, it is worth questioning whether or not the agents 
within the field will be able to keep its borders any wider than the doxa 
of  donorship. 
The field of  IDC was consolidated under the dichotomy of  developed 
versus developing countries, positioning agents as either donors or 
recipient countries. The positions the countries occupy in the field and 
the amount and type of  capital they possess also inform the received 
assumptions about the practices in the field. This is what gives agents 
the authority to act and lay down the rules of  the field for some but not 
for others. 
The presence of  SSC agents that do not follow traditional practices has 
put some strain on the doxa and stretched the boundaries of  the field. 
The demand for an alternative, such as the creation of  new multilateral 
banks, indicates that the field has become decentred. In 2016, global 
ODA was worth a total of  US$142.6bn, its highest level since the turn 
of  the twenty-first century (OECD 2017a). Nevertheless, if  the SDGs 
are to be reached, cooperation must rise from billions to trillions, but 
this can only be done if  private investments are brought into play. 
Hence, contrary to what might have been expected – that new agents 
would adapt to the existing framework as they jockeyed for positions 
in the field – what is actually happening is that traditional donors are 
adapting to the ways of  Southern agents and the new approaches they 
have introduced. 
Notes
*  This article was produced as part of  the project ‘Brazil, the BRICS 
and International Cooperation for Development’ funded by the Rio 
de Janeiro state funding agency, FAPERJ (CNE E-26/201.386/2014), 
with additional support from the Brazilian postgraduate education 
and research agency, CNPq. Previous versions were presented at the 
Development Studies Association 2016 Annual Conference and at an 
IDS Members’ Seminar in 2017.
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Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio), Brazil, and a researcher at the BRICS Policy 
Center, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
2 Paulo Esteves is an Associate Professor at the Institute of  
International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of  Rio de 
Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio), Brazil, Director of  the BRICS Policy 
Center, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Fellow at the Institute for 
Advanced Sustainability Studies, Potsdam, Germany.
3 For a comprehensive review of  existing definitions and methods, see 
Silva et al. (2016).
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4 Given the differences between DAC and non-DAC countries, 
the latter are currently trying to develop their own standards for 
measuring development cooperation. See Corrêa (2017).
5 On the value added by Bourdieu-inspired approaches in international 
studies, see Berling (2012), Leander (2008), and Guzzini (2006).
6 The social field is a sphere of  action, a locus of  social phenomena, 
a structured and abstract space of  social positions, a space in 
which agents occupy distinct positions in relation to one another. 
It is organised around structuring axes that constitute the space of  
related defined positions; i.e. agents’ social positions are defined in 
accordance with their relations (Bourdieu 1990). The field allows 
the social world to be divided into sub-systems, which are to some 
extent autonomous in their own logical practices, the result of  a 
historical process of  autonomisation. To analyse situations happening 
in the field it is necessary to first analyse the field itself. Nevertheless, 
autonomy should not be seen as a synonym of  independence or 
an a priori fact. It is first and foremost a methodological principle 
grounded in the assumption that it is necessary to empirically define 
an object of  study. The field always exists in a context involving other 
fields and its logic will be continually influenced by other fields’ logics 
(Criado 2008; Leander 2008).
7 Each field ascribes different values to different kinds of  capital, 
following a specific logic defined by the field. Capital may be 
material, like private property, economic capital, or a degree, but 
it can equally be symbolic, collectively recognised and authorised 
(Bourdieu 1990).
8 On doxic practices, see Guzzini (2006) and Leander (2008).
9 Dependency theory, for instance, emerged in the 1960s, and drew 
attention to the imperial exploitation of  the periphery and the 
reproduction of  structural inequalities. Despite its self-centred 
(nationalistic) perspective on accumulation, dependency theory 
agrees with economic development and capital accumulation. It was 
the alternative development thinking of  the 1970s that assimilated 
‘human flourishing’, focused on social and collective development 
(Pieterse 2010).
10 Rather than referring to the BRICS countries or BRICS as a group, 
the BRICS effect alludes to a general perception of  the end of  the 
unipolar moment and the establishment of  alternative poles of  
power, economic dynamism, and normative entrepreneurship.
11 One reflex of  this dispute is the aforementioned engagement in 
the Global Partnership. While Southern countries that are OECD 
members defend participation in the GPEDC, agents such as Brazil 
identify the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNDCF) 
as the legitimate forum, as it is under the UN system (cf. Esteves and 
Assunção 2014).
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Abstract The establishment of the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation (GPEDC) created the unique opportunity to 
bring together and explore synergies between South–South cooperation 
(SSC) and traditional aid, or North–South cooperation. However, 
the GPEDC lacks support from both sides due to a lack of trust and 
misconceptions among partner countries. This article discusses the 
challenges of operationalising the GPEDC as a truly global and inclusive 
partnership. This is done by analysing differences between North–South 
and South–South cooperation and the challenges of bringing them closer. 
Furthermore, the particular reasons of individual SSC providers, the rising 
powers in particular, for withholding support for the GPEDC are identified 
and looked at in the context of fundamental differences between SSC and 
OECD-DAC aid.
Keywords: Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 
rising powers, South–South cooperation, China’s development aid, 
emerging countries.
1 Introduction
The international development community has long focused on the 
complex aid paradigm concerning the North–South relationship 
since its inception. The last decade has seen many changes in this 
relationship, particularly in terms of  the rise of  the global South. 
The successful development experience of  China and other emerging 
economies, and the growing prominence of  Southern voices and 
influences at the level of  international development organisations 
and processes, make this change more significant and concrete. The 
high-level debate on aid effectiveness led by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) is a case in point. The First High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-1) was held in Rome in 2003 
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and is considered a milestone for engaging multiple stakeholders in 
international development to discuss the effectiveness of  development 
assistance. This forum and those that followed (Paris in 2005 and Accra 
in 2008) yielded important changes to the norms and guiding principles 
for delivering assistance for international development.
Yet, the emergence of  new sources of  development finance, including 
South–South cooperation (SSC), led to the recognition that this 
normative framework needed to be extended to new players and revised. 
This eventually led to a new forum for deliberating on development 
aid effectiveness that materialised in the establishment of  the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) at the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in 2011, held 
in Busan, South Korea. Despite the change in institutional structures 
(including through the involvement of  the United Nations) and an 
increase in the participation of  different stakeholders, the dynamics of  
power underpinning the global aid system, notably the dominance by 
the OECD-DAC, remains unchanged.
The first high-level meeting for the GPEDC was held on 15–16 April 
2014 in Mexico City. More than 1,500 participants from more than 
130 countries, multilateral and bilateral development agencies, as well 
as the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
participated in this event. In the opening session, UN Secretary-General, 
Ban Ki-moon addressed many critical issues relating to the development 
financing framework of  the Post-2015 Agenda: namely, global 
macroeconomic policy, development aid, trade, and debt. He pointed 
out that some of  the least developed countries were either trapped in 
conflict or could not benefit from the global financial market despite the 
importance of  official development assistance (ODA). He also noted that 
the traditional donor–recipient relationship was changing and that the 
ever-increasing role of  SSC offered new prospects for global development.
The president of  Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, also expressed his wish 
to establish a new international development framework that was 
more inclusive, sustainable, and that would yield effective cooperation. 
Additionally, participants discussed progress made on the commitments 
established at the HLF-4 in Busan, which had focused on domestic 
financial resources, the effectiveness of  SSC, middle-income country 
(MIC) development, and the role of  the private sector in global 
development (Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 2014). The forum finally 
released the document entitled Building Towards an Inclusive Post-2015 
Development Agenda and announced 38 follow-up measures that were 
agreed on and committed to by different countries, international 
organisations, NGOs, and thinktanks during the forum (GPEDC 2014).
There has been widespread debate on the significance of  this new 
partnership within the development community, as the outcome from 
the HLF-4 was criticised for being a much weaker and watered-down 
agreement than those in the past. This was because developing a 
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framework that would accommodate the diversity of  stakeholders’ 
needs required many compromises. Subsequently, it also left many loose 
ends (Besharati 2013). As such, it was expected that the Mexico City 
high-level meeting would begin a new era. However, although most of  
the major international development stakeholders attended the event, 
the initiative is still mainly coming from Western donors and this creates 
the fear of  the emerging powers that Western donors want to attract 
other development donors to continue an agenda that has been failing.
At the same time, the lack of  meaningful participation from China 
and India, as well as the suspicious attitude towards the partnership 
by Brazil and South Africa, strongly questions the legitimacy of  the 
new initiative. It can even be argued that the hope of  creating a new 
era of  equal cooperation between the traditional and newly emerging 
development players via this new partnership did not yield the 
expected results. As a result of  this, the transformation of  this existing 
international development cooperation structure remains unrealised. 
Although this new partnership signalled a paradigm shift from ‘aid 
effectiveness’ to ‘development effectiveness’, the wide range of  participation 
might fragment development cooperation plans, or even widen the gap.
Creating this collective forum outside the UN Development Forum 
might affect the legitimacy and authority of  the UN in discussing 
global development. However, it could be understood by this that 
the international development architecture has changed, and the 
influence of  the developed group has decreased. The new partnership 
has responded to this change and the new structure includes a wide 
range of  stakeholders from NGOs, thinktanks, the private sector, 
and representatives that are more legitimate than those comprising 
the 24 OECD-DAC membership (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness 2011).
This more optimistic proposition asserts that the new partnership is a 
good opportunity to develop a more inclusive, sustainable, and multiple 
stakeholder participation-based framework that shifts from the old ‘Aid 
Effectiveness’ agenda to the new ‘Development Effectiveness’ agenda, 
which was narrow, but nevertheless provided a space not only for China, 
but also for other developing countries to seek their own development 
model independently.
In fact, the emergence of  the GPEDC reflects the diversification of  
global power. On the one hand, historically, the domination of  Western 
power in development cooperation has been challenged by its decreasing 
financial supply capacity, and a lack of  effective progress in developing 
countries. On the other hand, the rise of  emerging nations with their 
financial capacity and successful development experiences, especially the 
large-scale poverty reduction and transformation that has taken place in 
China, has significantly influenced the global development cooperation 
system (Gu et al. 2014; Gu, Shankland and Chenoy 2016).
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Therefore, it is now the time to have a more inclusive global 
development cooperation structure, as an informal platform on which 
to exchange development cooperation experiences and lessons, that 
can support the global collective action taken by the UN Development 
Forum. In this regard, active participation from emerging development 
players such as China and India in this new initiative is critical. 
This article begins with a historical review of  the evolution of  the 
development partnership. Following this is an analysis of  why China 
and others were reluctant to join the GPEDC. Finally, this article 
will provide an assessment of  China’s future perspective towards 
this new partnership and provide recommendations that should 
help to build a more legitimate and inclusive global development 
cooperation partnership.
2 The historical evolution of the development cooperation partnership
The GPEDC was primarily derived from the HLF-4, held in November 
2011 in Busan. The HLF-4 concluded with an 11-page outcome 
document. This document called for the construction of  the GPEDC. 
Under the facilitation of  the OECD-DAC, all parties that attended 
the forum agreed to initiate this partnership (Fourth High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness 2011). The OECD-DAC and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) agreed to provide joint secretariat 
support (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2012). The Indonesian 
Minister of  Development Planning, Armida Alisjahbana, the Nigerian 
Minister of  Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-lweala, and the UK’s Minister 
of  Development, Justine Greening were proposed as co-chairs of  the 
steering committee that would be responsible for the meetings and 
annual events, but the composition of  both co-chairs and steering 
committee presented two major concerns.
Firstly, due to the vital future roles of  both the recipient and emerging 
countries in the international development policy arena, it was 
agreed that it was necessary for the representatives from those two 
groups to be co-chairs, and to be included on the steering committee. 
Secondly, it was agreed that along with the increasing role of  NGOs, 
particularly new development foundations and private sectors, new 
development partnerships should also include a wide range of  actors. 
Despite the argument that this proposal would not reach the expected 
goal of  improving aid effectiveness, the GPEDC presented a different 
form from previous discussions on aid effectiveness which had been 
dominated by the OECD-DAC members, and marked a milestone for 
global development cooperation governance.
Thus, the HLF-4 in Busan signified the end of  the ‘Aid Effectiveness’ 
agenda; instead, it ushered in a broad-based Development Effectiveness 
agenda that became the central theme of  a new future development 
cooperation partnership. Three years after the HLF-4, a wide range of  
stakeholders from recipient countries, traditional development partners, 
NGOs, and private sector members participated in the HLF-1. Contrary 
to the then mounting expectations, China completely declined to 
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participate, India sent its diplomat stationed in Mexico City, and Brazil’s 
delegate disagreed with the whole agenda.
Lack of  an active response from the emerging actors to the HLF-1 raised 
the question as to why the emerging development actors were reluctant to 
such an open proposal that clearly offered compromises. To understand 
this, one needs to start by reviewing how the traditional aid architecture 
has developed. The emerging actors still perceive the GPEDC as 
representing the hidden dominance of  the Western aid regime, in terms 
of  moving from the previous ‘aid’ agenda to the current ‘development’ 
agenda without a substantive change in its character.
The HLF-4 renewed the global development cooperation architecture 
by establishing a new, legitimate, multiple stakeholder partnership, 
and more importantly, shifted the aid-focused agenda to the 
development-focused agenda to better reflect the changing nature 
of  international development, especially in light of  the emerging 
development actors. In order to better engage the active role of  the 
emerging actors, the Busan outcome document agreed to the principles 
of  country ownership, transparency and accountability, and inclusive 
partnership that would involve shared goals, but ‘differentiated 
commitments on a “voluntary basis” ’ (Fourth High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness 2011). This was a big compromise made by the 
Paris Club in order to ‘buy-in’ more stakeholders, particularly China, 
India, and others. China participated in the event with a relatively 
modest-level delegation, but emphasised the need for a different role 
in SSC, and remained reluctant to join the new club (Atwood 2012). 
Here, the HLF-4 marked its third expansion wave in the international 
development cooperation system that had previously been dominated 
by the West. This expansion indeed generated a series of  impacts on the 
international development architecture.
First, the broad-based development issues that developing countries 
are interested in, replaced the issue of  aid effectiveness that the most 
developed group was interested in. Second, the Working Party on 
Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) was formally replaced by the GPEDC. 
Finally, global development cooperation institutions that had been 
predominantly influenced by the OECD-DAC changed to become a 
more inclusive partnership mechanism. However, despite these positive 
changes, the fundamental influence of  the West’s development ideology 
still exists, which to some degree explains the reluctant attitude to the 
new partnership by the new development actors. This is largely because 
that effective voice of  the developing countries and emerging actors 
could not only rely on legitimate governing mechanisms in order to 
be heard, but would also substantively depend on many other factors. 
The West’s dominant role in international development is heavily based 
on its well-articulated knowledge and knowledge production system, 
which has lasted for over 60 years. Unfortunately, other developing 
countries and emerging actors have been unable to assert a similar 
influence. International development institutions have produced a 
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strong path-dependence that may be difficult to change in the short 
term. Hence, to a large extent, the new partnership might not be able to 
change the nature of  the global development regime.
3 South–South cooperation and the OECD-DAC
In order to understand the unwillingness of  countries which are 
actively engaging and promoting SSC to join and actively work within 
the framework of  the GPEDC, it is important to highlight how the 
approach of  the SSC differs from that of  the OECD-DAC. To explore 
the complexity of  this difference, it is important to recognise both 
individual cooperation and the blockages in SSC, and the problems 
of  coordinating SSC methods with the OECD-DAC. This will be 
discussed further in later sections by looking at the engagement of  active 
SSC countries as donors in the international aid system.
3.1 Reasons for a possible clash between the DAC and SSC in the GPEDC
South–South cooperation has rapidly evolved since it was first formally 
recognised through the recommendation of  the United Nations 
General Assembly to create the United Nations Office for South–South 
Cooperation (UNOSSC) in 1974 (UN 1974). The idea behind 
establishing SSC was to oppose the OECD-DAC ODA which mostly 
focuses on monetary issues and the transfer of  public funds. Yiping 
Zhou, the director of  the Special Unit for South–South Cooperation in 
UNDP described the main unique characteristic of  SSC compared to 
ODA as the following:
South–South development assistance is manifested in public and 
private funding or partnerships as developing countries see value 
in creating beneficial environments for trade, investment and 
development in partner countries using their full range of  resources – 
both public and private. In this context, development assistance from 
one developing country to another is to be seen as a continuum from 
policy advice to technical assistance to pre‐investment activities – all 
working seamlessly together to create an enabling policy, institutional, 
technical as well as environment [sic] for sustaining economic growth. 
Thus, public and private support to developing countries is not 
compartmentalized (OECD 2010).
This clearly indicates the importance of  looking at SSC via different 
channels and the need for a global development partnership, to 
avoid dominance of  the ODA channel over the channels SSC uses to 
promote development in the global South. In addition to paying more 
attention to the different channels, it is also important to highlight the 
attributes of  SSC. Compared to the OECD-DAC approach, Southern 
development assistance is less conditional and tries to interfere less with 
a country’s internal affairs. When it comes to channels of  assistance, 
Southern aid tends to be more direct. Most South–South assistance is 
directed towards infrastructure. It is also normally more flexible and 
low-cost orientated; however, this might lead to lower standards such as 
ones that relate to environmental issues (UN ECOSOC 2008).
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It seems to be a logical conclusion that several problems may arise 
when trying to merge these two systems. Analysing the GPEDC Mexico 
Communiqué reveals both the reasoning behind it and the main 
obstacles. The Communiqué (GPEDC 2014) continues to stress the 
importance of  ODA as the main source of  international development 
assistance in the shift from aid effectiveness to development cooperation.
Key points which can be found in the Communiqué (GPEDC 2014) 
and which indicate potential conflicting issues, are the following:
 l ODA needs to remain the main source of  development assistance;
 l It is reaffirmed that South–South cooperation differs from North–
South cooperation;
 l ODA flows should stay predictable;
 l Actions for countries receiving insufficient assistance are needed;
 l It is stressed that global development cooperation will not be effective 
if  support to MICs were to be phased out. However, support to 
MICs should not be undertaken at the expense of  the support 
provided to countries with lower incomes.
Hence, it can clearly be seen that, even in this formal Communiqué, the 
MICs in particular are afraid of  decreasing flows of  ODA, and that the 
OECD-DAC would like them to shoulder more of  the financial burden 
of  ODA. The inhibition of  the emerging powers to participate in a 
formal framework, even though the GPEDC is a long way from being 
institutionalised, can only be overcome when the MICs feel the security 
of  showing international dominance as donors of  development aid 
without fearing further decreases in ODA to their countries. Moreover, 
the founding of  institutions in the global South such as the India–
Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), or the New Development Bank (NDB) shows 
the trend of  more autonomous emerging powers. Therefore, connecting 
the North and the South also requires active support and participation 
from the OECD member states in these institutions. The refusal of  
major donors such as the USA or Japan to join the AIIB illustrates the 
widening gap between traditional actors in international development 
assistance and the new players.
Another problem is that emerging countries may fear that their role 
in development assistance is put on a level with China, even when 
their volume of  development aid contributions is much smaller. As an 
extreme counter-measure, this could also lead to them teaming up with 
China and creating a block which opposes Western donors (Li and 
Wang 2014).
The main concerns of  the rising powers can be separated into the 
sub-topics of  political legitimacy, attribution of  responsibilities, 
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definition of  the agenda, and trust. In terms of  political legitimacy, 
the rising powers would prefer the UN and its structure for dealing 
with these issues, since the UN has a higher level of  legitimacy. The 
attribution of  responsibilities accounts for the fear of  a decrease in the 
responsibilities of  the OECD-DAC, and the fact that development 
cooperation should follow the common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDR) approach. Regarding definition of  the agenda, it is necessary 
for the rising powers that the GPEDC focuses more on the framework 
of  SSC, in particular the principle of  mutual economic benefit, and 
focuses less on aid as only concessional financial flows. However, the 
trust issue might be one of  the most important, since the rising powers 
fear that the West will try to maintain the current level of  power 
balance, and will try to create additional burdens, or withdraw support, 
thus blocking the rising powers from achieving their goals (Constantine, 
Shankland and Gu 2015).
The draft outcome of  the Second High Level Meeting of  the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) in 
December 2016 in Nairobi shows how some of  these problems were 
addressed. Key issues and solutions to be agreed on were outlined in 
connection to the problems between the OECD-DAC, SSC, MICs, 
and the rising powers. This differs to the 2014 Communiqué and is 
more positive regarding the role of  MICs in relation to SSC. The key 
issues relevant for SSC and MICs in the draft outcome of  the Nairobi 
meeting in 2016 are the following which should be seen in contrast to 
the Communiqué of  2014:
 l The development of  graduation policies for MICs which are 
sequenced, phased, and gradual, and represent in the best way the 
opportunities and challenges of  MICs;
 l The recommendation that MICs should start sharing their 
experience with low-income countries (LICs);
 l The recommendation that development cooperation should 
address the transition challenges faced by countries joining the 
middle-income category;
 l The recommendation that methodologies need to be devised to 
better account for the complex and diverse realities of  MICs;
 l It is noted that South–South cooperation is a complement to, and not 
a substitute for, North–South cooperation but it should be continued 
to increase accountability and transparency;
 l The impact of  SSC should be assessed with a view to improving, as 
appropriate, its quality in a results-orientated manner;
 l SSC should disseminate results, share lessons and good practices, and 
replicate initiatives (GPEDC 2016).
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Compared to the 2014 Communiqué, the expected outcome for the 
Second High Level Meeting seems to address more comprehensively 
the concerns of  middle-income countries, and the clause that SSC is 
a complement and not a substitute to North–South cooperation is a 
strong statement towards the MICs and the rising powers. It is hoped 
that more accommodation between the two sides in this issue will lead 
towards improved levels of  cooperation, especially in the case of  China 
and India.
4 China’s perspective on the GPEDC
Although the GPEDC has much higher legitimacy than any other 
previous form of  development cooperation partnership initiated by 
the OECD-DAC in terms of  representation, the follow-up Mexico 
City Forum was delayed for two and a half  years. Funding for joint 
secretariat support had not been secured until the Mexico City Forum. 
It was clear that even within the traditional donors’ group, there was 
still a lack of  confidence that the new partnership would lead to the 
expected results. It can even be argued that similar to the HLF-4, the 
organisers neglected the differences among the different parties just in 
order to obtain signatures. It can be seen that, in reality, the partnership 
would remain on paper.
First, it had taken hard work and late-night negotiations to get China, 
India, and Brazil to agree to sign the HLF-4 outcome document. 
However, China completely declined to attend the following event in 
Mexico City. Despite the offer made to either compromise on shifting 
the agenda from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness, or on 
the composition of  the governance structure of  the new partnership, 
the core values of  the partnership remained aid-based with mutual 
accountability. The new partnership can therefore be seen as a 
DAC-driven process, since the main initiative and methodology comes 
from the DAC. The big emerging economies realised that the openness 
of  this new partnership initiated by the DAC was more so because of  
the growing role of  emerging actors in the global economy, and the 
increasing difficulties that traditional donors faced in providing financial 
support to international development. They were afraid of  being 
brought in to cover the bill that traditional donors have amassed over 
decades of  failed development practices.
Despite having a unified group with very different policy approaches, 
they all shared a disapproval for the mainstream aid-based framework 
which they believed still reflected a Northern paradigm of  development, 
and as such, they never wanted to subscribe to this. Although critiques 
are that China’s growing role in international development largely 
undermines the good governance agenda that the traditional donors 
have generally dismissed as alternative development experiences, other 
emerging actors endorsed this. And so, the emerging economies took 
this new partnership as another type of  skilful methodology that the 
West executed in order to reinforce the existing development regime. 
From the Chinese perspective, this new partnership, reinforced by the 
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HLF-4, signalled the further expansion of  the Western-dominated 
international development discourse, as the West has been 
using a similar approach through its institutional structures and 
well-elaborated framework to safely ‘buy-in’ others in order to sustain its 
fundamental agenda.
Second, the emerging economies perceived the new partnership as the 
strategy to acquire more financial resources to share so-called ‘common 
goals’. Under the financial demand scenario, those most developing 
countries which needed financial inflows would rationally follow the 
call for the participation of  emerging actors because aid is less costly 
than other forms of  financial flow. In this regard, the new partnership 
has sufficient support from many developing countries, which creates 
political pressure on emerging actors, despite emerging economies’ 
insistence that they engage with other developing countries only if  
there is mutual benefit through SSC, rather than from donor–recipient 
aid flow. Therefore, emerging actors were fearful because once they 
joined the new partnership, their approach to mainly engage in 
learning and exchange, solidarity, and mutually beneficial economic 
cooperation would be undermined by the donor–recipient model. 
Broadly speaking, politically, if  they did not fulfil the ‘commitment’ 
which is even differentiated by ‘common goals’, then the leading 
position of  China and India within the developing group may have 
been challenged. Subsequently, the emerging economies were afraid 
of  being hijacked politically if  they took part in this new partnership. 
Instead, the emerging actors identified other options such as the Global 
Development Forum under the UN system and the G20 Development 
Group, as this new partnership did not seem to offer much value.
Third, the main concern for emerging actors particularly from China, 
is the approach of  how to promote development. China certainly 
welcomed the shift of  aid effectiveness to development effectiveness 
during the HLF-4. China also appreciated multi-stakeholder 
participation in global development policy (Gu 2015). However, both 
the Busan outcome document and the Mexico City outcome still 
maintained the belief  that developing countries need to create good 
conditions such as good governance, corruption-free institutions, gender 
equity, and other kinds of  social, political, and institutional conditions. 
China and other emerging actors do agree to these conditions to some 
extent, and could also argue that these stated conditions could be 
achieved along with development progress or as the pre-conditions.
Therefore, the question is not so much about the structure, as it is about 
the approach and framework that are deeply rooted in the Western-
based knowledge of  development. This knowledge is very much about 
the marriage between neoliberalism and neo-institutionalism, based 
on a well-established knowledge production system which constantly 
generates a set of  seemingly undeniable theories that create the field 
of  development studies and produce ‘independent development industries’ 
to justify and sustain this development business. China and other new 
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players may have difficulty in not only owning this process, but also 
sharing the cost, because under this knowledge gap, China and other 
players struggle to benefit from equal and mutual communication. 
China and other players might also insist on SSC by advocating a 
‘non-interference policy’ towards partnership, one that does not focus on 
immediate institutional reforms to provide ‘conditions’ for development. 
China and others may still feel weak in this new more open partnership 
with its wider participation, because the OECD-DAC family has strong 
mechanisms for consensus and joint action through a well-established 
donor coordination mechanism.
Fourth, both the Busan and Mexico City forums continued to be driven 
by an aid-industry-based system, which was very much engaged in 
aid management and the continuous efforts to make financial flows to 
the pre-existing aid-based system. This is an essential incentive for the 
DAC’s agenda to support this new partnership. To justify the budget 
to allocate to development cooperation in the DAC, member countries 
would be required firstly to meet the domestic political demand, as 
elaborated on during HLF-4 by Hillary Clinton regarding the USA’s 
policies in development financing. This would not necessarily create 
a conflict with the commitment that the aid budget could be effective 
for development, but would certainly limit aid resources to prioritise 
effective development. This is because very often, in an effort to 
prioritise development in most developing countries, it means that 
member countries cannot meet the political, environmental, and 
social requirements set by traditional donor countries. The mutual 
accountability regarding the conditions set by donor countries and the 
need of  recipient countries is often controversial. Although the Accra 
Action Plan called for using an in-country system, and it was also put 
forward as one of  the indicators to measure aid effectiveness, the mutual 
accountability regarding the conditions set by donor countries and the 
need of  recipient countries is often controversial. However, the key 
question was the extent to which implementation would move beyond 
the existing system to address concerns such as those of  civil society 
that, without greater inclusivity and a strong rights-based approach, the 
Plan could simply become ‘another set of  empty promises and targets’ 
(Better Aid Coordinating Group 2009: 16). 
Lastly, emerging countries seem much more likely to create their 
own platform on which they feel more open and equal. Although the 
Development Working Group has not yet addressed the development 
cooperation issues of  member countries, China has become more 
active in consulting domestically and internationally for a development 
agenda within the G20 Agenda (Gu 2017). The G20 will likely act as 
another legitimate platform for coordination or norm-setting within 
the new global development architecture. The thinktanks from India, 
China, Brazil, and South Africa initiated the Network of  Southern 
Think Tanks (NeST) during the Mexico City Forum; however, the 
NeST was seemingly unhappy to be included as part of  the follow-up 
actions outlined by the forum. The recently concluded South–South 
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Cooperation Conference in Delhi, India signalled the commitment 
from the South to move beyond the traditional SSC paradigm, and the 
beginning of  a systematic development framework and accountability 
system SSC. Along with the process of  operationalising the NDB and 
the AIIB, the emerging players will have a variety of  mechanisms to 
discuss global development issues.
5 India’s perspective on the GPEDC
To understand the perspective of  India on the GPEDC, it is important 
to see the evolution and scope of  Indian development cooperation. 
India’s development cooperation approach is mainly based around SSC, 
and some of  its main features are the principle of  mutual benefit and 
the demand-led nature of  India’s development cooperation. India tries 
to pursue real partnership through development cooperation. However, 
principles like these are not formalised and articulated in India’s policy 
sphere (Chaturvedi et al. 2014).
When compared to China and Brazil, India seems to be more of  a 
minor player in international development cooperation. Most of  the 
academic studies and international attention has been targeted on these 
two rather than on India which has followed the principles of  SSC 
since its independence in 1948, and has always provided a share to 
help fellow developing countries. Therefore, India’s increasing activity 
in development assistance and cooperation can be seen as a desire for 
global recognition. India hereby follows the approach of  Brazil and 
China and wants to be called a development partner rather than a 
donor, which is also consistent with most of  the other emerging powers. 
India’s ambition to fulfil a larger international role was also supported 
by its ability to promote the blocking of  processes in institutions such 
as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). India could do this by consolidating the 
group of  developing countries together with Brazil and South Africa. 
India actively offers its approach to share each other’s strength rather 
than only offering altruism as an alternative to the normative approach 
of  the DAC donors (Chaturvedi 2012).
Since India follows the approach to be a so-called ‘development 
partner’, it avoids engagement in a process such as the GPEDC, 
thus not ending up in a situation where a close political relation or 
partnership with the DAC or accepting its principles might imply that 
India sees itself  as a donor country. This is connected with the overall 
issue that emerging powers which are getting stronger might end up 
in the situation that traditional donor countries and their respective 
taxpayers stop seeing them as developing countries, and start reducing 
aid for them (Zimmermann and Smith 2011).
One of  the most sensitive issues for India connected to this was already 
visible during the Busan process. India, together with Brazil and 
China, made it clear that under no circumstances do they want any 
monitoring from the Northern DAC countries, since such monitoring 
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could later make them accountable in terms of  their accomplished 
aid. Even though monitoring would be a huge improvement for global 
development, it could not be implemented at all due to the heavy 
resistance of  India, China, and Brazil back then (Atwood 2012).
There are several reasons why India rejects a higher level of  
participation in international frameworks or partnerships in particular 
outside of  the UN framework. India is a country which has experienced 
high levels of  growth since it opened up its economy in the early 
1990s, and the increasing volume of  technical assistance indicates that 
it will be able to rise in the foreseeable future to becoming a major 
development partner. However, India still faces huge levels of  poverty in 
some of  its rural and even urban areas, and a reduction in international 
aid received would have dramatic consequences for the country’s 
population and food safety. However, even without further engagement 
in partnerships such as the GPEDC, India will slowly lose its status 
and reputation as a developing country and will be more measured 
in crude economic terms. For example, India was already the biggest 
source of  Greenfield Investment in Hungary in 2014 and 2015. Total 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from India just to Hungary is already 
close to US$1.5bn (HIPA 2016). The same happens in the UK where 
India became the third largest source of  FDI in 2015 (The Times of  India 
2016). With such huge numbers of  financial outflow from India, it is 
likely that the motivation of  Western donors to maintain their current 
levels of  aid might decrease.
Furthermore, Indian development assistance strongly follows the 
principles of  SSC. India does not hide that it sees a main purpose 
in development aid to be a strategic measure to establish economic 
relations and to allow its small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
to enter and penetrate foreign markets. The SSC principle that 
development assistance should have mutual benefits is clearly visible in 
the case of  India. There is also no visible interest in following the DAC 
approach which includes giving unconditional aid. As a recipient of  aid 
which mainly relied on loans, India fosters its approach of  extending 
lines of  credit. Its focus tends to be more on providing capacity-building 
measures or technical assistance than on giving out aid, and if  it gives 
out aid it is more targeted towards its neighbouring states to establish 
strong political and economic relations.
Nevertheless, it is still important to distinguish India’s case from 
China’s. India’s development cooperation is unique most of  all because 
of  six factors: ‘(1) It is sustainable and inclusive; (2) based on India’s 
development experience; (3) without conditionalities; (4) demand driven; 
(5) based on mutual gains, and (6) contributing to India’s soft power’ 
(Chaturvedi et al. 2014: 4).
Those principles are close to China’s principles, as both countries base 
their principles on the 1953 ‘Five Principles of  Peaceful Coexistence’ 
(Li et al. 2014) and the 1955 Bandung conference which can also be 
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seen as a launching point for SSC long before it was officially recognised 
by the UN. However, there are still some differences between China’s 
and India’s development principles. China and India each follow their 
own path to provide development assistance. China is addressing the 
hard infrastructure gap which can again be seen by the establishment 
of  the AIIB, while India addresses more the issue of  capacity building. 
The latter approach helped India to avoid the international focus and 
the problems for China which came with it. Nevertheless, both countries 
lack a strong bilateral and possible trilateral development strategy, and 
establishing joint projects might be a strong catalyst for regional and 
global development (Li and Zhou 2016).
If  the GPEDC wants to involve India as an active actor, the current 
framework will possibly not provide a solution. In addition to not 
monitoring its activities, India will continue to insist on not having 
binding principles. Therefore, changing the GPEDC more towards a 
knowledge platform and increasing the weight of  SSC compared to 
traditional ODA might facilitate a change in the current situation. First 
of  all, India wants to be seen as what it is: a strong, growing economy 
which, nevertheless, still struggles with poverty and is highly dependent 
on aid in some sectors. The current gridlock can only be overcome if  
Western donors can guarantee that India will be able to maintain the 
current levels of  aid it receives.
6 Brazil as a fading Southern power
Until recently, the Brazilian government was keen to affirm its Southern 
identity and separation from a space perceived as dominated by the 
hegemonic North, including the GPEDC. Over the last decade, Brazil has 
frequently been depicted as a rising power or as an emergent Southern 
influence in a changing geopolitical order. This happened in a context of  
economic prosperity in Brazil that helped to boost the country’s stance in 
foreign affairs. The construction of  the Southern identity also reflected a 
particular party-politics configuration in Brazil where the leading left-wing 
ideology of  the Workers’ Party (PT) was favourable to a counter-hegemonic 
role in foreign politics and, as part of  that, greater engagement with 
Southern nations and diversification away from traditional Northern 
partners, such as the USA and Europe. Recently, however, Brazil’s 
Southern power identity seems to be fading away for reasons to do with 
(again) domestic politics, the state of  the Brazilian economy, and the 
underwhelming performance of  the country’s SSC.
Brazil rose to prominence in international development from the mid 
to late 2000s with an active foreign policy towards the South steered by 
a charismatic president, Lula da Silva, who took an active role in the 
country’s diplomacy (Amorim 2010). Brazil’s ascendency in international 
development is illustrated by the exponential increase in resources and 
pledges for development cooperation in the late-2000s, the consolidation 
of  a place on the side of  the likes of  Russia, India, and China (that 
collectively with South Africa make up the so-called ‘BRICs’), the 
successful bids for the leadership of  international governing bodies, 
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such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations 
(FAO) and the WTO (currently headed by Brazilian nationals), and 
the internationalisation of  Brazilian businesses, with new trade and 
investment deals going hand-in-hand with SSC, particularly in Africa.
Although committed to multilateralism (Visentini and Silva 2010) and 
the ‘minilateralism’ of  fora such as the BRICS, IBSA, or the Community 
of  Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), Brazil’s Southerly-bent 
foreign policy has emphasised the country’s unique contribution to 
international development through South–South relations that comprise 
diplomacy, technical cooperation, and business (White 2010, 2013). 
Brazil’s claimed successful public policies and technological innovations 
were deemed particularly fit for other developing countries, particularly 
within the tropics where affinities were greatest (Cabral and Shankland 
2013). Also, Brazil’s SSC was more than a charitable endeavour between 
donor and recipient, but was described as a mutually beneficial affair 
between partners (Abreu 2013), much like China and India portray their 
engagements with developing countries.
Foreign policy activism waned under the presidency of  Dilma Rousseff 
and the budget for technical cooperation was first frozen and then 
slashed. The economic downturn put significant pressure on the 
government and eventually led to the president’s removal from office. In 
the meantime, Brazilian businesses abroad had been struggling with a 
less favourable environment (e.g. the fall in commodity prices) and were 
further weakened by the political crisis that eventually led to President 
Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016.
The new conservative government, led by President Michel Temer, that 
abruptly took office in 2016, announced major policy turns. Regarding 
foreign policy, the Southern identity rhetoric has been replaced with the 
reinforcement of  alliances with traditional Northern nations – such as 
the USA – and a stronger narrative on business and bilateralism (MRE 
2016). China and India are still viewed as strategic partners, although 
some have talked about ‘Braxit’, the voluntary (or altogether forced) exit 
of  Brazil from the BRICS club (Simha 2016). Even if  Brazil remains in 
the club, the counter-hegemonic soft power element will surely vanish 
on the Brazilian side. As for Africa, the new foreign ministry sees it as a 
big and expanding market that needs to be engaged with pragmatically, 
and with clear benefits for Brazil, leaving behind the compassionate 
rhetoric and diplomatic extravagances of  previous PT-led governments 
(MRE 2016). Indeed, the new minister of  agriculture, Blairo Maggi, 
noted when taking office that Brazil cannot distribute its agricultural 
technology to Africa for free (Ramos 2016).
Brazil’s commitment to multilateralism and to Southern solidarity 
(even if  the latter has been topped with a generous dose of  rhetoric), 
may be at stake and this may compromise the country’s contribution to 
sustainable global development.
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6.1 Why Brazil’s Southern identity remains important
There are at least two reasons why Brazil’s Southern identity 
remains important (Cabral 2017). One concerns geopolitics and 
counterweighting the world’s hegemons – being the USA or China 
– in international development. Brazil’s Southern assertion has been 
part and parcel of  a campaign for democratising global governance 
and the reinforcement of  multilateralism. With regard to sustainable 
global development specifically, Brazil has demonstrated considerable 
engagement with the process, leading to the ratification of  the SDGs, 
and its SDG position paper (Ministry of  External Relations 2014) 
highlights areas of  contribution to sustainable development and the role 
played by SSC in that process.
Indeed, the second reason concerns the uniqueness of  Brazil’s potential 
engagement with other developing or Southern nations through SSC. 
It is not the win–win formula that makes Brazil an exceptional partner 
– China and India have proved to be much more skilled in practising 
win–win cooperation. The uniqueness of  Brazil as an international 
development partner results from the country’s own development 
trajectory and its experiences with holistic social policies, deliberative 
democracy, and technological innovations that constitute key references 
for global development, and have indeed been emphasised in Brazil’s 
pre-Temer contribution to the formulation of  the SDGs. Many of  these 
experiences have a distinctive Southern (in the sense of  non-conformist 
and non-conventional) flavour that the current conservative government 
risks failing to acknowledge or understand.
Yet, the transfer of  Brazil’s appealing innovations into other contexts 
is not straightforward. The socio-political fabric that generated these 
innovations, such as a particular state–society dynamic, is not easily 
replicable. It should not be taken for granted that Brazil’s agrarian 
structures have a similar match in Africa and hence call for similar 
struggles. And one should not assume that the institutional machinery 
of  African governments (and indeed social checks and balances) can 
cope with the types of  technological innovations (such as those which 
have resulted from the establishment of  a massive continental-size 
research corporation) and multi-dimensional social experiments (as 
Brazil’s equally massive social protection programmes) that Brazil has 
managed to generate.
Furthermore, getting over-enthusiastic about Brazil’s uniqueness 
and success may be counterproductive. Asserting Brazil’s unique 
contribution should not be about celebrating Brazilian ways and trying 
to emulate them, but it should be about reflecting on Brazil’s domestic 
trajectories and how they were generated, and the lessons emerging 
from this. Reflecting and reflexivity are the key words, and this requires 
a considerable change in attitudes by those at the front line of  Brazilian 
official and non-official diplomacy (being state or non-state actors). 
The presumption of  South–South affinities has often been taken too 
far, particularly vis-à-vis Africa, with an over-confident reliance on the 
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Brazilian brand, that has compromised the ability to engage with the 
needs, aspirations, and perspectives of  partners in other countries.
The future of  Brazilian SSC and how it will relate to the other rising 
and Southern powers in international development is uncertain. Thus 
far, the study of  Brazilian cooperation has been confined to a particular 
historical moment of  Brazilian politics (and diplomacy) that has led to the 
categorisation of  Brazil as an unquestionable Southern power. It remains 
to be seen whether our understanding of  Brazil’s position in international 
development – with its Southern turn, its solidarity diplomacy, its SSC 
principles, and warm relationship with other emerging powers – will need 
to be revised, once, in a climate of  greater political stability, the Brazilian 
government clarifies its international development policy.
7 Conclusions and recommendations
The international aid system was born out of  the ruins of  the Second 
World War, with aid or ODA as a main operational instrument and 
channel of  influence. During the Cold War era, the system mainly used 
ODA to support allies. After the Cold War, the allocation of  ODA began 
to shift to the countries beyond the scope of  Cold War alliances, and 
became more strongly guided by poverty alleviation and development 
concerns. It was at this stage that the international aid system began 
to focus on aid effectiveness, and eventually moved to the post-aid 
framework that emerged with the establishment of  the GPEDC at the 
HLF-4. However, despite the changing form and increasing participation 
of  multiple stakeholders, the current system is the result of  continuous 
expansion of  Western-based aid at different times under different 
geopolitical contexts. The shift from an initial belief  in the modernisation 
model for development to the current marriage of  neoliberal and 
neo-institutionalist models for poverty reduction has not resulted in a 
substantive change of  the ‘conditional development approach’ that has applied 
to developing countries through the aid-based paradigm.
A central argument in relation to the international development 
assistance system has been the relationship between aid, growth, and 
development, so that aid can be properly directed and managed in areas 
such as health and basic education. The HLF-4 sought to examine 
progress in the quality of  aid with regard to the relationship between 
aid and development, which was measured by meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), particularly poverty reduction targets. 
The agenda eventually shifted to a focus on development effectiveness, 
emphasised by the GPEDC. The attempt to increase the voice of  
multiple stakeholders in international development cooperation policy 
was a bold, if  unavoidable, initiative. However, the lack of  experience 
and non-aid resources by DAC members would make it difficult for the 
GPEDC to adopt a truly new approach. Instead, aid has remained the 
main instrument driving the GPEDC agenda.
It is widely agreed that the GPEDC is a more open and legitimate 
platform for discussing international development cooperation than 
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previous ones (Li 2017). However, there is also the view that the 
DAC remains very influential in setting the procedures, instruments, 
and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the performance of  
development interventions. Disappointingly, the involvement of  key 
players like China in the definition and design of  these procedures and 
mechanisms has not been sought or encouraged.
As a result, China and other emerging players have not actively 
engaged with the GPEDC. In order for that to change, the GPEDC 
needs to demonstrate a more internationally inclusive approach and 
global legitimacy. This may require a stronger connection with the 
UN Development Financing Forum and with the G20 Development 
Working Group. Furthermore, the GPEDC also needs to gain a better 
understanding of  how diverse international players institutionally 
manage their development cooperation programmes, to ensure it gets 
the right stakeholders in order to get an effective response.
China’s remarkable development trajectory has been acknowledged by 
the international community. Furthermore, recently new cooperation 
frameworks such as triangular Africa–China–UK, Africa–China–USA, 
and Africa–China–Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation cooperation 
illustrate the convergence between China and individual traditional 
donors and their willingness to promote global development in a 
cohesive way. Despite the dominant role of  the DAC in the normative 
framework for international development, the practice of  cooperation 
has undergone significant changes. This creates a momentum for 
new influential players such as China, India, or Brazil (though the 
latter’s predisposition towards other Southern players is currently 
unclear), to play their important role in the global governance of  
international development cooperation. However, the emerging powers 
need to consider carefully how to engage effectively with upcoming 
GPEDC fora, and particularly what appropriate level of  political and 
institutional representation should be sent to these policy spaces.
Notes
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